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ABSTRACT
Midcentury American novelists variously reworked the traditional conversion narrative to
reflect a marked cultural shift in attitude towards human "nature," newly conceived as innocent
and inclined to salvation. This liberalized aesthetic of conversion takes shape through the trope
of the "organic angel," a developmental female figure whose journey from childhood innocence
to saintly womanhood merges the processes of sexual maturation and Protestant conversion.
Because she purifies self-interested desire by redirecting it towards spiritual ends, the organic
angel provides a symbolic reconciliation of the young nation's budding imperial capitalism with
its millennial expectations.
While traditional emphasis on a maternal ethos at work in sentimental fiction has
obscured the thematic and generic traction of this nonmaternal female saint, my project traces
her structural impact across a surprisingly diverse range of authors and works—Sylvester Judd's
Margaret, Maria Cummins' The Lamplighter, Hawthorne's The Marble Faun, Melville's Pierre,
Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin, and Harriet Wilson's Our Nig. At once a remarkably flexible and
legibly constraining trope, the organic angel determines the relationship between narrative form
and nationalist commitment; her relative efficacy as an agent of conversion measures authorial
confidence in a pre-Civil war era vision of a unified, prosperous, and evangelical nation.
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1. INTRODUCTION: NATURALIZED RELIGION AND LITERARY FORM

What became of the sinners? [...] What became of the angry God?
— Perry Miller, Nature's Nation
Had but the tale a warbling Teller
All the boys would come—
Orpheus’ sermon captivated,
It did not condemn.
—Emily Dickinson
Love is this world's great redeemer and reformer;
and [...] all beautiful women are her selectest emissaries.
—Herman Melville, Pierre

By 1850, over ninety percent of white American adults could read, and critics
ambivalently conceded the triumph of the novel as the defining literary genre of the century.1
The cultural rise of the novel in the United States intersected with a conspicuous decline, not in
religiosity, but in adherence to Calvinist orthodoxy. The decentralized spirituality of
Transcendentalists like Emerson and Thoreau comprised merely the esoteric, outermost ripple of
this sea-change in antebellum theology, a radical reorientation of American Protestantism toward
natural phenomena, including pre-socialized human nature, as a transparent ground of divine
expression. Transcendentalists rarely attempted to veer from nonfictional forms, 2 but the popular
version of naturalized theology widely suffused religiously-inflected activities across

1

2

See Michael Gilmore, American Romanticism, p. 4 and Nina Baym, Novels, Readers, and Reviewers, p. 44.
See Lawrence Buell, New England Literary Culture, p. 47 and Myra Jehlen, American Incarnation, p. 124.
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denominational lines, including and especially the composition of novels. This dissertation takes
as its premise an inherent tension between a thoroughgoing version of naturalized theology and
the literary form of sustained fictional prose narrative. It comprises the first systematic treatment
of the dialectic between a theology of natural innocence and the orthodox Christian narrative of
conversion, as it informs the shape of sentimental novels in the 1850s.3
Through its identification of a trope that bridges theology and literary form in 1850s
sentimental novels, this project contributes to our understanding of the evolution of the American
novel and the cross-fertilization of religion and literature in the antebellum era. I have termed
this trope the "organic angel," and because I examine its function in the works of male, female,
black, white, popular and canonical authors, my work participates in breaking down the divisions
traditionally applied to 1850s fiction and adds to our reconstruction of a cultural moment whose
concerns preoccupied novelists across class, race, and gender lines. And finally, because the
trope of the organic angel derives from a representational sacralization of the female body, its
excavation brings to light a fresh perspective on the interrelationship between constructions of
gender, materialism, and evangelicalism in midcentury America.

3

See The Cambridge Introduction to the Nineteenth-Century American Novel for a definition of the novel as "a

fictional prose narrative of substantial length" (1). By applying the term "sentimental" to the novels I examine, I
intend to suggest neither a domestic setting nor female authorship but a formal preoccupation with reconciling
human inclinations and divine will through material intermediaries. "Sentiment" in these novels serves (or purports
to serve) as a natural bridge between human and divine love, rather than as an outcome of conversion. Although I
maintain use of the term "sentimental," my formal concerns draw on the work of Susan K. Harris who objects to the
terms "sentimental," "women's, and "domestic" as applied to "the dominant novelistic sub-genre of the 1850s"
because the terms tend to confine critical discourse to treatments of content rather than rigorous formal analysis
(20).

2

Early nineteenth century America saw a mainstream shift in thinking about human nature
and, by extension, the character of Christian conversion. The Puritans had inherited by way of
Calvinism the conviction that human beings were innately depraved and so from birth
instinctively hostile to God. The state of "natural" persons within orthodox Calvinism thus
consisted of an unrelieved congenital predisposition toward sin.4 The impact of this debasing
vision of human inclinations or the human "heart" persisted well into the early 19th century,
shaping the childhood and young adult experience of many authors who would come to maturity
in the 1850s. Sylvester Judd and Harriet Beecher Stowe, for instance, two key authors in this
study, both articulated the influence of Calvinist doctrines upon their formative years in terms of
traumatic estrangement from natural affections. In an 1837 apology for his conversion to
Unitarianism, Judd lamented the orthodox catechesis that hatred for and resentment of God
comprise "the first, spontaneous, natural feelings of our hearts" (qtd. in Hall 87, author's
emphasis). Judd's positive pre-conversion resonance with the beauty of natural phenomena had
prompted him, as a youth, to reflect that "[his] own nature was cursed, and that the earth had
been cursed"; as a result, he worked to detach himself from this instinctive delight in beauty (qtd.
in Hall 17). As Herbert Ross Brown notes, "Before the impact of the romantic revolution upon
New England, natural phenomena had been commonly regarded as setting up a barrier between
God and man" (334).5
4

Jonathan Edwards used the term "natural" interchangeably with "carnal," "unsanctified," and "unconverted." All

"natural men," according to Edwards, "are held in the hand of God over the pit of hell." See "Sinners in the Hands of
an Angry God," pp. 93, 95, and "Treatise," p. 156.
5

This popular concept developed out of Edwards' strenuous reiteration of the "radical difference between nature and

grace," Reynolds, Faith, p. 3. Although Edwards argued for the goodness of creation and established a
contemplative tradition within Calvinism that celebrated divine and earthly beauty, he insisted that intuitive
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Because Calvinism posited an unmitigated unlikeness between the character of God and
that of human beings in their "natural state," the traditional conversion experience entailed an
arbitrary and comprehensive supplanting of human nature by supernatural grace. This paradigm
of conversion placed souls entirely at the mercy of an invasive divine initiative. As Stowe would
reminisce in her 1859 novel The Minister's Wooing, "the views of human existence" propounded
by Edwardsian Calvinism involved "the human race, without exception, coming into existence
'under God's wrath and curse,' with a nature so fatally disordered, that [...] men were infallibly
certain to do nothing to Divine acceptance until regenerated by the supernatural aid of God's
Spirit" (335).
Even prior to Edwards, Puritan theologian Cotton Mather had insisted that human beings
could not so much as cooperate in the process of spiritual rebirth once irresistibly catalyzed by
the Holy Spirit; the concept of involuntary participation smacked too much of mitigating the
"unbridgeable" gap between nature and divinity that only a divine procedure could close
(Mandelker 42). Sylvester Judd remarked on the impact of these abstract tenets upon his
childhood spiritual consciousness: "Religion [...] as a subject of feeling deeply interested my
heart [but] [...] It was a fundamental article of my belief, that I could not become religious until I
was made so by an extraneous and special operation" (qtd. in Hall 16). The friction occasioned
by this "extraneous and special operation" could provoke a tremendous crisis: Lyman Beecher,
Congregationalist minister and father of Harriet Beecher Stowe, preached a conversion
experience at once "violent and immediate [...] because it assumed the confrontation of two
enemies, God's grace and man's sinful nature, and the absolute conquest of the latter by the

attraction to beauty on the part of "natural" persons in no way corresponded with "divine light" and might, in fact,
signify interference by the devil. See "A Divine and Supernatural Light," p. 109-110.

4

former" (Douglas 6). With an inconceivably "other" and infinitely angry God across an
impassable gulf, salvation-seekers of Judd and Stowe's generation could only agonize and
uncertainly await for the dispossession of their "natural heart."
But already that generation's childhoods corresponded with a slow, intransigent turn
away from a conversion paradigm predicated on painful crisis. As Ann Douglas notes, "More
and more religious thinkers and activists of the generation succeeding Lyman Beecher's
sidestepped or redefined the traditional conversion experience" (134). Congregationalism, the
American denominational branch of Calvinism, lost its status as established religion across all of
New England by 1833, and the doctrinal grip of innate depravity began to inexorably loosen
(Howe 164). In 1741 Jonathan Edwards penned his reverberating discourse, "Sinners in the
Hands of an Angry God," in which he made the startling appeal, "you children that are
unconverted, don't you know that you are going down to hell, to bear the dreadful wrath of that
God that is now angry with you every day, and every night?" (104, author's emphasis). Just over
a century later, his liberal Congregationalist successor Horace Bushnell would counsel that a
child "is not to be told that he must have a new heart" (14); rather, "the child is to grow up a
Christian" ("Views" 6). The contrast between Edwards' and Bushnell's perspective on the presocialized child captures the era's shift into thinking about human nature as innately innocent and
instinctively drawn to the good and to God.
Bushnell and other liberal antebellum Protestants undercut the need for a conversion
crisis by positing a fundamental compatibility between nature, including "the natural heart," and
divine grace. The rapid fragmentation of denominational authority in the early part of the century
contributed to a widespread welcome of Continental Romantic philosophy, imported with

5

Coleridge's Aids to Reflection.6 As church authority and clerical influence lost ground and
scientific hypotheses conversely gained authority and influence in the early 19th century, the
beauty of visible nature seemed increasingly to present a more reliable ground for the encounter
between the self and the divine than did either disputed religious doctrines or unpredictable
onslaughts of the Holy Spirit.
This prospect occasioned the theological fury that erupted in Protestant circles in the mid1830s over the concept of miracles, which appeared to violate the stability of visible nature so
essential to a spirituality mediated by the biological world's predictability. By contrast, the
constant and organic invitation of so-called natural miracles of biology—that is, of natural
beauty—typified an "unconscious" resonance of all selves with Christianity in its pure form.
While up until the late 1820's the majority of Unitarians, the most liberal contemporary
Protestant sect, still "adhered to the 'Supernaturalist position' with regard to miracles," the tides
began to change at the end of the decade (Gura, "American" 99); the emergent generation of
Unitarians were willing to envision Christian conversion as an expansion, a renewal, or a
releasing of the self, but never as itself the source of a break in interiority or violation of
spontaneous impulse.
My purpose here is not to trace out the theological niceties of antebellum Protestantism
but to establish the importance of a far-reaching theological tension, encapsulated by
6

James Frederick notes that "fragmentation of sects and the attending dissension and often acrimonious debate [...]

were specially characteristic of the first half of the nineteenth century," The Darkened Sky, p. xi. In New England
Literary Culture, Lawrence Buell argues that Coleridge's range of influence from Congregationalist Horace
Bushnell to Transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson "testifies [...] to the importance of theological erosion and
European Romanticism as cultural influences that created a similar sort of literary ferment throughout New
England," p.51.

6

Unitarianism, to the structure of the sentimental novel.7 In What Hath God Wrought, historian
David Howe notes that while the "Unitarian denomination [...] never penetrated much beyond
New England and a few other outposts," their arguments "against Calvinist determinism [...]
resonated broadly with the attitudes of the growing urban middle class and the ethos of selfimprovement." These arguments "had a cumulative effect, across the nineteenth century, in
greatly diminishing the influence of Calvin's theology within American Christianity" (616-617)
and disseminating what I call "sentimental theology."
Because sentimental theology rejected Calvinism but remained Christocentric, it
occupied a middle ground between the orthodox crisis-oriented narrative of reconciliation
between God and human beings, as mediated by Christ's crucifixion, and the Transcendentalist
marginalization of this foundational Christian story in favor of an atemporal, ahistorical spiritual
unfolding. Transcendentalists—with one exception all either professing or former Unitarians
(Howe 619)—distinguished themselves from mainline Unitarianism by embracing religious
experience as a transcendent mythical whole, unaltered by supernatural intervention at a
particular historical moment.8 This distinction in large part determined the Transcendental
7

Lawrence Buell argues that "after the 1850s theological concerns dwindle almost to a vanishing point in the work

of younger authors," New England, p. 53. It is important, however, to treat the work of fiction writers maturing in
the 1850s as theologically serious. John Ernest's advice in Resistance and Reformation, although applied only to
African American 19th-century texts, resonates with antebellum sentimental fiction generally: "Understanding the
visions of divine order that serve as the foundation of [these] texts [...] requires one to accept that these authors had
and took seriously religions beliefs," pp. 5-6.
8

The Transcendentalists' rejection of a supernatural interruption of natural laws, including time, accounts for their

dismissal of miracles even when Unitarian theologians were still insisting on their importance. In Science and
Religion in America, Herbert Hovenkamp notes that the Transcendentalists "vehemently" claimed that "miracles
were not part of the permanent values of Christianity but merely a mythical mechanism," p. 86.

7

literary aesthetic, whose primary features Lawrence Buell identifies as "inchoate structure,
prodigal imagery, wit, paradox, symbolism, aphoristic statement, paratactic syntax, and a
manifesto-like tone" (Literary 18)—in effect, everything but narrative.9
Because midcentury Unitarian theology—and, more broadly, sentimental theology—
mapped the Christian narrative of conversion and reconciliation onto the Transcendentalist
principle of concurrent identity between natural and divine life, it posed a singularly productive
and problematic challenge to narrative form. Gregg Crane notes a paradoxical core structure in
the sentimental novel in that "it values permanence and stasis as signs of transcendent value, but
is full of movement and transformation" (112). I argue that sentimental novelists in the 1850s
addressed this tension between stasis, or natural innocence, and transformation, or Christian
conversion, by structuring their narratives around the maturation of central female characters
who experience conversion as a natural part of their growing up process. These heroines, in
effect, grow into grace from a preexisting innocent nature; the development of their natural
affections—and bodies—provides stepping stones to sainthood. Furthermore, after these girls
become young women, their attractiveness in turn "naturally" draws other characters, especially
male characters, into conversion. The term I have developed for describing these female figures
is "organic angels," because their spiritual magnetism is organic in that it originates in their preconversion nature, including their natural bodies.
9

In American Incarnation, Myra Jehlen explores the anti-narratival tendency of Emerson's spiritual vision in

particular. Remarking that "if pictures are rare in Emerson's writing, stories are rarer still," Jehlen explains how if
"man" and "nature" prove "adequate to the whole of their shared world, they would be identical and there would be
no story." Conversely, "if one were thus commensurate with everything he would absorb the other and again there
would be no story," p. 124. Jehlen demonstrates this "identical wholeness" as the de-narrativizing property of
Emerson's philosophy, p. 125.

8

The trope of the organic angel thus encapsulated the 19th century movement toward an
organic rather than supernatural relationship encounter with divinity. Antebellum sentimental
authors valued the organic angel for her ability to harness the natural desires inspired by physical
beauty for moral and spiritual ends; she created, in other words, a 'rung' human beings could
seize as they climbed toward salvation. In The Minister's Wooing, Stowe used the term "rungless
ladder" to describe the gulf she saw Puritanism positing between the helpless, unredeemed
human soul below and an angry God above. In the words of Edwards, "you have no interest in
any mediator, and nothing to lay hold of to save yourself" ("Sinners" 98). The organic angel, by
contrast, served as an object of desire toward which human beings would naturally gravitate and
so stood as a mediator of divine grace through physical means—a role that the Puritan
forefathers would have found blasphemous.
While proposing a connection between representations of womanhood and spiritual
influence is nothing new, the trope of the organic angel comes into focus outside the lens of the
traditional scholarly approach to this connection through issues of domesticity—women's filial
and household roles. Since Barbara Welter published her 1966 seminal article, "The Cult of True
Womanhood: 1820-1860," scholars have thoroughly explored the relationship between the sacral
power of women and the ideals of domesticity as constructed by sentimental novels, often more
narrowly termed in this context "domestic" or "women's" novels. Welter described the "four
cardinal virtues" of "True Womanhood" as "piety, purity, submissiveness and domesticity,"
adding, "together [...] they spelled mother, daughter, sister, wife—woman" (152). A long critical
tradition builds on this characterization of female representation and its implied conservative
function of empowering women spiritually in order to suppress them politically by cordoning
them off as queens of the domestic sphere. In her pivotal justification of domestic fiction, "The

9

Other American Renaissance," Jane Tompkins argued for a paradoxically liberating function of
submission for sentimental heroines who by pleasing "husband or father" obtain "an access of
divine power": "By making themselves into the vehicles of God's will, these female characters
become nothing in themselves but all-powerful in relation to the world" (43). Generally critical
studies on sentimental novels have built on the Welter-Tompkins model of exploring a generic
"female influence" and its connection to spiritual submission in domestic settings. 10
In her influential 1985 study of American domestic literature, historian Mary P. Ryan
both refined and extended this tendency by reconceiving the "cult of domesticity" as the "empire
of the mother": according to Ryan, "the true woman was the perfect candidate for the role of
child nurturer [...] She was loving, giving, moral, pure, and consigned to the hearth" (56). By
consolidating all kinds of spiritualized female influence under the banner of the "empire of the
mother," Ryan obscures a powerful, distinctively nonmaternal strain of feminine power that took
shape across sentimental novels in the 1850s, as typified by the organic angel.11 In her article on
prophetic virgin figures in the works of Harriet Beecher Stowe, Kimberly VanEsveld Adams
remarks that "[w]hen scholars separate the term 'maternal' from actual motherhood and apply it

10

In Monika M. Elbert's introduction to the edited collection Separate Spheres No More, she traces the

qualifications scholars have gradually made to Welter's monolithic characterization of the female personality and
role in sentimental literature. See pp. 8-16. In Beneath the American Renaissance, David S. Reynolds contends that
"numerous character types" of women in fiction "proliferated and diversified to such a degree that by the 1850s
there was a great complexity in perceptions of women's roles," p. 340.
11

In Mothers and Daughters in Nineteenth-Century America, Nancy M. Theriot reiterates Ryan's comprehensive

conflation of antebellum representations of womanhood and motherhood, calling motherhood "the major script of
true womanhood between 1830 and 1860," and "the major cultural metaphor for femininity," pp. 16 and 18.

10

to almost all gentle, nurturing behavior shown by characters, [the] authorial critique of numerous
mother-figures is obscured" (92).
Adams' criticism can be applied broadly to scholarship on midcentury sentimental novels,
which in fact seldom feature "an ideal woman" who "fulfil[s] her most hallowed and imperial
role in the act of conception" (Ryan 104). Claire Chantell, in an article on the limits of
motherhood in domestic literature, goes so far as to argue that "Detailed portraits of competent,
capable motherhood (let alone the sanctified variety) rarely appear in most domestic fictions"
(132). Indeed, none of the novels I examine configure women's spiritual power primarily in
terms of ideal motherhood, what Chantell terms "sentimental maternalism" (132). Ryan herself,
although she observes that "the cult of the mother's empire continued to gain converts during the
1850s" (111), argues that over the course of the same decade a number of "factors were
beginning to subvert the mother's role" (102). Rather than exploring an alternate form of
specifically female influence, however, Ryan concludes that "The American child took on the
literary role of 'redeemer'" (103).
My project addresses the gap implied by Ryan's conceptual leap from nurturing mother to
child-Messiah by following up on the figure of youthful female redemptress in the 1850s
sentimental novel. In effect, my analysis picks up where Ryan leaves off—exploring a
conciliatory and transformative rather than nourishing ethos of feminine influence. As Ryan
demonstrates, between 1830 and 1850, the heyday of sentimental maternalism, cultural
interpreters laid the groundwork of a singular organic affective bond between mother and infant
that—I contend—set the stage for that bond's sidelining in 1850s sentimental novels fiction. In
Sentimental Materialism, Lori Merish identifies the mother's central place in the sentimental
economy as "literally the sentimental subject's opening on to the world" (124). The

11

extraordinary emphasis placed on the role of motherhood derived from the mother's putative
psychosomatic or "organic" connection with her child. Bushnell, for instance, argued that "the
child, after birth, is still within the matrix of parental life, and will be more or less, for many
years [...] And the parental life will be flowing into him all that time, just as naturally, and by a
law as truly organic, as when the sap of the trunk flows into a limb" (19). This glorification of a
mother's unconscious influence over her child had a theological foundation in the antebellum
shift towards a naturalized rather than supernatural form of spiritual regeneration. As Douglas
points out, the painful dynamics of Calvinist conversion had "presupposed a struggle for
maturity that implied distancing from the mother and conflict with the father [God]" (137);
antebellum writers, by contrast, encouraged a protracted attachment with the mother, and the
anticipation of its necessary eclipse, especially for sons leaving the home sphere, occasioned real
anxiety (Ryan 58-9).
Because the trajectory of human development demanded an eventual emotional
withdrawal from the mother, a figure mediating a different kind of feminized affect supersedes
her in the sentimental novel.12 Like the domestic mother, the organic angel diffuses divine light
through physical means, but unlike with the mother, her saving influence can span a full
narrative structure. The sentimental novel typically traces her development from natural child to
supernaturalized woman, at which point she can effect a transformative rather than preservative
(maternal) impact on her converts. Where the immanent character of the mother-child bond
promotes a kind of total identification that borders on absorption,13 the organic angel serves as a
12

Douglas describes the antebellum shift in theological emphasis from "paternal" to "fundamentally maternal and

affective," p.124, but it is important to note that not all feminized "affect" is also "maternal."
13

In Susan Warner's The Wide, Wide World, for example, it is the heroine's expulsion from a claustrophobic

intimacy with her mother that initiates her (excruciating) spiritual and emotional individuation. The mother in this

12

differential that invites spiritual change. In other words, the organic angel's otherness accrues a
mesmeric quality that can, in turn, transmute the interested gaze of potential converts from a
natural to a spiritual plane. As this argument suggests, the organic angel's affect straddles the
erotic and aesthetic, rather than partaking of the protective and the maternal. In her analysis of
the role of virgin intercessors in Harriet Beecher's Stowe's 1861 novel Agnes of Sorrento, Adams
employs the term "living icons" to describe their capacity for "possessing and reflecting a portion
of the divine, able to draw others' minds and hearts to God" (97). The detached but emphatically
sensory and sensual quality of the "living icon" characterizes what I am calling the organic
angel—a figure not physically intimate, as with the mother and infant, but visually and
affectively captivating.
A product of both unfallen nature and spiritual illumination, the organic angel combines
the power of physical attractiveness and spiritual grace within a transformative visual field.
Merish speaks of antebellum writers' "simultaneous secularization and feminization of spiritual
'grace,' its incorporation within an aesthetics of feminine presence" (62). While antebellum
Christians would not have construed this conflation as secularizing, it unquestionably grounded
divine illumination in feminine-specific material forms. Paul Giles explains how Puritanism
"traditionally harbor[ed] a deep suspicion of the power of art and artifice" (90)—that is, of the
power of sensory beauty to evoke a carnal rather than a spiritual response.14 But increasingly into
the 19th century American Protestants began placing cautious confidence in the intermediary
role of a "naturalized" aesthetics in redirecting the affections toward God. In Augusta Jane

context serves as a kind of anti-conversion agent; as Claire Chantell points out, the mother herself concedes that
"perhaps [God] sees, Ellen, that you never would seek him while you had me to cling to," qtd. in p. 16.
14

As Colleen McDannell puts it, where Catholics "see," Protestants "read." See Giles, p. 90.

13

Evans' 1859 sentimental novel Beulah, for example, the author carefully distinguishes between
an idolatrous and a purifying adoration of natural beauty: "There is such a thing as looking
'through nature up to nature's God,' notwithstanding the frightened denials of those who, shocked
at the growing materialism of the age, would fain persuade this generation to walk blindfold
through the superb temple a loving God has placed us in" (276). Without turning "all divinity
into materialistic elements," Evans expatiates, "it may be safely proclaimed that genuine
aesthetics is a mighty channel, through which the love and adoration of Almighty God enters the
soul" (202). So long as aesthetic intermediaries could claim a "natural" inception, they could be
venerated as a revelation of "nature's God."
As the female incarnation of divine beauty, the organic angel most fully exploited this
tentative Protestant aestheticism. However it might partake of the "genuine aesthetics" of
mountains and rivers, the female body clearly introduced a distinct if related affective dimension
into the process of aesthetic conversion; inasmuch as her influence derived from the female
body, it mobilized erotic longing in the service of spiritual transformation. In American
Madonna, John Gatta provides a case-study of eroticized female spiritual power through his
analysis of The Minister's Wooing. Gatta outlines Stowe's belief "that a progressive scale of
affections connects the theological orders of nature and grace, that natural love is indeed
sacramental" (63). As Gatta pictures it, the "regenerative inspiration" that the heroine supplies to
numerous male characters in the novel figures Stowe's "faith that youthful womanhood might
embody the power of eros coextensively with that of agape and communal caritas" (63, 67).15

15

Although Gatta continues to associate the heroine Mary's influence with maternity, he concedes that she is

"clearly a lover as well as spiritual mother—and, without conscious design, she fulfills much of her latter role
through the former," p. 63.

14

Nor was Stowe by any means a cultural anomaly in her thinking; as Protestantism gravitated
toward a "theology of the feelings," the power of romantic attachment over the heart seemed a
"natural" means of efficacious evangelism.
The organic angel's role as agent of eroticized conversion—rather than of conception and
nurture—positions her as a specifically democratizing figure. An exclusivist intimacy inheres in
the glorification of enclosed domesticity, one that midcentury sentimental novels trenchantly
resist. In her analysis of Susan Warner's The Wide, Wide World, for example, Chantell notes that
the dynamics between mother and daughter suggest that "the sentimental mother will seduce her
child away from engagement with any world beyond that of the cozy domestic enclosure" (16).
Conversely, in her article on The Lamplighter, a sentimental text which I examine, Cindy
Weinstein observes of this novel that it "produces a family based on chosen affections rather than
biologically determined ones" (1023). 16 As a result, the heroine "gets to belong to everyone [...]
her sympathy produces a family economy where one person's gain is not another persons' loss"
(1024). Where the self-mirroring bond with the biological mother closes down alternative
emotional exchanges, the filial freedom of the organic angel renders her affect universally
accessible.17 Put simply, not everyone can be born to a sentimental mother, but anyone can look
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In States of Sympathy, Elizabeth Barnes similarly speaks of how in The Lamplighter "The potentially fatal effects

of intensive bonding are annulled by the redistribution of familial ties," p. 91.
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In each of the texts I examine, the heroine is either orphaned, disowned, or expatriated, with Eva of Uncle Tom's

Cabin comprising the only exception. None of the novels features an intimate mother-daughter bond; in most cases
the mother is absent or deceased. While Chantell does not focus on a specially feminine affective alterity in her
analysis of The Wide, Wide World and The Lamplighter, she does point out that both novels supply the "motherless
heroine with extra-domestic, non-maternal surrogates who oversee [their] education and bring [them] to ideal
womanhood," p. 141, my emphasis.
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at an organic angel. Because sentimental novels downplay filial exclusiveness, the organic angel
typically ranges outside the domestic sphere, and the telos of marriage, if present, proves
secondary to the expression of her generalized affective power. Overt concern with biological
reproduction in these novels is furthermore virtually absent.18 These deviations from the
sentimental norms of the cult of domesticity suggest that the authors of these novels were
invested in breaking up the sacred circumscription of the hearth to broadly disseminate the
eroticized force of the female body.
The democratic accessibility of the organic angel has a theological resonance. In
Sensational Designs, Jane Tompkins argues that "Religious conversion as the basis for a new
social order was the mainspring of the Christian evangelical movement of the mid-nineteenth
century," a movement characterized by an unprecedented prioritization of "feeling" as the means
and indicator of conversion (218). This "theology of the feelings" was centered on "affective
response"19 rather than on supernatural election; anyone who could experience attraction to
moral beauty could, therefore, be saved. And what could more effectively evoke a spiritualized
adoration than the beautiful bodies of saintly women? In "The Other American Renaissance,"
18

What Nina Baym claims for particular novels by the Warner sisters, I would apply to sentimental novels in the

'50s more generally: when marriages take place, they "celebrate a social as well as a personal renewal, the salvation
[...] of a whole and healthy community," Woman's Fiction, p. 163. In this same vein of minimizing the exclusivity
of the nuclear family, none of the novels I analyze features a heroine who gives birth—or indeed shows any interest
in the child-bearing role—with the exception of Sylvester Judd's novel Margaret, in which the titular heroine's role
as mother is merely one ray in the spectrum of her affective powers over an entire utopian neighborhood.
19

In Truth's Ragged Edge, Philip Gura describes a "theology of the feelings" as the "new religion, based [...] on

affective response to Scripture," p. 267. While I have taken Gura's term "affective response" somewhat out of
context, I believe this term applies more broadly, especially as interest in natural revelation—as mediated by
material forms—was on the rise mid-century.
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Tompkins contends that the "entire weight of Protestant Christianity and democratic nationalism
stood behind" antebellum conviction in "the power of Christian love and the sacred influence of
women" (48). It is precisely the intersection of Protestant Christianity and democratic
nationalism in the early 19th century that generates the principle of the "sacred influence of
women," which, in turn, culminates in the generous communal affect of the organic angel. In his
introduction to Bushnell's liberal theology, Smith notes that Jonathan Edwards as well as
Bushnell "affirmed that the sine qua non of spiritual life is the ability to see the divine nature
expressed as beauty"; however, whereas Edwards "saw the sense of the heart as a special
dispensation of grace given only to the elect," Bushnell, "saw sensibility to the divine nature as
potentially universal human capacity" (20). In this sense, he suggests, "Bushnell democratized
Edwards' sense of the heart" (20). Springing from the kind of naturalized theology Bushnell
espoused, the organic angel reflected the antebellum period drive to realize—theoretically—the
essential equality of persons and undifferentiated access to material and spiritual goods.
In this regard also the organic angel bestrides the line between Transcendentalism, which
interiorized the relationship between the heart and the divine, and orthodox Calvinism, which
structured communities under the patriarchal control of the church and demanded a public
profession of faith. Buell writes that "Transcendentalism is, in a sense, the natural religion of
democracy, by virtue of its claim that divinity in here in every human being and indeed in every
particle of the universe" (Literary 168). Transcendental democracy, however, tended towards
individualism, the principle, Howe contends, that Emerson and consociate Transcendentalists
"most valued about their new spirituality" (620). Transcendental individualism "put every person
directly in touch with the divine, without any need for tradition, a written scripture, or an
institutional church" (620). Sentimental theology, while it maintained an emphasis on private
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affective response to Scripture, likewise drastically depreciated the role of the traditional
ecclesiastical structure. But in its Christocentric orientation, sentimental theology retained a
communal urge lacking in thoroughgoing Transcendental naturalism, which posited an allsufficiency to the private individual experience of depersonalized divinity.20 The organic angel
figures this theology's search for a democratic point of consolidation for the communal Christic
body. Her own body called for a visual rather than textual hermeneutic, substituting spontaneous
emotion for accurate interpretation and thereby rendering obsolete the rancorous divisions that
increasingly plagued a disestablished midcentury Protestantism.21
The organic angel's conciliatory and communal function ramified beyond the religious
sphere to include the economic and political narrative of the antebellum nation. America's myth20

In Separate Spheres No More, Monika M. Elbert challenges a critical approach that "Not only does [...] not allow

for an overlap between sentimentality and individualism, but [...] equates the sentimental impulse with the
communal impulse," p. 10. Elbert suggests that approaching sentimentality as inherently communal "promotes a
separatist politics for women," p. 10. However, Elbert's criticism comes in the context of celebrating the "noncommunal and strongly individualistic experiences" of women "who actually flee from the dangers of
claustrophobic and dangerous maternal and sisterly bonding," p. 10. I am arguing for the organic angel as a
communal trope deriving from sentimental theology, who in many ways does represent a departure from "dangerous
maternal and sisterly bonding" at the same time that she provides a point of communal consolidation for both male
and female authors of sentimental fiction.
21

In The Altar at Home, Claudia Stokes makes the surprising claim that sentimental literature exhibits a highly

sectarian character deriving from Methodist revivalism and therefore actively participates in the antebellum era's
intense theological disputes. She concedes, however, that such texts "offer a portrait of a religious world in which a
particular religious belief set"—essentially populist and universalist—"has vanquished its critics and found
absorption into the mainstream, its sectarian specifics replaced by intimates of ecumenical unity" p. 6. The organic
angel, as I suggest above, effects this ecumenical unity by reorienting conversion away from the textual and
doctrinal and toward the visual and affective.
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making process had, from the beginning, fused the political and providential. The "mission of
America," as religious historian Ira L. Mandelker describes it, dictated that "Liberty had been
established by deity in an empty western continent so that, freed from European traditions, it
might flourish and become an inspiration to the rest of the world" (40). David Howe observes
that "Almost all Americans regarded their country as an example and a harbinger of popular
government to the rest of the world, and even non-church-members found millennial
expectations an appropriate metaphor for this destiny" (285). In an 1852 lecture on nonresistance, Judd distilled this nationalized evangelical vision by declaring that "If you can
understand what Christ's mission was, so can you understand what the proper mission of
America is among the nations of the earth" (qtd. in Hall 302). This drive to incarnate heaven on
earth converged in the early 19th century with an incipient industrial capitalist economy and the
entrenchment of Jacksonian democracy, fostering a generalized "millennial search for God"
(Morone 130). Because millennial expectations rested on the premise of America's
predestination to the role of "a city upon a hill," it behooved Americans who invested in this
metaphor to forge a national narrative linking origins and destiny.
In her development from natural child to supernaturalized woman, the organic angel
spanned this distance between America's auspicious origins and elect destiny; in so doing, she
collapsed historical conflict into a transcendent democratic body that realized heaven on earth.
Paradoxically rooted in the divine through an "organic" material connection, this natural saint
thus brought America's primitive origins in nature to a supernatural telos in a prosperous
industrial age.22 Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr. explains how primitivism, or the nostalgia for a
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Perry Miller, Annette Kolodny, and Myra Jehlen have established Americans' investment in their continental

identity as "nature's nation," juxtaposed to the corrupting artifice of their European Old World counterparts.
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primordial natural paradise, and millennialism, the pursuit of a utopian future, really comprise
"opposite sides of the same coin of human aspiration for a way of life dramatically opposite in
complexity and organization from the present" (72). On the one hand, the organic angel served as
a celebratory accommodation to the "complexity and organization" of the historical moment,
with its exponential increase in material comforts for middle-class Americans and corresponding
satisfaction of instinctive desires; on the other hand, however, she highlighted a desperate desire
to purify the conditions of American expansion, consumerism, and, retroactively, its very
formation on a less than "empty" continent. By translating a supposed universalized human
response to feminine beauty into a purified resonance with divine love, the organic angel
advertised an inherent consonance of natural desire and divine will, and, by extension, the
ultimate superfluity of conflict, whether spiritual, political, or economic.
This comprehensively purifying role took on a particular urgency in the 1850s. In the
decades leading up to the Civil War, the United States saw, in addition to its ecclesiastical
upheaval, the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War (1846-1848) over the federal
government's annexation of Texas, the California Gold Rush (1848-1855), and a series of
enactments on the part of Indian Removal Policy beginning in 1830. Between 1840 and 1860,
approximately 4,242,000 immigrants touched ashore on North America, a trend spiked by the
devastating 1845 Irish Potato Famine; the resultant huge influx of Irish immigrants touched off
virulent anti-Catholic recriminations across the United States (Howe 527; 200). Decades of
escalating tensions over Southern slavery peaked violently in the 1850s, making it the most
volatile and defining national issue. Finally, as Michael T. Gilmore explains, the period from
approximately 1815 to 1860 "marked a watershed in the history of the American economy," as it
shifted from a primarily agrarian economy to an industrial capitalist one (1-2). This shift
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furthermore laid the groundwork of an incipiently consumerist society that would transform
Americans from producers to consumers in the decade of the 1860's and beyond (Douglas 66).
These intersections climaxed in the defining problematic of the 1850s: how to reconcile
America's spiritual, political, and economic imperatives—the drive to evangelize, democratize,
and consume. In an era preoccupied with the spiritual efficacy of the affections, the economic
and political aggressions that fueled the nation's rising prosperity threatened to belie that
prosperity as a harbinger of divine blessing.
The trope of the organic angel mediates this nexus of concerns. Unspoiled by the
conditions that gave rise to America's burgeoning wealth, the organic angel purified cultural
products by refracting them for aesthetic consumption through her own body, making them—in
theory—both democratically accessible and spiritually-oriented. Challenging a long critical
tradition that opposes a feminine spiritual sphere to a masculine commercial one, Lori Merish
makes the case that, while we "have learned to see an apparent contradiction between revivalism
and materialism in antebellum America," in fact, "consumer purchases" increasingly came to
serve as "visible signs of spiritual conversion" (89, author's emphasis). This evangelical economy
figured women simultaneously as chief consumers of "luxury objects" and as themselves
luxurious objects of consumption: like other "mediating material forms," the "bodies of refined,
gracious women" exerted a purifying influence (2). This spiritualization of a consumer-oriented
culture countermanded a long history of Puritan and civil warnings against the corrupting effects
of material decadence (15) and implicitly consecrated America's rising prosperity. As an
aesthetically pleasing but sexually inaccessible object, the organic angel promoted a paradoxical
disinterested materialism—providing affective pleasure and spiritual renewal without "property"
limitations.
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Chapters 1 and 2 set out this landscape of a liberal Protestantism aesthetics of conversion
and establish its centrality as a structural formation in the sentimental novel. At the heart of this
transformative aesthetics stands the figure of the organic angel, an embodiment of an unbroken
continuity between natural and Christian beauty, both moral and physical. The organic angel's
capacity to experience and effect conversion stems from a dialectic of desire rather than fearful
compulsion. For the authors of these female bildungsromane, the trope of the organic angel not
only typifies the inherent compatibility of human nature and the divine will, it also figures
America's peculiar millennial destiny as the locus of heaven on earth, where the nation's budding
materialism could intersect with her divine mission to evangelize the world.
Chapter 1, devoted to Unitarian minister Sylvester Judd's novel Margaret (1851),
examines the earliest, most optimistic, and most comprehensive portrait of the organic angel, and
therefore serves as the control chapter against which my other four are measured. Of all the
"natural" heroines I analyze, Margaret instantiates the most seamless fusion of human and divine
nature and effects the most sweeping spiritual reform. A utopian prototype of the explosively
popular sentimental female bildungsroman, Margaret sets the stage for my project's exploration
of the possibilities and limits of the organic angel as a figure who embodies the reconciliation
between divine and human interests, and whose representation shapes and misshapes narrative
structure in the 1850s novel. Sylvester Judd labored in Margaret to develop a viable aesthetic of
communal eros that prevented the concentration and closure of desire in sexual possessiveness.
The titular heroine establishes this paradoxical ideal by founding a community on the
democratically accessible beauty of art, her own body at the center of an aesthetic constellation
that endlessly redirects desire toward the origin of all beauty in Christ.
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In my second chapter I explore the development of the organic angel over the course of a
female-authored female bildungsroman, Maria Cummins' wildly successful sentimental novel
The Lamplighter (1854). This chapter traces the unfolding of the adult heroine's spiritual
influence directly from her origins as a "wild child" of nature. In spite of the characterization of
the child-heroine as both morally and physically unattractive, the magnetic power of the adultheroine's presence proves an organic outgrowth from her pre-pubescent natural appearance and
temperament. Because Gertrude's spiritual power filters through her physical features, Gertrude
wins souls with the power traditionally used to win hearts, and Cummins creates fragmented and
contradictory portraits of her heroine in order to confuse the source of Gertrude's spiritual
influence. As physical and spiritual traits slide into each other, they throw off any direct
correlation between Gertrude's magnetic spirituality and erotic body.
The sentimental novels of Judd and Cummins illustrate how, as American Protestantism
moved toward a recuperation of intercessory roles, the trope of the organic angel served to
catalyze an ideal coalescence of sensuality and purity. The representational success of this
dynamic depended on the illusion of a dematerialized sexuality that awakens desire in order to
transfer it to the spiritual realm; any recurrence to the female body as body threatened the
dissipation of desire into mere lust. Sentimental authors accordingly adopted a variety of
strategies to stave off the breakdown of the sacral body of the organic angel into a perverse
rather than purifying aesthetic. Not all antebellum authors were so optimistic about America's
immanent reconciliation of heaven and earth, and their experimental adaptations of the organic
angel reflected their respective misgivings. The hidden corollaries of the trope surface as diverse
complicating factors in mid-century novels by Hawthorne, Melville, Stowe, and Wilson.
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In Nathaniel Hawthorne's 1860 novel The Marble Faun, which I explore in Chapter 3, the
incipient feminized aesthetic of liberal Protestantism confronts an overpowering mirror image in
the institutional decadence of Rome. In a real sense, Calvinism had emerged fundamentally as a
rejection of medieval Christianity's material and feminized mediation between the human and
divine, and The Marble Faun pictures a representational male American's effort to navigate
between purified and idolatrous iconography. The resultant pressure splits the trope of the
organic angel into competing feminine aesthetics, stripping the figure of the natural saint Hilda
of her transformative powers and displacing them onto the natural seductress Miriam. The
Marble Faun, I argue, demonstrates Hawthorne's spiritual and artistic investment in the trope of
the organic angel, alongside his ultimate rejection of its conciliatory function on the eve of the
Civil War.
Chapter 4 traces a similar but more devastating breakdown of the trope of the organic
angel. In Melville's 1852 novel Pierre, a loss of faith in the benevolent divinity of liberal
Protestantism and the corresponding benignity of nature comprehensively destroys the ground
for spiritual purification. Like The Marble Faun, Pierre features a representational American
male's quest for regeneration mediated by the affective female body; but where Hawthorne splits
his organic angel into separate spiritual and sexual women, Melville depicts eroticism and agape
as mutually intensifying, generating a hopeless confusion of holy and perverse desires. Pierre
ends up spiritually transported by not one but two rival organic angels, neither of whose
magnetic eroticism can effect the purification of interior motives or inherited estate. The failure
of the organic angels in Pierre to translate Pierre's spontaneous desires to a spiritual plane
allegorizes Melville's rejection of America's founding and millennial myths.
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Published the same year as Pierre, Harriet Beecher Stowe's 1852 abolitionist novel Uncle
Tom forces the trope of the organic angel to reveal its racialized origins and racist limitations.
Chapter 5 opens with an analysis of how Stowe's concept of the opaque and aesthetically inferior
properties of black bodies prompted her exclusion of black females from iconographic
conversion roles in Uncle Tom's Cabin. Because the author finds the white body alone capable
of the transparency necessary to mediate divine lumination, Eva plays the role of organic angel
while Uncle Tom serves as her racial counterpart, effecting conversions through the public
debasement of his flesh. Unable to mediate divine light either through transparency or exposure,
with its overtones of sexual exploitation, the young black female Topsy completes the organic
angel's trajectory towards sainthood, but at the cost of further physical representation in the text.
The concluding sections of Chapter 5 contrast Stowe's vision of racialized physical
essences with that of Harriet Wilson, a free born black woman and author of the 1859 black
female bildungsroman Our Nig. The heroine of Our Nig, a girl of mixed race, attempts to follow
the charted course of the organic angel but, blocked at every turn by the cultural articulation of
her blackness, finds herself unable to either experience or effect conversion. Wilson's depiction
of Frado's failed conversion implicitly highlights the costs of antebellum Protestantism's
sacralization of gender and race-specific bodies as constructed by the trope of the organic angel.
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I. AESTHETIC CONVERSION IN SYLVESTER JUDD'S MARGARET

The most theologically liberal of the six novels I examine, Judd's Margaret seeks to
replace what its author viewed as the repugnant doctrines of orthodox Christianity with a gospel
predicated on mutual attraction between humanity and divinity. The heroine Margaret's journey
from innocent child of nature to messianic Christian woman reflects this liberal redaction of the
dynamics of conversion. Rather than assenting to the emotional and spiritual disruption which
characterized the traditional conversion experience, Margaret clings to the integrity of her natural
heart, and her eventual embrace of Christianity transpires at a cognitive and linguistic level when
her interior life finds its fullest expression in the language of Unitarianism.
Because Margaret's conversion entails only a process of maturation into a more perfect
representation of preexisting harmony, it highlights the central tension of the sentimental
bildungsroman: how to dramatize a static goodness as developmental. Judd anticipated the
sentimental novel's solution to this paradox when he settled on an unfolding aesthetics as the
means of generating movement at the narrative level while preserving a continuity between
original and consummate forms.
The novel's concluding proliferation of beautiful forms radiates from the vision of
Margaret as both preeminent author and work of public art, and points to a marginalized angle on
antebellum femininity. Criticism of sentimental fiction has tended to conflate the feminine and
maternal and, consequently, overlook the extent to which many literary figurations of the female
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saint dilate not on her home-making or reproductive capacities but on her erotic and visionary
powers. The reconstruction of conversion as an aesthetic process centered on the organic angel
enables Judd to construct a full-scale argument for the viability of a national narrative premised
on the immanent fulfillment of an original American innocence, even in the face of slavery,
commercialism, Indian removal, and Westward expansion. Judd incorporates Native Americans
into his overarching millennial scheme by positing their lost noble savagery as the original form
of American innocence that finds its fullest realization in the white Unitarian utopia of Mons
Christi. The production and consumption of aesthetic forms—whether as stylized recreation,
sculpture, or cultivated landscape—asserts a transcendent continuity of substance unbroken by
historical contingences, and thus serves to crystallize the gap between America's pre-history and
her New England utopia. Democratic access to the production and consumption of aesthetic
pleasures harmonizes interests across racial, economic, social, and even sexual lines, making
Margaret the most idealistic and all-inclusive treatment of the powers of a organic angel.
Margaret first takes the stage of her titular two-volume narrative as a sacred infant, a
"dimly-revealed form" hallowed by "a fantastic light": "We behold a child of eight or ten
months; it has brown curly hair, dark eyes, fair conditioned features, a health-glowing cheek, and
well-shaped limbs" (1:1). Margaret's features and aura anticipate those of the Jesus who,
illumined by a "preternatural light," will later appear to her in a dream with eyes of "dark blue"
and hair which "flowed in dark-brown curls down his neck" (1:165). "Who is it?" the narrator
inquires of the infant Margaret; "It is God's own child, as all children are" (1:1).
Judd's apotheosis of the infant Margaret, and his democratic attribution of her beatific
state to "all children," encapsulates a revolution in 19th century thinking about human nature.
The figure of the pre-socialized child served as a battleground for the orthodox doctrine of
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natural depravity and the emergent Romantic sacralization of human intuition; as Judd scholar
Richard Hathaway notes, "After 1820 the nature of the child was central to any discussion of
theological issues" (207). Puritanism had taken a dim view of the child's spiritual state, to say
the least: Cotton Mather went so far as to warn parents that their progeny were "the Children of
Death, and the Children of Hell, and the Children of Wrath, by Nature" (qtd. in Epstein 82). In
case they misunderstood the implications of their bringing a child into the world, he went on to
explain, "You must know, Parents, that your Children are by your means Born under the dreadful
Wrath of God; and if they are not New-Born before they Dy, it had been good for them, that they
had never been born at all...There is a Corrupt Nature in thy Children" (qtd. in 82). By contrast,
Horace Bushnell, Congregationalist author of the wildly popular and controversial Views of
Christian Nurture (1847), published two years after the first edition of Margaret, boldly
counseled parents to "never to disturb the infant soul, which, like the needle of a compass, points
unerringly and instinctively toward its maker" (Douglas 136). Bushnell charged that the "effort
and expectation should be, not as is commonly assumed, that the child is to grow up in sin, to be
converted after he comes to a mature age; but that he is to open onto the world as one that is
spiritually renewed" (Views 6).
The infant Margaret not only opens "onto the world as one that is spiritually renewed,"
within Judd's stylized portrait of her exquisite physicality she also forecasts her role as spiritual
renewer of her world, the organic angel as the millennial Christ. Her growth from "universal
child" into "idealized woman" (Dedmond 64) entails the unfolding of a moral and aesthetic
perfection that inheres in her "nature" from the beginning. Already "attractive" as a "child of
nature," Margaret, as Hathaway points out, nevertheless "has no power to enact" (5). The
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prelingual consciousness of childhood may hold perfect correspondence with divine purity, but it
has no means of infusing that purity into social structures.
Like Emerson, Judd sought an adult consciousness that "retained the spirit of infancy,"
wherein sacred nature "illuminates" not "only the eye," but "shines into the eye and heart" as it
does for "the child" (127); unlike Emerson, however, Judd's vision tended toward community
and the revitalization of human institutions. Judd seeks through Margaret to elide the need for
the falling away from a prelingual intimacy with nature that attends the superseding adult
consciousness, but on behalf of a collective rather than individualistic integration between a
divinized humanity and natural world. Margaret as organic angel will combine the integrity of
the infant's absolute correspondence with uncorrupted nature with the adult's capacity to enact
that purity in complex aesthetic forms as a foundation for Christian utopia.
Margaret, Hathaway contends, is "perhaps the first American novel to be so centrally
concerned with inner life and with the development of a child into an adult" (16-17); the
maturation process of Margaret serves as the link between the uncorrupted consciousness of the
romantic divine child and the incorruptible consciousness of the female saint. Through Margaret
Judd thus dramatized what for Transcendentalist nonfiction remained only a rhetorical
possibility: the development of another Christ who, through her resistance to the demands of
traditional religious conversion and her attendant fidelity to the claims of natural beauty, ensures
both her own salvation and the reform of a whole community.
Judd's heroine proves a consummate agent of natural impulse, protected by her inability
to comprehend and therefore submit to the invasive forces of traditional religious conversion.
Scornful of any claim to her allegiance beyond what appeals to her intuitive desires, she imitates
the obtuse and rebellious response of the "unregenerate" or natural heart in the face of spiritual
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truth. But for Judd, the natural heart enlightens rather than depraves, and Margaret's childhood
resistance to traditional conversion, either by the emotional inundations of revival spirit or the
bleak offices of prescribed piety, represents an escape from heresy. The dramatic movement of
the first episodes in Margaret's progress towards female sainthood thus transpires through a kind
of inverse friction: the child Margaret struggles, not to obtain freedom from natural desires, but
to resist religion's sinful mortification of natural desire. In a dramatic reversal, the crisis of
traditional conversion instigated by revival proves the soul's greatest threat.
In her landmark essay, "The Other American Renaissance," Jane Tompkins registered the
significance of crisis-oriented conversions on the antebellum literary consciousness; midcentury,
she affirms, "the one great fact of American life [...] was the 'terrific universality' of the revival"
(35). Literary historian Barbara Epstein observes that by the 1840s and '50s, the rash of revivals
associated with the Second Great Awakening had abated; nevertheless, revivals continued to
break out intermittently (89), and across the century "the more theologically conservative and
revivalistically oriented denominations kept the earlier Calvinist emphasis on a profound, even
violent, often sudden conversion experience" (Douglas 131-312). Richard Hathaway goes so far
as to argue that that the "whole movement" of Unitarianism originated out of an "antipathy to
revivalist conversion" (270), and Judd certainly fit this profile of reaction to the repeated spiritual
crises associated with his childhood and youth. Even within the Congregationalist camp, as
Bushnell illustrates, discomfort had arisen with respect to the association between divine grace
and aggression: "we hold a piety of conquest rather than love" (8) he laments regarding
conversions conducted by revivals, "Our very theory of religion is, that men are to grow up in
evil, and be dragged into the church of God by conquest" (25).
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For Bushnell, postponing a child's intercourse with the spirit of God to some
indeterminate, unpredictable future date of conversion constituted an "unnatural and pernicious"
mistake (15), and Judd too found "the orthodoxy of his youth" to be "unnatural" (Hathaway 88),
a mistaken disarticulation of the supernatural and natural orders. "It was a fundamental article of
my belief," he later wrote, "that I could not become religious until I was made so by a special and
extraneous operation" (qtd. in Hall 16). Bushnell wrote of adherents to this literalist
interpretation of conversion that "They separate the divine agency in men, from the general
system to which it belongs,—they make the doctrine special in such a sense that God is himself
[...] coming and going [....] while all his other operations go on by a general and systematic
machinery" (126).
It is this artificial disjunction between the natural and supernatural workings of the divine
spirit that threatens to unmoor Margaret from the tranquil bosom of nature. In Volume I of the
novel, which traces the heroine's development from infancy through adolescence, the growing
girl attends a backwoods camp-meeting-style revival, her first encounter with the powerful
rhetorical and communal appeal for traditional conversion. Dropped off by her elder brother
Nimrod and left in the care of one of the local ladies, Margaret finds herself besieged by the alien
forces of damning oration and escalating group hysteria, only to demonstrate a preternatural
invulnerability to religious coercion. Because her obstinance proves symptomatically identical
with Calvinist depictions of the unconverted heart, a bewildered Margaret finds herself
marginalized to the opaque status of an unregenerate.23
23

In the context of the rhetorical struggle to overcome the natural heart, the totalizing marker of unregeneracy tends

to subsume all characteristics of the individual in question. For instance, in spite of her congenial and inquisitive
nature, Margaret's neighbor, in fact a kindly woman, remarks her as a "born fool" who "will certainly die"
unprepared, p. 1:71.
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From the outset, both the revivalist preacher and the villagers anticipate the trajectory of
the revival in terms of an irresistible invasion. The village herbalist, the Widow Wright, warns
Nimrod of the immanent presence of a punitive force, saying, "I cal'late God is here [. . .] and
you had better not be pokin' your fun about" (1:67). The Widow's notion that "God is here," in
the context of the camp meeting suggests an abrupt entrance of the divine for the occasion of the
revival, a concept which generates the revival's affecting sense of imminent judgment. As Ann
Douglas points out, not only the older generation of Puritan ministers but "even latter-day
revivalists [...] stressed the inexorable press, the immediate need of conversion: the crisis was
now, the decision was now, time was running out, which was to be your destination, heaven or
hell?" (1:140). The rhetoric from the pulpit denotes this movement of calculated momentum, as
the preacher conflates the "work of grace" with wildfire: "'The sacred flame [...] has spread in
Virginia. Brother Enfield [...] conjectures that from eighteen hundred to two thousand souls have
been converted since the middle of May. Twelve hundred experienced the work of grace in
Sussex; in Amelia half as many more" (1:68). The accumulation of numerical estimates implies
to the audience that, in terms of sheer mathematical probability, based on the recent patterns of
the "work of grace," some, if not the majority of them, must succumb to the revival spirit. The
revivalist of necessity resorts to vivid psychological evocations and mathematic predictions,
rather than a reasoned appeal which must signify little in the face of divine onslaught.
As the preacher gains momentum, his conversion imagery turns increasingly violent.
Those at first reluctant to ascribe the movement to divine intervention, he proclaims, "began to
bemoan their own hardness of heart" when "the Lord broke in upon their own families" (1:68).
To be "broke in upon" by an outside force proves the only remedy to the alienation produced
between those whose "hardness of heart" darkened their vision and those who "saw it" (1:68).
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The harder the heart, the preacher indicates, the more violent the experience of invasion: "Many
gospel-hardened, old, orthodox sinners, have, as mighty oaks, been felled; and many hightowering sinners, as the tall cedars of Lebanon, bowed down to the dust" (1:68). The metaphor
of the "mighty oaks" and "tall cedars"24 highlights the role of irresistible grace in felling the
natural magnificence and power of the individual person, an absolute abasement bespeaking
humiliation and death through a "bow[ing] down to the dust." The preacher further reports that
"As many as fifteen or twenty commonly gave up in a day under Brother Staffin's preaching,
who is indeed a Samson among the Philistines. It is no strange thing now for children down to
seven years of age to come in" (1:68). The fact that to "give up" and to "come in" prove
commensurate turns of phrase in matters of conversion exposes the predicament each potential
convert in the audience must resolve: to "give up," to surrender one's natural being to the alien
force of the axe, enables one to "come in," to dissolve the alienating tension between the saved
and the unsaved. If children "down to seven years of age" succumb, only those under the age of
accountability, too young "to be knowing" (1:71), may escape the inexorable operation of grace.
Margaret retains just such an infantile simplicity with respect to religious rhetoric but
demonstrates her moral and intellectual capacity to choose; she thus ensures her castigation as
unregenerate while preserving her natural integrity from the revival spirit.
In the midst of cries of "Glory! glory!" the revival's climax manifests itself as a physical
and psychological assault, a kind of destructive possession that threatens to wrench Margaret
from her intimate grounding in nature. Margaret's young peer Obed capitulates under the
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prophets' descriptions of God's overthrow of Israel's enemies.
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escalating pressure, "waving to and fro in his seat, groaning, and calling upon his mother" (1:69).
His mother the Widow Wright likewise appears seized by an outside force, exclaiming
"convulsively" to her son, "'Its [sic] an orful time. God has come, we are great sinners" (1:69).
Like the swaying, groaning Obed and the convulsing Widow, others in the audience collapse in
various forms of physical contortions, all suggestive of a distorting victimization: "Some of the
congregation foamed at the mouth, others fell to the ground in spasms; the color of their faces
fluctuated from white through purple to black; one appeared to be strangling and gasping for life,
another became stiff, rigid, and sat up like a dead man on his seat; there were sobs, shrieks, and
ejaculations" (1:69). James A. Morone in Hellfire Nation cites the intersection between
antebellum excitement and outbreaks of bizarre behavior: one minister's revivals "featured
'jerking exercises'—an irresistible rush of the spirit that left sinners flopping uncontrollably on
the ground" (124); another minister reported on attendees "crying for mercy in the most piteous
accents while other were shouting most vociferously" (qtd. in 124). "A supernatural power," he
added, "seemed to pervade the entire mass" (qtd. in 124).
As the "supernatural power" of Judd's' fictional revival reaches new heights of aberrant
expression, a contest of wills ensues over Margaret's dispossession through conversion. Nimrod,
who has attended only to take advantage of the gathering for social amusement, "rushed among
the people [...], seized Margaret and drew her out" (1:69); his intervention elicits the revivalist's
stern rebuke: "Son of Belial! [...] thinkest thou to stop the mighty power of God? Will he deliver
that child into thy hand as he did the children of Israel into the land of Chushan-rishathaim?"
(1:70). The preacher's austere language and obscure Scriptural references illustrate the
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foreignness of the entire drama acted upon and amongst the villagers,25 even as his allusion to an
exchange of captives indicates the extent to which he understands conversion as coextensive
with dispossession of individual autonomy. In the face of the irresistible force of the "mighty
power of God" Nimrod's efforts to preserve Margaret must prove futile, while Margaret's own
will in the matter ostensibly fails even to signify.
Margaret's rooting in nature, however, allows her to stave off her own conversion. As the
camp-meeting abruptly breaks off and the "exercises" close for the evening, Margaret
demonstrates her unbroken intimacy with nature by taking refuge in its comforts, a striking
contrast to the depictions of religious conversion's unnatural dangers. Herbert Ross Brown notes
that prior to "the impact of the romantic revolution upon the religion of New England, natural
phenomena had been commonly regarded as setting up a barrier between God and man" (334),
and Margaret engages the natural world precisely to create a barrier between her and the older
Puritan deity. She "ran off into the woods with her dog and laid down, under a tree, her head
resting on the flanks of the animal, and her feet nestling in the soft moss" (1:70). Margaret's
retreat to the woods, and her subsequent reclining at the foot of a tree, point to her resilient status
as an un-felled individual spirit. The woods and its attendant dog and moss provide a familiarity
and security that protects both the body and the natural heart from fatal uprooting by an external
divinity.
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cannot tell [...] only I am a great sinner; if you could hear the Parson preach you would think so too," p. 1:238.
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Margaret's resistance to conversion reflects a spirit of Transcendental self-reliance, and
her deflection of religious interrogation proves nearly as daring as Emerson's pronouncement, "if
I am the devil's child, I will live then from the devil" (321). When a kindly woman attempts to
ascertain Margaret’s spiritual state and prod her toward conversion, the woman finds the girl's
commitment to natural integrity startlingly unassailable. In response to the woman’s prompting
her whether "she didn’t want to be saved," Margaret "replied that she didn’t know" (1:71).
Margaret's lack of knowledge, however, points to more than a missing education; it suggests the
obdurate ignorance of the unregenerate heart. For, when the woman presses further, saying,
"The spirit is here mightily […] won’t you come in for a share?" Margaret firmly declares, "It
won’t let me" (1:71). The child’s ambiguous use of the pronoun "it" allows for a confusion
between her spirit and the "spirit" present "mightily" to the assembly. On the one hand,
Margaret's protest might seem to align her within the conventional Calvinist dichotomy between
the saved and the unsaved; "it," the "Holy Spirit," "won’t let" her come in, has predestined her to
damnation. On the other hand, the "it" seems to denote a resistant principle within herself; her
own spirit secures her against the fall into conversion, stubbornly pitting nature against the alien
spirit at work vanquishing the congregation: to paraphrase Emerson, no law is sacred to her but
the law of her own nature (321). When the woman warns, "You may lose your soul," Margaret
continues to defend the natural integrity of her person, shocking her with the announcement, "I
haven’t got any" (1:71). Her rejection of traditional Christian terminology indicates her refusal
to conceptualize an inherent division of her being, a discontinuity between the natural body and
supernatural soul.
For Judd, as for Bushnell, true "religion is a power that works primarily in and through
the imagination" (Selected, Smith 2), and Judd counters the revivalist's assault on Margaret's
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consciousness with the projection of an a priori natural Savior from within her unconscious
mind. Romanticism had elevated "the creative imagination as a source of quasi-divine authority"
(Buell, New England 69), and historian Richard Rabinowitz notes the emergent strain of
antebellum Protestantism whose "emphasis upon the dramatic interaction with the divinity inside
consciousness" prompted a "revolt against the centuries-old disdain for the visual among pious
New Englanders," a revolt which "resulted in increasing interest in the physical representations
of the Godhead, particularly of Jesus" (174). Within this conceptual framework of the sacred
imagination, Margaret's dream-Christ carries the weight of supernatural revelation.
After her unhappy first visit to "Meeting" at the local church, which institution
systematically represses the natural desires that the revival endeavored to uproot, Margaret
discovers an alternative to the dispossession of her "natural" soul when she dreams of an
invitational, aesthetic Christ, "the beautiful one" (1:166). In contrast to "meeting," where the
parishioners endeavored to crush Margaret's spontaneous enthusiasm for beauty by rejecting
flowers as "an abomination" (305), Margaret's dream puts forth a floral Christ whose natural
beauty evokes the "natural amiability" of each child-like soul (1:168). In every way the antithesis
of a demanding presence, Christ’s exceedingly delicate, effeminized beauty belies any doctrinal
pretense of divine aggression: "The face […] was pale but very fair, and a hidden under-tinge of
color seemed to show through an almost transparent skin, as she had seen the blush of the white
goosefoot shining through a dewdrop" (1:165). The figure’s gauzy skin and pale complexion
suggest an almost infantile fragility, while his luminous beauty models the unobtrusive, even
secreted natural phenomenon of a flower blooming beneath the dew. This Jesus Christ, and with
him the Apostle John, materializes from a "ball of light" that coextends with the natural sun
setting in the trees, rather than descending from a heavenly sphere. Jesus' entrance and
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appearance reflect Bushnell's teaching that "supernatural influences, as available as sunlight,
pervade the organic networks of nature" (Selected, Smith 2).
By recreating Christ as a transparent, delicate figure contiguous with the most pleasing
natural phenomena, Judd replaces "the ugliness and primacy of dogma" with "the consolation of
aesthetics" (Douglas 150). As a struggling orthodox youth, Judd's "love of the beauty of nature
clashed with his developing religious devotion" (Dedmond 21); as an adult, he determined to
reconcile religious and natural appeal by rendering "the attractions of [Christ's] moral glory and
beauty" (qtd. in Rabinowitz 186) in aesthetic terms. If, as Tompkins suggests, for midcentury
sentimental authors "the highest function of art" was "to bring souls to Christ" (149), depicting
Christ himself as work of art resonated with a broader growing confidence in the correlation
between sensually pleasing and spiritually salutary influence. For by recreating Christ's
attractiveness as infantile, feminine, and floral, Judd goes beyond a general promotion of the
visual—he highlights the picturesque in particular as salvific. Judd's earliest biographer Arethusa
Hall remarked that, "unable to see ugliness and deformity in the natural, to him the picturesque
was easily attainable" (457).
Nor was Judd a cultural outlier in this propensity. Judd’s description of Jesus with hair
which, "parted on the crown, flowed in dark-brown curls down his neck" (1:165), suggests his
familiarity with a historical document in circulation at the time, later found to be a forgery.
Purportedly a physical description of "the person of Jesus Christ," it includes the following
details: "His aspect is amiable and reverend; his hair flows into those beauteous shades which no
united colors can match, falling into graceful curls below his ears […] and parting on the crown
of his head."26 Judd encapsulated the aesthetic theory of sentimental art when he insisted that
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"man was made to love the lovely" (qtd. in Hall 90), and, for enthusiasts of a naturalized
Christianity, a picturesque Christ represented the fullest expression of divine loveliness in natural
form.
The aesthetic of the picturesque not only promoted religious visuals in contradistinction
to Puritan suspicion of the senses, it foreclosed aspects of devotional iconography essential to
Catholic and Eastern Christian traditions—namely, representations of Christ's torture. Historian
David Walker Howe has asserted the antebellum era's "growing public revulsion against the
infliction of physical pain" (650), and this emerging sensibility impacted apprehension of
doctrines relating to Christ's atonement for human sin via crucifixion, which, in turn, shaped the
liberal ethic of art. Increasingly, the orthodox doctrine of Christ's suffering and death as pain
inflicted by a Father God to sate his own wrath proved distasteful to liberal Protestants. The
pacifist Noah Worcester made this point when he penned a tract titled, "The Atoning Sacrifice, A
Display of Love Not Wrath" (Douglas 126). Bushnell and other theologians worked, in various
ways, to "minimize, even ignore suffering" (126) as a tool of divine punishment, shifting the
emphasis from Christ's agony at death to his offering as a gesture of divine welcome. As Douglas
observes, the "personalized, feminized, literary Bushnellian view of the Atonement was [...] a
non-crisis-oriented one, and it implied and presupposed a tranquil theory of religious
development in man as well as in God" (130).
Margaret's dream-encounter with this aestheticized Savior thus proves a "meditative,
pleasant communion with natural beauties" (qtd. in Rabinowitz 176), rather than a jarring
confrontation with the implications of sin and justice. Not only Christ himself, but the Holy
Spirit and the emblem of the cross undergo redaction into benign loci of natural beauty: the
conquering force of the Holy Spirit transforms into the innocuous symbol of a "milk-white dove"
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that "offered itself very familiarly" to play with a crippled child (1:169). Similarly, the
disturbing symbol of the cross as site of Christ’s atoning torture transfigures into an attractive
"cross-tree," an image of natural growth and invitational beauty which subverts the revivalist's
Old Testament metaphor of felled trees. Margaret sees it "set in the ground, where it grew like a
tree, budded and bore green leaves and white flowers, and the milk white dove […] flew and lit
upon the top of it" (1:165). Rather than manifesting himself as a sufferer nailed to this cross,
Christ mildly "lean[s]" on it, a distinction the author underscores by having a little child cry out
happily, "He doesn’t hang on the cross as he does in the Primer" (1:167). The body scarred by
the hideous torture device yields to a figure whole and untouched, with a mild visage "so
beautiful and so good" that children "rejoice to go near him" (1:168). In the Apostle John’s
words, "Welcome to Jesus!" (1:167). This liberalized Savior "is a creature of feeling, passive
rather than active, invoking not displaying" (Douglas 127)—as retiring and inoffensive as a piece
of picturesque art.
Margaret's attachment to the Christ of her dream, "my own Beautiful One" (1:310) as she
will later call him, exemplifies Emerson's "conviction that Christianity was founded on human
nature, not on the Bible," that Christianity, in fact, coextends with consciousness (Richardson
292). Paradoxically, then, the perfection of this consciousness subsists in the most
unselfconscious stages of human development—infancy and early childhood—when instinctual
attractions and repulsions guide responses to the world. Rather than have his heroine diminish
in her moral perfection as she grows, however, Judd illustrates through Margaret the spontaneous
response to beauty as the perpetual regeneration of infantile simplicity. Thus in another dream,
alongside the figure of Christ, Margaret dreams of "four beautiful female figures," whom she
recognizes as "Faith, Hope, Love, and their sister, who was yet of their own creation, Beauty"
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(1:224). Judd's inclusion of a fourth figure in the traditional trinity of cardinal virtues indicates
the crux of his theological redaction; receptivity to beauty, coequally natural and moral,
constitutes the path of spiritual regeneration. Rather than submitting to the will of God as
fundamentally antagonistic to the heart, the aspiring Christian need only embrace the original
and instinctual pursuit of pleasure in beauty.
Judd's effort to recast true Christianity in terms of integrity to nature yields the novel's
primary structural quandary: how to dramatize Christian conversion as a seamless process rather
than a disruptive event. This formal dilemma registers what Gregg Crane has identified as "one
of the central paradoxes of the sentimental novel": its valorization of "permanence and stasis as
signs of transcendent values" alongside a preoccupation with "movement and transformation"
(112). In "trying to reconcile the usually static vision of innocence with his concern for progress"
(Hathaway 4), Judd turns to language as the organic site for an unfolding Christian conversion
uncompromised by the unnatural crisis of supernatural intervention. As Margaret advances from
child to youth, she retains her uncorrupted "natural innocence" but in the context of enlarging
mental capacities; her conversion, therefore, entails a maturation into "Christian innocence,"27
marked by her assent to the rational and Christocentric language of Unitarian theology.
After Margaret's refusal to convert to the local orthodoxy, the community designates her
as unregenerate, a "wicked Indian" (1:309) with the unbending pride of the "natural heart"
(1:302). An isolated youth, she finds herself yearning for a language that will render the divinity
within her nature fully intelligible, but the only religious language she knows consists of the
townsfolk's falsely discriminating theological categories. For Judd as for Unitarians generally,
"the categories of seventeenth-century Covenant theology were largely fictive" (Buell, New
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England 273), and he rejected the language that separated nature from grace and "split
households" and communities "between the regenerate and unregenerate, or along sectarian
lines" (Mandelker 17). When Mr. Evelyn, the novel's Unitarian spokesperson and Margaret's
future husband, inquires why she does not "speak with the people" of the village to "discover the
nature of their emotions and thoughts," Margaret condemns their speech about God as
"unintelligible" (1:308). Because their "theological distinctions do not conform to anything that
exists in nature" (1:309), neither the townspeople's interior life nor the divine infusion of that life
can find expression.
Rather, for the orthodox townsfolk, religious language takes the form of antagonism,
between God and humanity, between desire and speech, and between the elect and the damned:
"There seems to be something above the people," Margaret complains, "something over their
heads, what they talk to, and seem to be visited by occasionally [...] making them solemn and
stiff like a cold wind" (1:308, author's emphasis). As in the case of the camp meeting revival,
Judd stresses the unnatural physical deportment that results from the gap between the divine and
human interposed by a language that "all runs of sins and sinners, the fall and recovery,
justification and election, trinity and depravity, hell and damnation" (1:309). The practical
outworking of these abstract distinctions comprises an interior disruption of the natural outflow
from religious desire to religious language; lacking the language to articulate "their emotions and
thoughts" in a religious context, the people turn "solemn and stiff" from the artificial disjunction
between nature and divinity. Their very bodies evince the disconnect in the life-giving
continuity of desire and speech. The village orthodoxy has nothing to offer Margaret by way of
expressing her maturing interior unity with divine nature.
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Although the child Margaret's affinity with nature manifested itself in a language of
simple, concrete enjoyment of the physical world, as a youth she finds herself lacking the
terminology to articulate and thereby fully experience an emergent reflective relationship with
nature: "I used to sit here in my merry childhood and think all was mine, the earth and the sky. I
ate my bread and cider, and fed the ants and flies. Through me innumerable things went forth
[...] and my jocund heart kindled the twilight" (1:313). These "innumerable" physical facts and
entities entered her bodily experience without suffering retention through reflection; she
therefore encountered the world as an uninterrupted flow of corporeal sensation, stimulating
correspondent emotion rather than complex reflection. In adolescence, however, she no longer
enjoys this simple correspondence between her somatic experience of the physical world and her
interior response: "In the same moment that I am worried I am at rest. How is this?" she
demands, "Are we divided like sheep? has each feeling its fold?" (1:314). Margaret's
anatomization of her psychological states signals cognitive development, an unfolding
complexity situated within a larger uncompromised simplicity of innocence.
The problem of providing Margaret with a language at once original and incomplete
proved a central challenge to Judd's project of rendering innocence in a developmental form. In
reference to affording the maturing Margaret "a species of erudition," he averred, "The
management of this part of the tale, it need not be said, was one of the most difficult problems
the author had to encounter" (1:iv-v). As a solution, Judd turned to the language of classical
mythology, which, though once a historical religious language, now lay open to reappropriation
as a transcendent language unattached to the particularities of its communal context. In the
absence of a religious nomenclature that discloses the union of nature with the divine, and her
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own place within that integral "whole," Margaret thus develops a partial, private system of
naming that betokens the concomitance of natural beauty and godhead.
A proficiency in academic Latin and ancient mythology enable Margaret to participate in
a seamless community of her own making, grafted out of history onto her local New England
landscape: "I have," she explains to Mr. Evelyn, "many and improving visitations, and much
select company. I told you of Egeria; then there is Diana's Walk in the woods, and close upon
the edge of the water you see some graceful white birches; those are the Nine Muses. Brother
Chilion is our Apollo" (1:314-15). She goes on to enumerate her "pretty Pantheon" (1:316), a
miscellany of mythological figures associated with various features of her home territory,
including "Mons Bacchi" or "Bacchus's Hill" (1:315) as the designation for the village's West
District, known locally as "the Head or Indian's Head" (1:20).
Margaret's cooptation of a dead religious language leaves her unfettered by any particular
conceptual paradigm. As such, it operates as a kind of "natural" vocabulary, creating space for
Margaret to engage in protracted games of expression, freely adopting, discarding, and coining
phrases on impulse, as she gropes for a language adequate to her expanded capacities: "while I
speak all I feel, there is more in me than I can ever speak. What harmony circumscribes the
whole? In what are pain and pleasure one?" (1:314). She can sense the fundamental unity that
encloses the new excesses of her interior life, but she cannot as yet name it. Margaret's
experience of nature deepens with her reflective capacity, so that she finds her home "every year
more beautiful, the trees more suggestive, the birds more musical, the bees more knowing"
(1:314), but can only assimilate the totality within a gesture of limitation, wryly confessing to
Mr. Evelyn, "To which divinity we are on the whole consecrated, I hardly know" (1:315). As a
child, Margaret simply enjoyed the contiguity between her spontaneous innocence and the
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physical world's sacred beauty; as a youth, she creates a self-contained but partial system of
naming all her own.
Margaret's erudite mythologizing and free-play of associations renders nature—the
physical world as well as her interior life—privately intelligible and so unintelligible to her
fellow villagers, with their "unnatural" religious vernacular. But her jumbling of linguistic
possibilities proves ultimately directional, hinting towards a future communal language in
Unitarianism. At one point, perplexed by an encounter with Mr. Evelyn, she at first exclaims,
"Patience, Silence, Feronia, Venus, O Mother God! help thy child!", a bizarre litany which
demonstrates her freedom from any particular conceptual system. Her contemplative outcries,
however, soon gravitate toward a Christological center: "O Christ!" she concludes, "relent thou
iron soul of the skies, and speak to me!" (1:319). In Volume II, following a more extensive
interaction with Mr. Evelyn, this Christological orientation becomes less fitful and more
pronounced; the intersection of Unitarian doctrine with Margaret's unfettered impulses prompts
the peculiar stream-of consciousness outbreak, "Toupee, tyetop, pomatum, powder—my hair
goes for a towel to wipe Christ's feet with" (2:33). Progressing through a combined association
of sense and sound, this sequence purports to follow a natural advancement of linguistic forms
towards a stylized culminating action centered on the figure of Christ.
The purportedly natural teleology of Margaret's developing language sets Judd's theory of
language apart from his Transcendental compatriots like Emerson and Thoreau; Judd, indeed,
never embraced the designation he and his novel would acquire as "Transcendental." On the one
hand, he shared with other Transcendentalists a "linguistic program" of "romantic primitivism"
(Hathaway 231), a theory of language as the purveyor of moral truths rooted in natural
phenomena. With Thoreau, he would have affirmed that "the roots of letters are things" (582),

45

for he harbored a strong bent for capturing dialect and discrete natural facts in an effort, as
Hathaway puts it, to "return to the origins of language, where grubby words smack of the soil"
(231). On the other hand, Judd retained the Christocentric theology that Emerson and Thoreau
abandoned, and this commitment shaped his representation in Margaret of a millennial evolution
of language toward Christian fulfillment. In Theology in America, E. Brooks Holifield notes that
by the time he composed Nature, "Emerson no longer believed in the transcendent and personal
God of Christian tradition" (443), and Dedmond observes that Judd "found the
Transcendentalists hollow, principally because Christ was not accorded his rightful place in their
view" (32). For Judd, words "came from God, in the nature of things" (Hathaway 272) but they
also tended toward Christ and therefore toward a recognizably Christian theological climax.
Unitarianism for Judd represented the Christian end toward which both natural
phenomena and human inclinations tended; it reclaimed Christ "from an unnatural and factitious
place in the universe" (qtd. in Dedmond) and placed him at the center of a harmonized
relationship between human nature and Christianity ("Young" 27). In its emphasis on reason,
order, and logic, Unitarianism indeed contrasted sharply with Calvinism's insistence on the
suprarational quality of special revelation (Holifield 456) and, as a result, offered to the minds of
many liberal Christians a welcome means of assimilating a formerly incomprehensible God to
his more or less comprehensible creation. But for the Unitarians and ex-Unitarians who espoused
Transcendental sympathies, this very attachment to the regularity of empirical systems signified
a debilitating overcorrection of irrationalism. As Lawrence Buell notes in Literary
Transcendentalism, the Transcendental movement "served as an expression of radical discontent
within American Unitarianism," stemming from that denomination's tenet "that God and his laws
are apprehended by rational reflection on the natural creation and the revelations of Scripture,
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rather than by direct intuition" (4). As Judd himself would admit, "It is said that Unitarianism is a
religion for cultivating the mind alone" ("Young" 32).
But therein lies the peculiar role of Margaret as organic angel, who, by virtue of her
infallible intuition, unites the Transcendental "vision of divine immanence" (Holifield 439) with
the theological and aesthetic symmetry of Unitarianism. According to Douglas, influential
antebellum author Sarah Hale "defined woman as the register of man's capacity for personal
experience," and Bushnell asserted that females by nature administer the "grace" of the "gospel"
(141). Within this sentimental schematic, the woman embodies spiritual and emotional interiority
on behalf of the male, and as a counterpoint to male rational abstractions, figured in Margaret as
the person of Mr. Evelyn. Buell suggests that "the mind of [...] Margaret must be refined by Mr.
Evelyn before she can qualify as the completely satisfactory alternative to Calvinist dogma
(341). I would argue, however, the inverse: the legitimacy of Mr. Evelyn's Unitarianism as
satisfactory alternative to Calvinism depends on the sanction of Margaret's intuition.
Through the reciprocity of Mr. Evelyn's rational disquisitions and Margaret's spontaneous
feelings, Judd intimates that, once afforded enlightened translations of Scripture and attendant
updated doctrine, human nature irresistibly gravitates toward Christianity as self-evidently
desirable. Presented with the reasonable gospel of Unitarianism, Margaret's resistance to the
language of the Christian faith dissolves; she can now respond to the underlying unified
substance of Christian truth formerly hidden by the false dichotomies of orthodoxy. When Mr.
Evelyn in their early encounter queries, "You have heard of the Savior of the world, Jesus
Christ?", Margaret replies, "Till I am sick of the name. It sounds mawkish in my ears [....] The
name is associated with whatever is distasteful in the world" (1:310). But a disinclination that
traditionally signaled an attitude of rebellion towards God here proves evidence of the capacity
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of individual instinct to separate true substance from false forms. Immediately after associating
the name "Jesus Christ" with "all that is distasteful in the world," Margaret recollects a latent
original harmony between form and substance, a substance self-validating through its evocation
of desire: "What, my own Beautiful One? Christ—yes—that is his name. I had almost forgotten
it [....] Is he not beautiful?" (1:310).
When, in their subsequent rendezvous, Mr. Evelyn pours out a torrent of Unitarian
inflections on Christian orthodoxy, Judd presents the uncompromised simplicity of Margaret's
emotional reactions as the definitive proof that reason and sympathy exactly coincide in
Unitarianism's rational redaction of Christianity. After an expository enumeration of Christ's
sufferings, Mr. Evelyn prepares to dispassionately transition "to other points" in his gospel
program, when Margaret cuts in with a passionate outburst: "O, Mr. Evelyn! [...] how can you go
on so! How cold you are! I cannot hear any more" (2:11). She then collapses on the ground
with "an audible profusion of tears" (2:11). Margaret's grief appears incongruent to the form
taken by Mr. Evelyn's discourse, that of a compressed homily, a block of text unrelieved even by
notation of the speaker's deportment, which he neatly sums up as "a brief notice" (2:11) of
Christ's sufferings.
But this very seeming discordance highlights the importance Judd places on the rational
dimension of Unitarianism—a rationality often charged with being excessive and dry. For Judd,
pure reason comprises absolute harmony and therefore absolute beauty, the beauty of this
otherwise tedious prose which Margaret finds so irresistible: "I only know," she ventures,
smiling through her tears, "that I feel it all through me, my heart swells like a gourd, and I ache
in a strange way. My memory and my sensations seem to be alike agitated" (2:11). Margaret's
profoundly sensual formulation of emotion suggests the vitality inherent but hidden in Unitarian
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theology. Because her intuitive tastes and distastes infallibly derive the true life-giving
substance beneath partial forms, when Margaret encounters the correct forms of the gospel
history, she can proclaim to Mr. Evelyn, "I know what you say is true, and when I hear it said, I
shall feel it to be so" (2:4, author's emphasis). Judd saw Unitarianism as at once the true Gospel,
"virginal, verdant, beautiful, and God-given" (Dedmond 45) and as still evolving toward its
perfection ("Young" 28); by aligning its doctrines with the intuitive approbation of Margaret as a
organic angel, he sought to instigate and dramatize this perfection, bringing this "virginal"
discourse to its moment of fertility.
Thanks to the rational discourse of Unitarianism, Margaret's conversion to Christianity
involves no essential transformation but rather the learning of a new Christian terminology to
express her "natural" spiritual state. She then symbolically extends this peaceful translation from
partial to consummate names over her patch of New England, formerly dubbed "Mons Bacchi."
As she initially senses the shift in formal allegiance inherent in moving from a partial and private
to a consummate and communal system of naming, Margaret seeks to assert the continuity
between her natural and Christian worlds by shoring up her mirrored interior and geographical
possessions against the possibility of loss: "But what becomes of my pretty Pantheon, Apollo and
Bacchus, Diana and Egeria, before this all-deluging One?" (2:4), she asks, in response to Mr.
Evelyn's exaltations of Christ. In return, he breaks down for her how all classical divinities serve
as a kind of "embodied Allegory," a concrete illustration of an original relation to divine
attributes (2:5). His explanation reassures her of the continuity between original substance and
consummate forms; nothing recontextualized as Christian suffers loss of intrinsic value.
Margaret in response gravitates towards the fullest expression of nature, as found in
Christ, stating, "the names must be changed. Bacchus Hill shall be Christ's Hill, Orpheus's Pond,
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his Pond. He shall be supreme; Head, Pond, and all, shall henceforth be called Mons Christi"
(2:33). By renaming her region according to a contemporary religious language, rather than an
academic classical one, Margaret establishes a new public domain that transcends her private
articulation of possessive desire, without occasioning the loss of her object. She will not
depopulate the region of its original deities but rather enable those deities, and the village folk
who cannot share them, all to access the one universal object of desire, Christ. In this way she
lays the foundation for the impending utopian Christian community, the future inhabitants of its
titular grounds, now Mons Christi.
Margaret's translation of local geography from pagan to Christian tacitly evokes the
colonial imposition of European names onto Native American land, and in the opening of the
chapter subsequent to Margaret's epic act of renaming, Judd goes on to establish the importance
of Native American absence to his millennial vision of a New England utopia.
Unlike the "little gods and goddesses" whose safety Margaret could energetically affirm in the
progress between natural and Christian innocence, the actual oppression, dispersal, and
dwindling of tribes by 1845, the time of Margaret's first publication, presented Judd with an
immanent and iconic disruption between nature and Christian civilization that resisted his effort
to posit the seamless assimilation of history into utopia. By the 1820's, Indian removal policies
had obtained the status of "'permanent' solution" to the problem of Native American land
holdings in areas of colonial expansion, and the government carried out the second phase of
removals across the decades of the 40's and 50's (Berkhofer 157; 165). As a consequence of
Federal Indian Policy pushing Indians west of the Mississippi, by "the middle of the nineteenth
century, most native people had indeed been made to disappear from the eastern landscape"
(Deloria 63-64).
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In practice, Judd strenuously objected to governmental action and popular attitudes
toward America's original inhabitants. In a Fourth of July lecture titled "The Idea of our
Country," he attacked America's behavior toward the Indians as its capital offense: "The most
glaring defection [...] appears in our treatment of the Indians. I think we have dealt worse by the
Indians than by the Africans. We exterminate the former; we domesticate the latter" (qtd. in Hall
310-311). While slave-trading derived from importation, a grafting on to America's landscape,
the destruction of Native Americans pertained to the roots of that landscape, and therefore
represented a greater obstacle to a core narrative of progressive national innocence. The
annihilation of aboriginals and their culture represented a "defection" from "the idea of our
country," its true substance of liberty which Judd hoped to bring to fulfillment in a Christian
utopia during his lifetime. Judd accordingly inveighed against the contemporary justifications for
the decline of the Native American population, saying, "Away with this doctrine of manifest
destiny, which, on our lips and in this connection, means nothing more than consummate
selfishness!" (qtd. in Hall 311). In spite of these bold pronouncements, his dramatization in
Margaret of millennial fulfillment would mirror the imperialist vision of Manifest Destiny in its
reproduction of the Native American disappearance as necessary and inevitable.
It seems probable that because Judd anticipated no popular adjustment in the
interpretation of Manifest Destiny, he determined to secure his projection of utopia against this
major historical contingency. Furthermore, Judd must have sensed the difficulty posed by
bringing a live, that is, contemporary pagan discourse into submission to Unitarian
Christianity—a discourse intimately bound up with the possession of land, of the right to name
and claim, in this case, "Indian's Head." Margaret's renaming of Indian's Head as Mons Christi
precedes her eventual ownership of it, even as the loss of the original Indian name for the
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geographical feature succeeded the respective tribe's loss of the land, and the communal
embedding signaled by the name.
Judd's version of Unitarianism, however, admits for little nostalgia, since it argues for
Christianity as not merely following upon but fulfilling all human expressions of truth, beauty,
and goodness. In The White Man's Indian, Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr. points out that because of
their attachment to "the scale of progress" in the "passage of history," American "artists and
authors could never espouse the thoroughgoing primitivism of their European counterparts" (91).
In Margaret, as Gavin Jones observes, "history is not to be bemoaned, but recreated" (461)—the
loss of the Native American presence, land, and systems of naming must be constructed as a
partiality that will be made whole in the Christian utopia of Mons Christi.
But if Native Americans have lost their American territories, how can the Christian utopia
erected on American grounds serve as a realization of their desires? Just as through the
progressive aesthetics of Margaret's language Judd creates a continuity between natural and
Christian innocence, so through a progressive aesthetics of racial bodies, he will bridge the gap
between Native American primordial innocence and American Christian utopia. The literal
translation of names from one system to another that characterizes Margaret's private conversion
maps onto a transference of bodies and land into a transcendent aestheticized estate, figured as
contained by and emerging from the body of the organic angel.
In order to prefigure Unitarianism's succession of Native American intimacy with the
natural world, Margaret must entertain a sliding racialized identity. Pejoratively called "Indian"
by the community for her intuitive association with the earth and resistance to orthodox Christian
instruction, the orphaned Margaret will function in the novel as a racialized stand-in for the
native populations. Unlike an integrated member of a Native American tribe, however, Margaret
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enjoys a peculiar kind of cultural mobility—as an adopted orphan, as an outcast of the religious
community, and as the recipient of an idiosyncratic education. This allows her to play the role of
local "Indian" without actually posing cultural barriers to her Christian conversion. Her selfconflation with nature remains always half-playful, half-fantastical. Of the trees she says, "They
are my home [...] I was born in them, have been sheltered under them, and educated by them, and
do sometimes believe myself of them" (2:3). Likewise, her language-play and toy divinities,
although they articulate a genuinely-treasured privacy, in themselves signify a cultural vacuum
readily filled by the complete system of Unitarianism, rather than an alternative natural language.
By contrast, Judd was well aware that Native American cultures presented a viable
alternative to Western civilization, as he remarked in "The Birthright Church" on colonial
captives' resistance to cultural rescue: "In our own New England history, little children, taken
captive by the Indians, assumed the costume, habits, language and religion of the Indians.
Eunice Williams, daughter of the well-known Deerfield minister, taken into captivity, married an
Indian; and on coming back to her native town, no persuasions could induce her to leave her
savage associates, or even lay aside her moose blanket" (11). Unlike the historical Eunice
Williams or any of her adopted Native American siblings, Margaret has no "moose blanket" to
lay aside—no real alternate costume, habits, language or religion to subsume in the course of her
transferred allegiance to Unitarianism. She offers a transparent natural innocence in place of the
Native Americans' opaque primitive innocence, which the novel represents as lost both from and
for the Indians following their fall into the white man's vices.
Judd has Mr. Evelyn present the ideal Native American "nature," embodied by the New
England Indian, as hopelessly lost to history, in spite of the novel's being set shortly after the
Revolutionary War. When Margaret inquires what Mr. Evelyn knows about "the original
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population," he immediately turns to "accounts written when they and the whites first met as
friends," and treats all their virtuousness as characteristic of the past: "They are universally
represented [in these accounts] as kind-hearted, hospitable, grateful, truthful, simple, chaste [...]
They possessed more virtues and fewer vices than Christians" (2:21). By contrast, following a
barrage of persecutions on the part of Christian settlers, they were forced "to assume a new
attitude as all men do in similar circumstances," and now "exhibit a melancholy instance of the
reflex, reciprocal action of evil" (2:35). These fallen Indians exist parenthetically between
America's edenic past and utopian future, interpolating innocence with history. As such, they
can no longer serve as representative "Indians" in the same way that the local orthodox
population can no longer serve as representative Christians. Berkhofer writes that within early
and antebellum constructions of "Indiannness," "If the Indian changed through the adoption of
civilization as defined by Whites, then he was no longer truly Indian [...] Change toward what
Whites were made him ipso facto less Indian" (29). In Deloria's words, Americans "desired
Indianness, not Indians" (90).
The resilient if marginalized presence of Native Americans posed a conceptual and
economic obstacle to the integration of primitive innocence into Christian utopia; their
geographic displacement via removal, however, enabled Judd to bracket their existence and
orchestrate an ahistorical reunion between the Noble Savage and Margaret as New World
heiress. In order to neutralize the land-based antagonism between Native and white Americans,
Judd splits a historical moment of conflicted white on Native American coexistence to displace
the virtuous pagan into an irretrievable edenic past and the true Christian into the utopian future,
disarming both parties of imminent interest in the appropriation of American soil. To bridge the
chronological and spatial gap the novel interposes between the races, Margaret must reach
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backward to link the primordial virtuous Indian with America's legitimate manifest destiny.
Only through the figure of Margaret as a culturally detached embodiment of American innocence
and true destiny, can Judd create a continuity between Native American and white land
ownership and between pre-history and utopia, thereby rendering the latter terms not only
necessary but desirable as the consummation of lost pagan virtues.
Judd thus privileges her alone with contact with the terminal members of a lost New
England tribe, looming magnificently out of an extinct era: "I know one Indian," she ventures to
Mr. Evelyn, "an old man, who comes here every year, and has come ever since I can remember
[....] He looks very old, as if he had seen a hundred years. Yet he is tall and straight, has fine
muscular proportions, and passes the house with a taught, Junonian step" (2:36). Mr. Evelyn
concludes that "He is probably a relic of the departed race, and comes to look upon the home of
his ancestors" (2:37). Alive only to Margaret, this "relic" presents no active threat as a
competitor of language and land—rather he has travelled out of the past to reconcile America's
future, just as Margaret, who plays with his little granddaughter, has traveled into the past. As
relic, he will offer himself up as aesthetic object in the coming Unitarian kingdom of Mons
Christi.
But to merit such a gift, Margaret must yield in Christian charity what America claimed
by mercenary coercion—the right to the land: "'What a pity they should not be here still; and I—I
would willingly be not,' observed Margaret, dropping her head upon her hand" (2:37). Margaret's
dejection atones for America's remorselessness, just as her sacrificial gesture restores its
innocence. Yet the gesture can only concretize emotion, rather than initiate action between two
peoples historically and geographically separated. Her token of self-abnegation creates an
aesthetic link that will fix the continuity of an American narrative of innocence without
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compromising its right, its obligation, to name the terms of that narrative. In essence, Margaret
must be willing to relinquish the land to a people who can no longer receive it, just as the
representative Native American must be willing to offer the land he has already lost. This mutual
endowment inverts the historical conflict and can only occur through the detachment of both
parties from the land.
Margaret's sliding racial identity enables her to espouse the victimhood of the Native
Americans, suffering at the same hands of false religion and receiving their gift disinterestedly;
at the same time, however, she will quit their encounter as a victor, the repository of Indian land
and memory. By embedding Margaret's body in a discourse of whiteness, and her identity in an
aboriginal discourse, Judd enables her to attach the Native Americans' memories of collective
suffering and white guilt onto her body with impunity. As an "Indian outsider," Margaret earns
the right to "mourn like an Indian" (Deloria 89). She is justified in completing what Native
Americans began because she shares their identity, yet her completion of them will entail the
fulfillment of her own body, ultimately a communal white body.
In their final fatal encounter, Margaret stumbles into the "giant form" (2:149) of Chief
Pakanawket and his granddaughter, who lead her up to the Head—Indian's Head/Mons Christi.
The village authorities have just hanged her beloved brother Chilion over a conviction of
manslaughter, and what was for Judd the whole ugly unnatural machinery of the Puritan church
and state has reached a climax, ready to be purified by the spark from the chief's pipe which has
set the town ablaze. The townspeople's revelries over Chilion's hanging mirror the
"thanksgiving" offered "to their God" at the burning of Indian children (2:152), pointing to a
common enemy in false religion. The disenfranchisement of the Native Americans cleared a
space for the erection of Margaret's village, and the destruction of the old structures of the village
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will clear the way for the utopia of Mons Christi—the chief thus serves a double role of removal,
through his own prior and impending absence and the goading of the fire that decimates the
town.
He has, in fact, appeared to stage his disappearance, like so many antebellum fictional
Indians before him (Romero 35), signaling both his protest of American history and his sanction
of American utopia. Deloria explains how in literary figurations of the vanishing Indian, the last
of tribes "offered up their lands, their blessings, their traditions, and their [...] history to those
who were, in real life, violent, conquering interlopers" (65). Judd creates a variation on this trope
by installing Margaret as "child of nature" cum organic angel who parallels the "romantic
savage" (Berkofer 78) and therefore stands in opposition to the same "conquering interlopers"
who have destroyed the Native American birthright. After narrating the aggressive mistreatment
of the Indians by Puritan settlers and enumerating his tribal losses, Pakanawket accordingly
bequeaths his forfeited lands to Margaret and seals his people's transformation into the aesthetic
realm: "Take this land, this hill, these woods, these waters—they are yours. Sometimes in your
love, your happiness, your power, remember the poor Indian!" (2:153). Equipped with his
granddaughter's "Heron's Wreath," and entrusted with the collective memory of Native American
losses, Margaret will go forth as the white Indian maiden uniting Old and New World innocence.
The chief has materialized out of history to purify the terms of a transaction that has
already occurred. As "safely dead and historically past" (Berkhofer 90), he offers in peace what
has already been taken in violence, and makes a controlled departure into a death once forcibly
inflicted: "The chief, taking his granddaughter in his arms, deliberately advanced to the edge of
the rock, balanced himself over the abyss, and leaped off into the dark waters, where, borne
down by the weight of his girdle, he sank beyond recovery" (2:153). In his relinquishment of the
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land, his life, and the life of his progeny—Margaret's would-be rival as child of nature—he
retroactively manifests the autonomous authority necessary to rectify the coercive character of
American expansion. Margaret receives his legacy in a spirit of resignation; this "tragic finale"
calls for no especial grief or action in the moment because the exodus simply restages a fact from
the past. Lora Romero identifies this feature of the vanishing Indian myth as its representation of
"the disappearance of the native not just as natural but as having already happened" (35).
Contained in the past, the "elegiac mode" (35) of this moment commutes historical conflict into
an image centered on "a safe, consensual past" (Deloria 69), and ultimately into a relic that
mediates the communal fulfillment of all American peoples.
In the novel's epistolary third segment, titled "Womanhood," Judd has Margaret elucidate
the Native Americans' part in his reconstruction of a maturing innocent American interior,
figured as Margaret's own womb-like interior, which absorbs the historical disruptions of
violence and transmutes them into consecrate objects. Chief Pakanawket "sank beyond recovery"
into the dark waters of history, but Margaret's interior constitutes an alternative watery grave,
one that will see the particularities of history resurrected as translucent art, letting only the light
of innocence shine through. Judd will explicitly conflate Margaret's struggle for coherent
selfhood following the death of Chilion with America's struggle toward nationhood following the
destruction of Native American culture: "Suffering," Margaret contends, "make[s] us conscious
of ourselves," and "I seem to myself to be deep as our own bottomless Pond. The Indian and his
child lie there; in me the last of many ages and races of hope and life seem to have perished.
Clamavi de profundis" (2:203, author's emphasis). This "clamavi de profundis" or "profound
depths" provide not simply space but rather a peculiar climate of coalescing intimacy and
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distance, the conditions that will yield, not the resurrection of Native American bodies, but
bones, objects destined for aestheticization in the Unitarian utopia (2:263-4).
Margaret's transparent interior comprises the crystallizing interval between pre-history
and utopia. The sublime depths of her aesthetic womb bring all historical contingencies to a
single luminous surface of divinely-ordained ownership, what she calls "the edge of this
illimitable, whale-bearing, sky-cleaving Nature," which, "with hoe and axe, microscope and
alembic, love and health, we take possession of [...] in the name of God and Christ, amen"
(2:263). For in spite of the threat of depths as productive of psychological and cultural
disruptions, a block in the "transition—from myself to myself" (2:201), Margaret's capacious
innocence leaves no object unilluminated by divine light. As she reassures a friend, "the sun
swims through me, and I hear Jesus walking on the troubled waters above" (2:203). Once
Margaret, heir of her grandfather's fortune, together with her now-husband Mr. Evelyn, has taken
official possession of the Head and its surrounding area, "Nature" finally finds its realization in
aesthetic productions; and just as landscaping will consummate the land, so will enshrinement
consummate its original inhabitants (2:263-4).
If, at a national level, Judd had to reckon with a conflict centered on racial and cultural
dispossession, at the communal and psychological level he had to address the disruptive force of
desire itself, in its possessive and exclusivist dimensions. Just as he dramatized through
Margaret's conversion the consonance of natural desire and divine beauty, Judd wished to assert
the fundamental compatibility of private desire and communal prosperity. To illustrate this
paradox, he deploys communally accessible aesthetic commodities as the centerpiece of his
fictional utopia. With the desirable person or object rendered sharable through aestheticization,
beauty, as Judd represents it, fuels generosity rather than provoking possessiveness. Because it
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purports to rely on a dynamic of access rather than possession, this process simultaneously
intensifies and diffuses desire, creating a sustainable community centered on personal
gratification.
Philip Gura notes that antebellum utopian novelists "portrayed ideal communities, often
based on the socialist ideas of the early-nineteenth-century French utopian thinker Charles
Fourier," who "was widely read at the time for his vision of a harmonious world devoid of social
and economic competition, where gratification of one's passions was assured" ("Truth's" xvi;
xvii). Judd would not go so far as to promote the literal "communism of property and persons"
through, for instance, complex marriage (Mandelker 18). Rather, he tried to present an alternate
form of consumption that maintained privatized material ownership and sexual commitment
while democratizing aesthetic and erotic enjoyment. As Gavin Jones observes, Margaret
"confines radical ideas of free love [...] entirely within orthodox structures" (457). Fourier had
advocated that "all aspects of life" be "organized by the 'passions'—the instinctual, nonrational
parts of the self that demand gratification" (Gura, "Truth's" 97), and Judd, in effect, abstracted
Fourier's belief in "the law of 'attraction'" as "the underlying principle of the cosmos" in order to
spiritualize its application.
Judd sets up this paradigm of nonpossessive desire in a side story devoted to
contextualizing Margaret's auspicious birth as herald of a new social order in which natural
desire and divine beneficence mutually flower as artistic creation. The child of nature turns out to
"have her birthplace in song" (1:115), reflecting Judd's Transcendentalist-tending faith in
genuine art as an organic outgrowth of nature (Buell 147) and therefore an immanent interaction
with divine life. Because artistic products can disseminate pleasure outside of ownership,
woman-as-art serves as the ideal remedy for the problem of marital exclusivity and, by
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extension, material property. Margaret's conception, therefore, occurs in the context of an
amative triangle mediated by aesthetic pleasure.
Though raised by an impious peasant family, Margaret, was born the daughter of the
naturalized Hessian Gottfried Brückmann and his American wife Jane Girardeau. Margaret's
name derives from her father's deceased great love, his erstwhile German pupil Margaret
Bruneau who perished an ocean away at the conclusion of the Revolutionary War. At the news
of Margaret Bruneau's death, Gottfried immediately devotes himself to an aestheticization of her
absence that reconstructs her presence through the art of flute-playing: "Margaret would reappear
in the tones of their love and their youth; her spirit would echo to the voice of his flute; in song,
like night, they would meet again; by an invisible pathway of melody they would glide on to the
grave" (1:102). Gottfried's exclusive love-object while embodied, Margaret can now, as melody,
entertain additional lovers. Lured by the enchanting music of the flute, a neighboring young
woman Jane Girardeau appears on the scene and takes pity on the lonely and destitute Gottfried.
The real object of captivation afforded by Gottfried's back story, however, turns out to be
Margaret Bruneau, or, more precisely, Gottfried's erotic gaze directed at Margaret as an object
who can be infinitely accessed but not possessed.
Instead of seeking to possess Gottfried for herself, by replacing Margaret in his
affections, Jane will seek aesthetic access to his more perfect union with Margaret, more perfect
through its freedom from the partial possession inherent in the limitations of particular bodies.
After successfully securing a subsequent visit with Gottfried and insisting on a repetition of his
life's story, an idea "seized her, and for that she was willing to sacrifice every thing" (1:106).
The narrator's description of this idea as one that "had neither shape, nor color, nor definition,
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nor end" (1:106), anticipates Gottfried's declaration that Margaret "was a transparent, articulate
revelation of God" (1:107).
Jane's falling in love with Gottfried entails a reenactment of his falling in love with
Margaret, through whom Jane in turn conceives of herself as aesthetic object of desire. A
complex intersubjective aestheticization ensues, creating an erotic triangle of perpetually
circulating desire:
[Gottfried] seemed for his devotion to Margaret Bruneau, purer, greater, diviner.
He and Margaret constituted to [Jane's] mind a delightful company. She entered a
magic circle when she came into their communion. She became one of a glorious
trio. Then she saw herself interpreted and symbolized in Margaret; and acted as a
conjuration to bring that delightful vision from the shades. (1:109)
The playful terms of "magic" and "conjuration" signal the manipulation of aesthetic objects that
allows for erotic desire to pleasurably diffuse without ever arriving at a terminus. Jane and
Gottfried's courtship and eventual marriage revolves around the dissolution of desire's
boundaries, as Jane at once seeks to be desired by Gottfried and Margaret, to be desired by
Gottfried as Margaret, to desire Gottfried because he desires Margaret:
I ask for entrance, for a home, in that which you are, for fellowship with you and
all your life. Tell me more of Margaret; I will grow up into her image; I will
transmute myself to her nature. You shall have a double Margaret; no, not
double, but one. Nay, if needs be, I will go out of myself; I will be the servant of
you both. Call me your child, your and Margaret's child, your spirit-child, and so
love me. (1:112)
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Jane attempts every conceivable relation to Gottfried and Margaret in order to demonstrate the
totality of her desire. Absolute, transparent, seamless, and endless, Jane's passion expresses
dispossession—going "out of" oneself—as the unqualified plunge into desire, rather than a
resignation of it. A desire without boundaries knows no confining edges of objects, only a
diffusion through the objective gaze toward an infinite end.
The anomalous, even bizarre dynamic of Jane and Gottfried's romance provides a crucial
contextualization for Margaret Hart/Brückmann's birth, destining her as the ambassador of a
religion that promotes an erotic continuum hosted within the neutral sphere of art. Through art,
Judd seeks to dissolve the boundaries between private and public, personal and impersonal,
spiritual and material, and desire and beauty, so that desire can seamlessly transfer from one
object to another without a sense of loss incurred by limitation. Jane rejoices that "little Margaret
is to have her birthplace in song!" and, were she to die along with her parents, would be
additionally succored by "our other Margaret" and blessed by Jesus (1:115). Born "in song,"
Margaret will thus lay the foundation for a religion that nurtures, intensifies, and diffuses erotic
desire by circulating it endlessly through artistic representation. The erotic triangulation that
characterizes Margaret's parentage acts as a synecdoche for the controlled satisfaction of all
human desire which will typify the utopian community of Mons Christi.
Mons Christi, which takes shape in the last third of the two-volume novel, reflects Judd's
effort to institutionalize an organic progression from natural phenomena into aesthetic
productions infused with divine life. Rabinowitz comments that an "attempt to visualize,
construct, and maintain a physical environment designed for holiness concretely expressed the
liturgical spirit among evangelicals in the 1840s and 1850s" (203). Unitarians and, by midcentury, liberal Congregationalists, had begun "aggressively to patronize the arts" (Buell, New
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England 49) which they "tended [...] to view as a means of evangelism rather than as a threat to
religion (Literary 26). Artistically-inclined Transcendentalists pushed the significance of art even
further, "intensifying the Unitarian commitment to artistic expression by envisaging the creative
process [...] as originating in the experience of divine inspiration" (New England 47). "Beauty
and truth came to seem inextricably intertwined" (Literary 26), and invoking religious
conversions by constructing aesthetically pleasing environments followed as a logical corollary.
Augusta Jane Evans, in her 1859 novel Beulah, would declare, "it may be safely proclaimed that
genuine aesthetics is a mighty channel, through which the love and adoration of Almighty God
enters the human soul" (202).
While Judd certainly envisioned Mons Christi as a formal instigation of "genuine
aesthetics," contemporary critics have found his concretization of the continuity between nature
and the supernatural awkward, to say the least. Hathaway asserts that when, "at the end of
Margaret, Judd tried to create a deus ex machina, the novel fell apart [....] The transformation is
mechanical, not an organic growth from what has gone before, and the result is a bit ludicrous"
(239). This very breakdown in Margaret's illusion of organicism highlights the dissonance
between Transcendental aesthetics and narrative, illustrating "why Judd wrote novels and
transcendentalists generally did not" (281). Hathaway points out that, unlike Emerson for
instance, Judd refused to "put off the weeds of time and place and personal relation" in his quest
for infinitude (281-2); his brittle crystallization of particularities around absolutes thus only
serves to suggest the contradictions inherent in the liberal Christian impulse itself.
As Philip Judd Brockway would remark, Judd "stands as an interpreter of his generation,
filling in colors and details of the good life sketched by Emerson and the Transcendentalists"
(108). If the estate of that good life, in Douglas' characterization of Margaret, "is laid out
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exactly like the new cemeteries, with floral names, marble statuary, etc" (373), it is because Judd
rejected an individualistic vision of divine immanence in art. Cemetery environments seek to
inculcate intensely private experience within a democratically accessible, public space, and
Mons Christi models Judd's conceptual balancing of individual and communal enjoyment of
divine beauty.
This communal tendency in Judd's vision revolves around Margaret, the female messiah
who, in Jones' words, "possess[es] the ability to reduce the ideal to the actual by embodying her
natural beauty and virtue in surrounding things" (460). Margaret makes possible the democratic
intersection of the real and the ideal that remains illusive, even undesirable, for thinkers like
Emerson, who valorized the heroics of self-contained salvation. Like Bushnell, Judd's
philosophy stands "opposed to the individualism of the then prevalent theology, and recognizes
and emphasizes the organic life [...] wherein no soul lives or acts alone as a unit, but all as parts
of a living organism" (Cheney 178). His choice of a heroine over a hero significantly
counterpoints Transcendental masculine heroics; Emerson, for instance, as Camille Paglia points
out, "rarely mentions women, from whom Romanticism normally draws its power" (601). Judd,
by contrast, called women "the bonds of society" (qtd. in Hall 148), and stated that Margaret as
novel "shows what [...] a woman can do" (qtd. in Hall 375). The novel, he further explained
"would give body and soul to the divine elements of the Gospel" (qtd. in Dedmond 63), and
Margaret, like the sacrament of Christian communion, instantiates the infinite multiplication of a
divine particular. The sacramental aesthetic of her body makes of the "many" "one," and thus
doubles as the distinctively American figuration of community, e pluribus unum. Nature,
divinity, and aesthetics converge in Margaret as the uncorrupted and incorruptible consumable
object at the center of a new "transcendental republic" (Jones 459).
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In section III, "Womanhood," Judd turns to an epistolary saga as the most effective form
for both setting out and illustrating this aesthetic solution to the problem of conflicted interests,
centered on the messianic role of Margaret. The letter's generic expectation of self-disclosure
provides the basis for a forthright transparency unavailable through dramatic action, enabling
Judd to rapidly round out his vision of the relationship between forms and substance, beauty and
desire. As epistolary collection rather than an exchange, "Womanhood" completes the
dissolution of the problem of alterity by deploying each voice as unidirectional; that is, each
letter addresses a minor character without an included response. The sweeping complementarity
of these voices compels the reader to assent to the accounts and forego critical analysis. Thus
even the most potentially troubling aspects of the new utopia subside into the guileless
enthusiasm and rhetorical questions which present them, an enthusiasm purportedly no longer
attributable to the narrator but expressive of the firsthand experience of the only ones with the
right to judge. The epistolary collection thus encapsulates Judd’s version of Christian
democracy—an aesthetic community that allows all to access the same thing and bear the same
witness about it.
The estates of Mons Christi, redeemed through a tremendous influx of wealth from
Margaret’s maternal grandfather Mr. Girardeau, represent democracy without conflict, capitalism
without self-interest, and religion without factions—the imaging of a repaired microcosm of the
United States. Margaret’s inheritance, which enables her and her now-husband Mr. Evelyn to
purchase the district including and surrounding the Head, consolidates her and the villagers'
interests. The Evelyns' possession of the grounds remedies the economic and spiritual
dispossession of the villagers, many of whose estates were mortgaged to the despotic Mr. Smith,
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and who were correspondingly enslaved to sinful habits of "indolence and dissipation" (2:224),
visually manifest as distasteful living conditions.
While hard cash literally redeems the estates, aesthetic harmony provides the irresistible
locus of spiritual transformation, mediating exterior and interior order and collapsing the
distinction between them: "Mr. Evelyn had their houses repaired and painted, sent men to help
clear out their intervals, planted a row of trees along the street, and had a beautiful statue of
Diligence set up at the corner" (2:224). For Judd, people recognize and irresistibly respond to an
exterior world in keeping with their interior orientation toward beauty, and art serves, not as
mere representation, but as an actual site of a centering equilibrium between interior and exterior
states. Freed from the impinging confusions of aesthetic disharmony, the villagers align
themselves with their new environment; as Margaret subsequently reports, "Houses, rooms,
yards, fences, streets, as well as persons, in all parts of the town, look wonderfully clean, neat,
tidy" (2:246).
The pseudo-virtuous qualities of cleanliness, neatness, and tidiness reveal Judd’s vision
of the fullest intersection of the human and divine at the point of aesthetics rather than simply of
"nature," as the organic physical world. The accumulation of dirt, physical deterioration, and
random and profuse growth which characterized portions of the village prior to its renovation
paradoxically represent a falling away from nature, so that aesthetic reform must in effect rescue
nature itself from its own unnatural conditions. This Unitarian utopia or Christian state of nature
thus involves the introduction and proliferation of artifice as corrective to undisciplined nature.
Because for Judd the intersection of the natural and divine occurs at the point of aesthetic
forms, he turns to the importation of artistic riches of the Old World to construct the New, even
as he contends that the New World completes the Old. In this way he participates in what John
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Gatta has called a "myth of total renewal,' whereby Europe can be colonized, remade and
reinvented according to the messianic destiny laid down for the United States" (84). The
importation of European statues, architecture, and even forms of recreation demonstrates the
New World’s boundless access to all the aesthetic products of history, freed from the
contingences of history, as Mons Christi’s pastiche of aesthetic objects and practices reveals:
"Mr. Evelyn brought from Europe a valuable library, fine maps and engravings, and a few choice
pieces of architecture [….] We have busts of the old philosophers, a copy of the Venus de
Medici, Apollo Belvidere, Antinous, Belisarius, a Psyche and Butterfly, a Prometheus and
others, and some excellent paintings" (119). In defense of the importation, Margaret first cites
the domestic unavailability of some products, then challenges, "Besides, what matters it? I am
made up of all nations, German, French, English, American" (2:221). The rather abbreviated list
of "all nations" here, drawn from Margaret’s ethnic origins, stresses the utopia’s solution to the
still disconcerting origins of the United States as a rebel colony—everything found elsewhere
can be found in Mons Christi also, and more perfectly realized: "No European village that I have
heard of," Margaret attests, "no American village that I have seen, is so beautiful" (2:297). By
exceeding the beauty of both European and traditional American villages, Mons Christi and its
surrounding estates collapse the loss implicit in the separation of the United States from its
mother countries, even as it suggests the auspiciousness of Anglo-Saxon roots as the basis for
New England’s privilege of pioneering utopia.
The aesthetic forms distilled out of the chaos of Old World and classical history, freely
recontextualized at Mons Christi, create a transcendent atmosphere of transformative beauty that
passively converts its witnesses, so that the acquisition of foreign art dovetails with domestic
charity. Initially Margaret's explanation of her estate's structural and ornamental opulence
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sounds like raw self-interest: "When Mr. Evelyn was in Europe," she recounts, "he visited the
Cemeteries of Naples, Pisa, and Pere la Chaise at Paris, and here he would reproduce the effect.
We cannot imitate all architectural and princely forms, but we can do that which pleases
ourselves" (2:237). Margaret’s emphasis, however, on the reproduction of effect helps situate her
ensuing remark that "Several of the citizens have already put up tasteful monuments" (2:237).
She can openly seek to please herself, insofar as her pleasure comprises a contagious aesthetic
delight; the purchase and production of aesthetic objects proves self-justifying, as private
ownership invites democratic participation.
Because a shared beholding rather than proprietary rights constitutes real access to the
Mons Christi heirdom, Margaret can unabashedly boast about the extent and expense of her and
Mr. Evelyn’s investments. Of her husband’s liberal expenditures she reports, "Our house is
finished […] The expense within and without, Mr. Evelyn says, has not been less than one
hundred thousand dollars" (2:261). She further celebrates aesthetic dominance over the land by
establishing a correlation between vista and conquest: "Our house […] will command a more
extensive Western view than we now enjoy, taking in the whole of the Pond, the Brandon Hills,
and Umkiddin. Through avenues that we shall cut in the Maples will be seen the Village, the
River, the Meadows, the champagne country, and mountains beyond" (2:215). Possession of
Mons Christi comprises a kind of absolute conquest grounded in innocence through the
democratic accessibility of visual objects. Whatever can be seen proves subject to possession,
yet all can possess what they see.
As a result, the more material harmony created through cultivation, importation, and
construction, the more justifiable, even charitable, the project. Bushnell entertained the same
level of boldness with respect to aligning Christianity and affluence: of the church, he wrote,
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"The wealth of the world runs towards her [....] till she has both enriched and regenerated the
world" (Views 163). Margaret associates the construction of her palatial grounds at Mons Christi
with Christian obligation, saying, in reference to her experiment in renovation at No. 4, "I know
not that I was ever conscious of any mission to this people; but after our house was done, I could
not be satisfied till something else was doing" (2:279). The "effect" on the villagers, she relays,
"was almost instantaneous and quite magnificent; that the Scripture might be fulfilled where it is
written, ‘Though they have lain among pots, they shall become as the wings of a dove covered
with silver, and her feathers with yellow gold’" (2:279).
Aware of the problematic slippage between "silver" and "gold" as aesthetic object and
currency, Judd has Margaret defend their expenditures by exploiting the slippage itself:
Some would fain make themselves believe that we have opened a battery of
systemic bribery, that we have got into the human heart […] by our gold. You
would be surprised to know how little we have bestowed in a mere eleemosynary
manner. We gave nothing to the No. 4’s, except what took an ornamental form.
(2:279)
Currency, crystallized as ornament, can advertise rather belie its basis—the more extravagant the
investment, the more beautiful the object, and the more communal satisfaction occasioned. In
American Romanticism and the Marketplace, Michael Gilmore observes that, for Emerson, "the
taint of commodity is transcended by spiritualizing matter and exchanging it for meaning instead
of money" (29). Judd points to this purification process when he has Margaret assert, "Our
money indeed has gone freely, but more in ways aesthetic and religious than otherwise" (2:280).
Meaning, not money, has converted the inhabitants of the village. Aesthetic consumption thus
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provides the wedge between capitalism and venal self-interest that weds private and public
possession, disinheriting none while enfranchising all.
At the heart of this program of proliferating artifice stands Margaret, the organic angel. In
a letter from Mr. Evelyn to Margaret's friend Anna, the former insists that "it is she herself, and
not we, who is, under God, and in Christ, the soul of all that which we now behold" (2:264). And
as Margaret herself acclaims, it is her dreams which "have gone out in realities" (2:229), with the
erection of a benign, floral cross on the Head, now Mons Christi. Margaret serves as Judd's
representation of uncorrupted nature flowering into transformative art, the reconciliation of two
fundamentally compatible natures—human and divine.
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II. NATURAL ELECTION IN MARIA CUMMINS' THE LAMPLIGHTER

In Chapter 1 I outlined Sylvester Judd's utopian vision of the aestheticized female body
as the matrix of universal regeneration; this chapter explores a scaled-down version of that ideal
as it appears in the antebellum genre of the female-authored female bildungsroman, variously
described as domestic, women's, or sentimental fiction. The traditional female bildungsroman,
like Judd's male-authored anomaly Margaret, takes as its fundamental premise the unique
converting power of the mature American Christian woman and attempts a concrete
representation of the process of her development into sainthood. As Lucinda L. Damon-Bach
observes, "the process of growing up for nineteenth-century women was synonymous with
becoming a Christian" (33), and novels of female maturation consequently double as a distinct
genre of the conversion narrative. In Judd's utopian novel, the heroine's absolute innocence
remains unqualified from birth to adulthood; the supernatural so fully interpolates Margaret's
nature from the outset that it threatens to dissolve the narrative tension of conversion. By
contrast, female-authored sentimental novels maintain a greater tension between nature and
divinity: the "natural" female child must still in some sense shed sinful inclinations in order to
fulfill her predisposition toward divinity.
Although it qualified the innocence of pre-conversion nature, the female bildungsroman
allied itself with a processual rather than instantaneous model of conversion, the latter associated
with contemporary revivals and, historically, with a specific moment of divine intervention that
displaced the naturally depraved heart with a supernaturally redeemed one. The processual
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model of conversion emerged as a rationalist redaction of orthodoxy; critics of the orthodox
model of salvation by divine election saw conversion as a disconcertingly arbitrary supernatural
event.28 In an increasingly rationalist society, instantaneous conversion—the idea that one might
be randomly selected for a complete and immediate change of nature—came to look both
somewhat implausible and unacceptably elitist. Sentimental novelists thus perpetuated a
democratized concept of salvation as universally accessible; regardless of circumstances, "rather
than awaiting religious conversion" as divine intervention, a person "could achieve moral
perfection through self-sacrifice and the power of the individual will" (Gura, "Truth's" xv).
But while the female developmental novel as a genre already reflected a major
theological revision through this depiction of salvation as gradual and self-directed, discrete
novels from the period differ widely in their representation of the conversion process as
continuous or discontinuous with a preexisting state of the heart. As Erica Bauermeister and
Philip Gura have argued, the two most popular representative female bildungrsomane of the
period, respectively Susan Warner's The Wide, Wide World (1850) and Maria Cummins' The
Lamplighter (1854), offer markedly divergent dramas of conversion, with Warner's novel
emphasizing the depravity of unredeemed instincts and Cummins' suggesting an innate
predilection for sanctity.29 While both novels present rigorous voluntary discipline as the catalyst
for spiritual development, The Wide, Wide World's heroine Ellen must relentlessly mortify "her
natural impulses and desires" (23) to achieve sanctity, whereas Gertrude's natural impulses and
desires eventually realize a perfect overlap with divine imperatives. A combination of primitive
28
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energy and inborn taste fits Gertrude for a spiritual transformation that selectively cultivates
rather than crushes natural desire (Fisher 66). Gertrude's blend of democratic discipline and
special predisposition reflects Cummins' attempt to conceptually reconcile the processual model
of conversion as universally accessible and an older orthodox model of conversion as contingent
on special election.
This effort to harmonize orthodox and liberal Christian constructions of human nature has
significant structural implications; The Lamplighter comprises a long, unwieldy narrative whose
second half unexpectedly shifts to read much "like a novel of manners" (Singley 117), a dramatic
generic departure that begs for formal analysis. Bauermeister rightly contends that the
"groundwork" laid in the first half of the novel works "against the theory that The Lamplighter is
a fiction which, due to financial pressure to make the book longer or a lack of artistry on the part
of its author"—a theory which resonates with the reputation, for instance, of Melville's
experimental Pierre—"suddenly and incongruously takes a detour" (26). Rather, as Bauermeister
suggests, Cummins' "compromise between conflicting cultural values" demands generic
deformation. The Lamplighter thus serves as an ideal candidate for analysis in terms of the
intersection of religion and literary form by virtue of its uneven but radical attempt to map
divergent structures of conversion onto mid-century middle-class material culture.
The Lamplighter has become a minor staple in critical discussions of mid-century
American women's fiction, usually in conjunction with or, more recently, as a foil to analyses of
Warner's preceding and more conservative bestseller The Wide, Wide World. Belonging to the
class of women's sentimental fiction, The Lamplighter has, however, seldom received the kind of
formal treatment Susan Harris encourages in 19th-Century Women's Novels (1990), the "paying
attention to the way women writers manipulate language, not only words but also sentences,
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paragraphs, and full narratives" (22). Harris dares to label these kinds of novels "exploratory" by
virtue of "their loose narrative constructions and disjunctive codes" which "give readers far more
freedom to constitute their own hermeneutic, to perceive different configurations, than they
would be permitted to perceive in more tightly structured didactic texts" (33). Formalist attention
to sentimental fiction as "exploratory" helps to elude the trap Lydia Fisher identifies as that of
consigning this literature to "one of two camps—as forces of either containment or cultural
critique" (50). Fisher warns against "reducing rich literature to accommodate our limited, often
binary understanding of the past" and urges critics to concentrate instead "on the competing
desires that shape individual domestic texts" (51). While critics since the publication of Jane
Tompkins' watershed defense of sentimental literature in Sensational Designs (1986) have taken
antebellum women's novels seriously as cultural agents, these works remain understudied as
formally innovative companions to male-authored "American Renaissance" texts.
By emphasizing sentimental theme as coextensive with simple formal imitation, the first
generation of American literary critics isolated out women's novels from a canon devoted to
formal complexity and conceptual richness. However, in so doing they neglected both the shared
sentimental thematic of traditional American Renaissance texts and the formal complexity of
women's "exploratory" fiction. Experimental novels by both male and female antebellum authors
reflect a shared thematic and formal preoccupation with the crisis initiated in the conversion plot
by a culture-wide shift in the perception of human nature. While antebellum women's novels
avoid the "ontological extremes" (Harris 21) characteristic of the works by canonical male
authors, they are invested in exploring the same problem of how to accommodate the doctrine of
natural innocence associated with liberal Protestantism to a plot structure predicated on original
depravity and divine intervention. Tompkins took the first step in reuniting the thematic interests
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of women's fiction with specific stylistic devices, but much work remains in terms of examining,
not merely the diverse cultural ideologies expressed in these texts, but their peculiar mechanisms
of expression—of examining not merely what they convey but how they convey it.
In the case of The Lamplighter, Cummins creates a hybrid model of conversion through
two strategic compromises. First, she universalizes Gertrude's situation by making her an
impoverished orphan and so an every-child whose resistance to conversion through spiritual
instruction, she implies, could not be exceeded by any child anywhere. The little Gerty thus
seems to present a test case for developmental conversion because she begins at spiritual ground
zero, knowing nothing at all of God and breaking out in acts of aggression toward her cruel
guardian. At the same time, however, Cummins creates a covert but powerfully operative blend
of specific origins for the orphan, by, on the one hand, deploying the trope of the noble savage to
associate Gertrude with Native American "noble" if not innocent passions, and, on the other
hand, revealing in the novel's final pages Gertrude's true aristocratic bloodline. As a
consequence, while the child Gerty resembles in ugliness of feature and deportment a depraved
child beyond the reach of grace, in fact these "features" of both body and character prove signs
of her special undeveloped capacity to receive and disseminate grace. As her second strategic
compromise, Cummins further blurs the distinction between a natural and redeemed life by
portraying Gertrude’s sexual maturation as itself a sign of her increasing sanctification; the
narrator and diverse characters generate contradictory, overlapping, and ambiguous descriptions
of Gertrude's physical appearance and its relationship to her moral character. This very
ineffability allows Gertrude to function as a liminal figure who captivates and converts
spectators. By positing the attractive female body as the conciliatory site that initiates salvation,
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Cummins thus conflates sexuality with spiritual power, closing the gap between natural and
divine life.
Because the burden for carrying out the work of conversion lies with the organic angel
and her harmonizing of sexual and spiritual interests, The Lamplighter paradoxically invests its
noncoercive model of conversion with an imperializing tendency. Women in the novel encounter
the divine directly through submission to spiritual discipline as the point of contact between
desire and duty; by contrast, men in the novel encounter the divine indirectly through their
attraction and attachment to saintly women. As a result, the male-dominated, market-driven
world acquires a tacit dispensation for the expansion of empire as a caveat to the domestic
evangelical imperative of aligning conflicting interests through benevolent action. Choosing the
converted woman signifies conversion for the male character, which, in turn, ensures that any
imperial spoils from abroad translate at home into gracious living and good works. The
Christian woman can afford to be absolutely transparent because she has no hidden, private
interests as distinct from public, charitable ones, and her transparency extends by proxy to her
male counterpart. In this way, female transparency, as the sign of pure alignment between selfinterest and self-sacrifice that results from conversion, blocks the view to selfish mercantile
interests and affords the means of enfolding material gain back into the bosom of charity.
The influx of new scientific and philosophical theories in the first half of 19th century
America put the concept of human nature as fundamentally depraved under profound pressure,
and by midcentury "the Calvinist idea of natural depravity was losing ground to the romantic
idea of natural innocence" (Baym 15). Marianne Noble observes that "Calvinist determinism"
had "tended to see human nature as inherently sinful, the body and the feelings as sites of
corruption and confusion, and passion as 'the devil in the inside of man'" (62). Sentimental
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ontology emerged as a reaction to "such pessimistic attitudes toward human nature, maintaining
instead that human being are naturally inclined to virtuous actions because of the pleasurable
feelings such actions generate" (Noble 62). The figure of the child and, in particular the orphaned
child, provided the ideal test case for ascertaining the unaffected moral constitution of human
nature and, as Nina Baym remarks, during this period in fiction "the image of the divine child
was put to special use" by liberal-leaning novelists (15).
In The Lamplighter, Cummins walks the line between conservative and progressive
concepts of human nature by proposing that both good and evil intentions may constitute
legitimately "natural" or spontaneous and intuitive responses to human experience and, more
radically, posits that the passions themselves might prove indicators of exceptional future
spirituality—in contrast, for instance to The Wide, Wide World where "the passions are the
problem, both physically and spiritually" (100). Rejecting both the "fallen child" and "the divine
child of nature" (Singley 104) as the prototypical candidate for conversion, Cummins develops
the figure of the "wild child" (Fisher 71) whose passionate intensity forecasts a vigorous
spirituality.
The trope of the noble savage provides Cummins with a preexisting literary tradition that
offers a third option for construing the passions as at once unchristian and non-culpable, what
Lydia Fisher calls "savage innocence" (63). In the opening chapter of The Lamplighter, the
reader finds the orphaned urchin Gerty victim, not only of her vicious guardian Nan Grant's
verbal and physical abuse, but of her own inflamed temper in reaction to that abuse. Cummins
characterizes Gerty's personality and behavior in terms of natural savagery: "spirited, sudden,
and violent," she "made herself feared, as well as disliked" among the gangs of street children
(5). Prior to her first touchstone of sympathy in the form of a kitten, Gerty's "fierce, untamed,
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impetuous nature [...] only expressed itself in angry passion, sullen obstinacy, and hatred" (7).
But the narrator insists that the "fire" of Gerty's nature is "a fire that Nan Grant had kindled"
(49), much as antebellum writers like Washington Irving would insist that Native American
violence was an inevitable reaction to white oppression. By no means the mark of a divine child,
the rage of "the wild little creature" (47) nevertheless bespeaks an absence of Christian
instruction and charity rather than a fundamental depravity. Indeed, the narrator laments Gerty's
condition in terms reminiscent of religious reflections on the unenlightened heathen, saying,
"Poor little, untaught, benighted soul! Who shall enlighten thee? Thou art God's child, little one
[...] Will he not send man or angel to light up the darkness within, to kindle a light that shall
never go out, the light that shall shine through all eternity!" (4). Gerty's lack of the instruction
and affection associated with a religious nuclear family and the cruelty she suffers at Nan Grant's
hands push her beyond the boundaries of Christian society and put her in need of the kind of
missionary action directed toward Native Americans. She does not merit condemnation because
unconverted but simply the illumination of Christian teaching and example.
Gerty's potential for exceptional moral character lies inscribed in the very outbursts of
passion that mark her as a racialized outcast in the Christian community; the measure of her
aggression coextends with the measure of her untapped affection. When the kindly Trueman
Flint, accidentally responsible for delaying one of her errands and thereby provoking the wrath
of Nan Grant, attempts to compensate Gerty by giving her a kitten, Cummins reveals the masked
nobility of Gerty's natural inclinations. The narrator reports that Gerty "had often felt a
sympathy" for the many stray cats in the area but had never considered harboring them for
practical reasons (7). She accordingly plans to release the kitten that Trueman has placed in her
arms, "But, while she was hesitating, the animal pleaded for itself in a way she could not resist"
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(7). It creeps up to her neck, clings there, cries piteously, and initiates Gerty's first loving
sacrifice: "its eloquence prevailed over all fear of Nan Grant's anger [...] She hugged pussy to her
bosom, and made a childish resolve to love it [...] and feed it" (7). Cummins insists on the
coexistence of and indeed correspondence between Gerty's "angry passion" and her soul's
"fountains of warm affection, yet unstirred, a depth of tenderness never yet called out, and a
warmth and devotion of nature that wanted only an object to expend themselves upon" (7-8).
Gerty's finding the kitten's appeal to her compassion irresistible precedes any "ideas of abstract
right and wrong" (8) and signals an inborn predilection for benevolent self-sacrifice, a sacrifice
motivated by the pleasures of fierce loving attachment. Her most savage act of aggression,
violently striking Nan in the head with a stick of wood, occurs after Nan discovers the kitten and
throws it into a pot of boiling water, and accordingly reflects the depth of her spontaneous pity
for "the only thing she loved in the world" (11).
Cummins systematically asserts the naturalness of young Gerty's "spirited" character in
tandem with her physical appearance; both initially uninviting, they nevertheless conversely
register the promise of a superior attractiveness. We learn that Gerty is "told, a dozen times a
day, that she was the worst-looking child in the world; and, what was more, the worst-behaved";
and Nan Grant, after Gerty fails to complete an errand, administers "one blow for her ugliness
and another for her impudence" (2). This apparent organic connection between body and
behavior sets up an inverted continuity between the pre-converted child and post-converted
adult: the adult Gertrude's moral and physical magnetism will grow precisely out of little Gertie's
grotesqueness. The narrator takes care in first introducing Gerty to imbue her unsightly physical
profile with a subtle air of intrigue and promise:
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She was scantily clad, in garments of the poorest description; her hair was long
and very thick; uncombed and unbecoming, if anything could be said to be
unbecoming to a set of features which, to a casual observer, had not a single
attraction,—being thin and sharp, while her complexion was sallow, and her
whole appearance unhealthy. She had, to be sure, fine, dark eyes, but so
unnaturally large did they seem, in contrast to her thin, puny face, that they only
increased the peculiarity of it, without enhancing its beauty (1-2).
The "uncombed" condition of Gerty's hair does not negate its length and thickness, just as the
jaundice and thinness of her face cannot negate the large, fine, dark eyes. Thus even as she
insists on the repulsiveness of Gerty's appearance, the narrator carefully delineates a potential
lushness to select features, an exoticism increased by its very foreignness or "peculiarity." The
"fine, dark eyes" might have been too small in the peaked face and sealed Gerty's moral and
physical fate as outcast, but they prove rather too large, "unnaturally" large, a foreshadowing of a
supernatural beauty that requires development. By the time she reaches maturity, Gertrude's eyes
will "have retained their old lustre" and "do now look too large for her face" (129).
Cummins relies on signs of racial difference to initially associate Gerty with moral
inferiority imputed to nonwhites, but this association functions to project a superior physical
vitality that express an amplified moral aptitude. As a neglected child, Gerty's appearance and
behavior lend themselves to xenophobic demonization; a neighboring boy, having "caught the
tone of the whole neighborhood" views her "as a sort of imp, or a spirit of evil" (2), and even
Gerty's future and first loving guardian Trueman Flint, when he initially encounters the waif,
exclaims, "What an odd-faced child!—looks like a witch!" (3). But the unhallowed aura born of
Gerty's emotional and physical excess presages her powers of Christian conversion, a
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bewitchment on behalf of holiness. As Fisher observes, "In America in the 1840s and '50s, the
prevailing scientific beliefs placed whites at the top of an evolutionary racial hierarchy" but
"some whites developed an avid interest in the physical and mental gifts of nonwhites" (57).
Americans had reacted to Native America racial difference since colonial days by alternately
exalting and demeaning their supposed unique constitution, and Cummins relies on this paradox
to represent Gerty's overt deficiencies as hidden assets. Gertrude's dark but "fine" features and
"dark" but "clear" complexion (128; qtd. in Lang 25) encode a sliding racial identity that will
allow her to shed her "dark infirmity" (63) of vengeful passions while retaining aboriginal
nobility and spontaneous warmth.
Gerty's tacit association with the noble savage forms part of the mystery of her origins.
Further, insofar as Gerty is "possibly…illegitimate and not quite white" (Fisher 65) she seems to
embody the radical democratic possibility of Christian conversion, which promises that even an
unknown and nonwhite orphan might find conversion available. However, as many critics have
noted, when the final chapters of the novel disclose the secret of Gerty's genteel ancestry, this
resolution works against the novel's pretext of radical democracy as embodied in the figure of the
unclaimed orphan. Nevertheless, Cummins' resolution works beyond simple reversal in that she
strategically maintains Gertrude's implicit natural election to spiritualized womanhood. First, the
racialization of Gerty's heritage persists even after the revelation of her genteel white origins;
Gerty's father Philip Armory turns out to similarly sport both an impetuous and ardent nature and
a mesmerizing aspect. In profile and deportment he resembles the noble savage, for he "was
above the middle height, slender, but finely formed, and of a dignified bearing [...] His features
were rather sharp, but expressive, and even handsome; his eyes, dark, keen and piercing, had a
most penetrating look, while his firmly-compressed lips spoke of resolution and strength of will"

82

(258). As with little Gerty's "peculiarity" (2), the narrator notes the "peculiarity" of Philip's hair
(258), and onlookers even mark his habits as "peculiar" (285). A dark, handsome, aloof stranger
with the melancholy air of a "Vanishing American" (Romero 35), Philip endows Gerty with the
biological source for her bio-spiritual charisma and confirms her natural predestination to
captivating Christian womanhood. Gentility and savage nobility dovetail; figurative Native
American and literal white blood map onto one another and create a blueprint for magnetic
holiness.
By asserting Armory's nobility prior to his conversion, Cummins furthermore maintains
the novel's theological ascription to savage innocence. When Gertrude urges Philip to "Trust in
goodness, wherever it be found" (305, author's emphasis) he confronts her with orthodox
religion's traditional "strict demarcation between the saved and the damned" (Singley 105),
saying, "Your world, your religion, draws a closer line" (305). This "line," according to Calvinist
doctrine, "would damn the unconverted but 'noble' savage to everlasting punishment in the
afterlife" (Romero 26), and Cummins, in Gertrude's rejoinder, explicitly distances herself from
this doctrine: "'Call it not my world, or my religion,' said Gertrude. 'I know of no such line. I
know of no religion but that of the heart'" (305, author's emphasis). Gertrude and Emily, her
guardian and Philip's childhood sweetheart, will bring Philip into the fold of Christianity, but
long before he considers conversion Gertrude believes "that nothing was hid behind [his face]
that would not do honor to the man" (272). Philip's past crimes prove, like Gertrude's, crimes of
passion—and that passion a measure of his sympathetic attachments and hatred for injustice. The
daughter of her father, Gertrude's peculiarity of temperament and appearance mark her as the
embodiment of an innovative theological compromise in the form of natural than divine election
or democratic choice.
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Antebellum America saw a drastic transposition of religious authority from the maledominated public world to the female-dominated private one. Alongside the proliferation of
Protestant splinter sects, sensational novels centered on exposing the corrupt underside of
contemporary life fed into a broad undercutting of clerical influence. As David Reynolds
established in Beneath the American Renaissance, "by the 1840s it had become virtually
impossible for an American novelist to portray a sympathetic clergyman figure because of the
satirical stereotype of the reverend rake" (342). Furthermore, with the rise of liberal
Protestantism's emphasis on cultivating rather than replacing the unconverted heart, women
seemed the obvious choice for channeling this new kind of Christian enlightenment. Romero
quotes Harriet Beecher Stowe's representative throwback conservative in Oldtown Folks as
believing "the minister who does not excite the opposition of the natural heart fails to do his
work" (22). Once exciting the natural heart itself served as the new evangelical paradigm, those
activities traditionally associated with mediating (while not ensuring) conversion—preaching,
church-going—prove superfluous, as the woman could do what the minister did, only better and
anywhere. When, as a result, "the female moral exemplar takes the place of the male clergyman"
in sentimental fiction (342), she absorbs the erstwhile sanctity of the church environment into her
own body.
While many critics have examined the centrality of motherhood to this revised religious
paradigm, to the point that in places the "ideal mother" functions as "God in human form"
(Tompkins 412), others like Cindy Weinstein have noted the remarkable dearth of biological
mothers and intact mother-daughter relationships in sentimental novels. As Claire Chantell
contends in the case of Ellen and her mother in The Wide, Wide World, I argue that the biological
mother, as too absolute an incarnation of divine mediation, threatens to keep the energies of
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benevolence turned inward; by contrast, organic angels, of the kind Gertrude enjoys and will
become, ensure that those attractions that mediate conversion continue to circulate and make
additional converts.30 Furthermore, biological motherhood necessarily implies that sexuality is
anchored in bodily functions, a correlation that undermines the conflation of sexual and spiritual
power so central to transferring "gospel authority from the clergy to the eroticized domestic
woman" (Romero 22). That is, actual reproduction denotes bodily direction of sexual desire, the
tendency of sexual desire toward sex rather than toward worship.
Accordingly, while a few oblique references to an active clergyman occur in The
Lamplighter, there is no mention of babies, pregnancy or birth—a truly remarkable feature for a
19th century text and genre predicated on the woman's sphere. Baym writes that female authors
of sentimental fiction "both as Christians and as Victorians, were disinclined to acknowledge the
body and physical sexuality as elements of self either inherently spiritual or capable of being
spiritualized [....] Hence rather than integrating physical sexuality into their adult personalities
they tried to transcend it" (18). This transcendence—presented as viable in The Lamplighter—
provides the means by which the women fulfill their organic bio-spiritual destiny as females, not
by birthing and raising children but by attracting converts.
Critics of 19th century women's fiction typically focus on antebellum reverence for the
spiritualized maternal body within an enclosed domestic space. Cummins, however takes care to
separate out surrogate mother from associations with home, a strategy that throws into relief the
mature female body's non-maternal force of influence. The fact that Gerty as a child does not go
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to live with her primary surrogate mother, Emily Graham, highlights the latter's role as mediator
of divine enlightenment rather than nurturing mother. The compassionate and unsophisticated
Trueman Flint, rather than a woman, takes in the disheveled and ill-tempered orphan left to
freeze on Nan Grant's steps; for, as he explains, "'t an't much there is here, to be sure; but it's a
home; and that's a great thing to her that never had one" (21, original emphasis). But "True"
himself ultimately articulates the insufficiency of his powers of affection to convert the strongspirited little girl: "Yes, Miss Emily," he affirms, "I loved my little birdie; but I was a foolish
man, and I should ha' spiled her. You knew better what was for her good, and mine too. You
made her what she is now, one of the lambs of Christ, a handmaiden of the Lord" (91). When, in
one instance, Gerty refuses to return to school after fighting with her schoolmates, the narrator
announces simply that "all True's persuasions had failed, and she would not go. But Emily
understood the child's nature so much better than True did, and urged upon her so much more
forcible motives [...] that she succeeded where he had failed" (65, original emphasis). Cummins'
emphasis on the gendered pronouns underscores the woman's singular power to motivate the
disciplinary regimen that translates her protégé into the self-possession coextensive with female
conversion. Emily's labor of spiritual discipleship locates her role closer to that of minister, while
it is True's parenting that stands closer to an image of maternal nurture.
This distinction provides an important corrective to views of the conversions depicted in
women's fiction as chiefly reflective of patriarchal conquest. Elizabeth Barnes, for instance,
explores the trope of conversion in the antebellum female bildungsroman in general, and The
Lamplighter in particular, in terms of a dispossession "by the ultimate father figure" that
correlates with the heroine's self-discovery (85). "[I]n order to be reformed," Barnes contends,
"the heroine must first learn to see herself as she would be viewed through the eyes of an all-
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seeing Father" (85). Barnes notes Gerty's association between the ideal Father and True as his
earthly counterpart (TL 41), saying, "the humble man who lights the lamps becomes for Gerty
the embodiment of the Father who lights the stars" (85). Without discounting the validity of
Barnes' reading, I think it overstates the role of both earthly and heavenly father in Gertrude's
conversion. As both True and the narrator themselves suggest, the key lies with Emily's capacity
to effect desire for such union with God through setting out a moral system that rewards
discipline with intimacy.31 While Gerty has a spontaneous yearning "for God and virtue" (41) as
self-identical objects, she lacks an immediate prospect of feminine intimacy that would excite the
necessary discipline to counteract her childish fury. Unlike Ellen, who, as Chantell points out,
must suffer physical separation from her mother in order to initiate her disciplinary journey
(136), Gerty's physical proximity to Emily and desire to maintain that proximity prompts her first
efforts at self-control.
Gerty's first encounter with the young lady Emily results in a profound emotional
resonance that factors directly into the child's subsequent decision to "be good" (55). They are
both listening to an organist play in an empty church building when Gerty stirs and startles
Emily, who is blind. Emily calls to Gerty, and, as the narrator reports, Gerty "not only stopped,
but came close up to Emily's chair, irresistibly attracted by the music of the sweetest voice she
had ever heard" (53). After a brief interchange, Gerty discovers that Emily is the woman who has
encouraged True to adopt her and promised to support his endeavors; at that moment the child
bursts out, "You asked him to keep me; he said so—I heard him say so; and you gave me my
31
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"disciplinary intimacy," pp. 17-18, as a program that "insists that disciplinary authority resides in persons and that
persons in authority make their authority [...] dissolve into their merely personal presences, p. 19, author's
emphasis).
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clothes; and you're beautiful; and you're good; and I love you! O! I love you ever so much" (54,
author's emphasis). Emily's "irresistible" voice and attractiveness fuse with her benevolent
disposition ("you're beautiful; and you're good") to trigger an overwhelming "excitement" (54)
("I love you!" O! I love you ever so much!). Noble describes how authors in the sentimental
tradition "endorse an epistemology that is neither purely rational nor purely sensual but blends
both in a form of apprehension that is best—though imperfectly—understood as 'intuition,'
consultation with the 'heart,' or simply 'feeling'" (64). Cummins captures something of this
primal connection when she adds that "As Gerty spoke with a voice full of excitement, a strange
look passed over Miss Graham's face, a most inquiring and restless look, as if the tones of the
voice had vibrated on a chord of her memory" (54). Emily remains silent, and, "passing her arm
around the child's waist, drew her closer to her" (54). What the reader does not yet know
concerns the fact that Gerty is the child of Emily's childhood sweetheart Philip Armory, who was
accidentally responsible for her blindness and fled the scene forever. Emily's attractiveness on
the one hand, and Gerty's biological connection to Emily's early lover on the other, in
combination add an organic erotic dimension that intensifies the resonance between them while
obscuring its origins. Indeed, while "the sweet voice and sympathetic tones of Emily went
straight to [Gerty's] heart" (55) the "excitable but interesting child took no less strong a hold
upon Miss Graham's feelings" (57).32 And it is in the context of this mutual excited affection that
their first conversation on discipline takes place.
32
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earnestness and pathos with which she spoke, the confiding and affectionate manner in which she had clung to her,
the sudden clasping of her hand [...] all these things so haunted Miss Graham's recollection, that she dreamt of the
child at night, and thought much of her by day," p. 57.
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As she has from the novel's outset, in the first conversation between Emily and Gerty
Cummins explicitly associates appearance and behavior, now illustrating their relationship to
discipline and intimacy. When Gerty learns that Emily is blind, she exclaims joyfully, "I'm so
glad [....] so glad you can't see me!—because now, perhaps, you'll love me" (54, author's
emphasis). Gerty accounts for her relief by explaining, "folks say that I'm an ugly child, and that
nobody loves ugly children" (55). Emily counters that "people do [...] love ugly children, if they
are good" (55), and Gerty, in turn, protests, "But I an't good [...] I'm real bad!" (55). In the
novel's most succinct endorsement of the universal accessibility of conversion, Emily replies,
"But you can be good [...] and then everybody will love you" (55). This emphatic direct
connection between discipline and intimacy, however, skips an important third term that shows
up in the larger context of the novel—namely, that good behavior and physical attractiveness
develop along a parallel lines and work in tandem to promote intimacy.
But Cummins is not making a disingenuous gesture here; rather, she is trying to assert the
transformative powers of conversion as effecting an occult change in the whole person and
producing a mystical appeal best rendered along a sliding bio-ethical spectrum. In a subsequent
private afternoon consultation between the exemplar and her protégé, the narrator makes an overt
attempt at categorizing—or rather, not categorizing—this appeal:
Some said that Emily had the sweetest mouth in the world, and they loved to
watch its ever-varying expression [....] But the chosen few who, who were
capable, through their own spirituality, of understanding and appreciating Emily's
character [...] had they undertaken to express their belief concerning the source
whence she derived that power by which her face and voice stole into the hearts
of young and old, and won their love and admiration, they would have said, as
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Gerty did, when she sat gazing so earnestly at Emily on the very Sunday
afternoon of which we speak, "Miss Emily, I know you've been with God." (64,
author's emphasis)
Cummins here explicitly invests the sensual projections of "face" and "voice" with the power to
penetrate consciousness as spiritual agents, for winning love and stealing hearts, in this context,
produce "a susceptibility to religious penetration" (Chantell 135). Apparently independent of
material expression (not the true source), the organic angel's spiritual luminosity nevertheless
comes to rest in physical features, which accounts for Gerty's "gazing so earnestly at Emily."
Indeed, the woman's sensual body serves as a sacred material projection that disintegrates into
discrete features in order to allow for the passage of divine light, a living Protestant iconography.
Gazing at Emily serves as a transformative private devotion that takes the place of public
worship.
Indeed, the fact that Gerty's first encounters Emily sitting under a pulpit in a church
building on a week day signals the latter's substitution for the once-central pastor and
congregation. In fact, Emily goes so far as to remark, "I love to go into a large church on a
week-day" (52), marking the superfluity of the clerical exercises that will play no recognizable
part in Gerty's religious awakening. Rather, Emily herself will comprise the whole ministry once
entrusted to appointed religious leaders. Church-going receives a few marginal references in the
text, but, in the paragraph devoted to the joys of Gerty's Saturdays and Sundays, escapes
reference entirely; rather, Gerty's Sabbath experience revolves around intense psychic and
emotional bonding with Emily:
Sunday afternoon Gerty always spent with Emily, in Emily's room, listening to
her sweet voice, and, half-unconsciously, imbibing a portion of her sweet spirit.
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Emily preached no sermons, nor did she weary the child with exhortations and
precepts. Indeed, it did not occur to Gerty that she went there to be taught
anything; but simply and gradually the blind girl imparted light to the child's dark
soul. (67, author's emphasis)
Not only does Cummins decline to have the narrator even mention Gerty's presumed Sunday
morning occupation, she boldly advertises Emily's tutelage as the ideal alternative to traditional
homiletics with its "sermons," "exhortations," and "precepts." Gerty "[goes] there," to Emily, as
to the building set aside for religious instruction and,
when goodness had grown strong within her, and her first feeble resistance of evil
[...] had matured into deeply-rooted principles, and confirmed habits of right,—
she felt, as she looked back into the past, that on those blessed Sabbaths, sitting at
Emily's knee, she had received into her heart the first beams of that immortal light
that never could be quenched. (67)
Cummins could scarcely be more explicit in identifying the catalyst for Gerty's processual
conversion in "the first beams of that immortal light" absorbed "at Emily's knee." Cummins does
not, in the manner of Emerson and Thoreau, actively scorn structures of organized religion—she
simply marginalizes them; they appear only in traces, taking shape in the physical features, the
voice (not the words), in the physical presence of this woman, whose body here substitutes for
the sermon.
In the conversation in which Emily prevails where True had failed over Gerty's resistance
to returning to school, Cummins lays out Emily's dual role as both spiritual intercessor and
incarnational divinity; that is, she both functions as lay minister in symbolically baptizing and
blessing the child and offers her own companionship as the inducement for conversion. When
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Emily, in an effort to arouse Gerty's conscience, inquires, "Do you not wish God to forgive and
love you?" Gerty struggles to piece together her primitive ideas about God, saying, "God, that
lives in heaven,—that made the stars?" (62). While Gerty expresses desire for obtaining access
to heaven by further musing, "Will he love me, and let me some time go to heaven?" she finds
the cost, trying "to be good, and love everybody," to exceed her capability: "Miss Emily," said
Gerty, after a moment's pause, "I can't do it,—so I s'pose I can't go" (62). Emily does not reply,
but a baptismal "tear fell upon Gerty's forehead," prompting the child to a new consideration:
"Dear Miss Emily, are you going?"
"I am trying to."
"I should like to go with you." (62)
Gerty's extremely limited concept of heaven comes here to coincide with the attraction of
Emily's presence, fostering a new strength of resolve that triggers her developmental conversion,
a simultaneous growth in physical and spiritual stature. When Gerty, after a period of silence,
whispers, "I mean to try, but I don't think I can" (author's emphasis), Emily "lay[s] her hand
upon Gerty's head" and pronounces the benediction, "God bless you, and help you, my child!"
(63). Emily thus consecrates her spiritual daughter to her new life, allowing herself to serve as
the initial inducement to that life.
If, however, Gerty is to become in her own right the initiator of others' conversions, she
must achieve an unmediated access to divine light. Unlike the male convert, the female convert
must move beyond her union with the attractive organic angel to reconcile in her own body the
divine and human natures. Cummins dramatizes the intermediate stage in this process when
Gerty, now the adolescent Gertrude and living with the Graham family after the death of "Uncle
True", encounters a new obstacle to the imperative to "be good and love everybody" in the form
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of the Grahams' surly housekeeper Mrs. Ellis. When Emily remarks, "It will make me unhappy if
I have any reason to fear that you and she will not live pleasantly together," Gertrude again
despairs of good behavior and cries, "I do not want to make you unhappy [...] I'll go away! I'll
go off somewhere, where you will never see me again!" (99). Aggrieved, Emily replies,
"Gertrude, do you wish to leave your blind friend? Do you not love me?" (99). This
consideration subdues Gertrude's "proud spirit," and, throwing "her arms around Emily's neck,"
she "exclaimed, 'No! dear Miss Emily, I would not leave you for all the world! I will do just as
you wish. I will never be angry with Mrs. Ellis again, for your sake" (80). When confronted with
Gerty's childish ardor to accompany her to heaven, Emily had "left the child to the working of
her own thoughts" (62); now Emily corrects Gertrude's motive for good behavior: "'Not for my
sake Gertrude,' replied Emily,—'for your own sake; for the sake of duty and of God'" (99,
author's emphasis). Emily's admonition signals the time for a developmental shift in Gertrude's
conversion journey: self, duty, and God, will comprise the triadic structure of the final stage of
conversion in which the female protégé leaves her subordinate spiritual status for perfect selfpossession, the organic angel's converse of sanctification.
The novel's climactic conversion scene, occurring less than a third of the way through the
expansive narrative, takes place during Gertrude's fourteenth year, and dramatizes the
transference of the locus of spiritual motivation from Emily to a triangulated spirituality
circumscribed by self, duty, and God, as interchangeable integers. Gertrude has just learned that
the obnoxious Mrs. Ellis sifted through her things and discarded as junk several mementoes of
her beloved Uncle True. After throwing herself on her bed and weeping, Gertrude prepares to
confront her antagonist, but "some new thought seeming to check her, she returned again to the
bed-side, and, with a loud sob, fell upon her knees, and buried her face in her hands" (117).
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Cummins provides only an outside view of the transfer of motive for self-discipline in order to
maintain it as a quasi-supernatural operation; the transformative thought remains hidden in
Gertrude's rapidly evolving selfhood:
Once or twice she lifted her head, and seemed on the point of rising and going to
face her enemy. But each time something came across her mind and detained her.
It was not fear;—O, no! Gertrude was not afraid of anybody. It must have been
some stronger motive than that. Whatever it might be, it was something that had,
one the whole, a soothing influence; for, after every fresh struggle, she grew
calmer [...] (117)
As in the case of Emily's source of power, Cummins refrains from categorizing Gertrude's
impetus for her "her first instance of complete self-control" (118). But its completeness derives
from its unprecedented autonomy from Emily—who discovers the incident from the maid and
"expected, for several days, to hear from Gertrude the story of her injuries; but Gertrude kept her
trouble to herself" (118). The hidden triangulation of self, duty, and God provides a "stronger
motive," and therefore a more perfect discipline of behavior, than even intimacy with Emily
entailed.
But neither self, duty, nor God takes a clear dominant role; the transaction, as Cummins
would have it, remains beyond the scope of simple articulation and is only suggestive of
traditional conversion through its depiction of protracted interior struggle and subsequent relief
and peace. The divine makes an appearance only indirectly through the amplification of natural
beauty in the scene outside Gerty's window, "the brilliant rainbow, the carol of the bird, the
fragrance of the blossoms," that coincides with the doubly beautiful "light that overspread the
face of the young girl" (117-8). Aside from the bird's "shout[ing] forth a Te Deum," no direct
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reference to God occurs; rather, the narrator affirms of Gertrude, "She had conquered; she had
achieved the greatest of earth's victories, a victory over herself" (117)—a truly unthinkable and
even blasphemous description of conversion from a Calvinist point of view. Self, duty, and God
presumably all play roles in the mature self's conquest of its childish passions, but the roles
remains mutually sublimating in the emergence of the organic angel.
In her transfiguration of Gertrude into an organic angel, Cummins reworks a central
sentimental strategy for constructing the moral exemplar—a processual repression of bodily
passions so forcible that, when complete, it dissolves the body into a transparent medium for
moral light (Noble 97). Typified in The Wide, Wide World, this rhetorical device, what Marianne
Noble calls corporeal "abjection," enables the heroine to exercise spiritual power by virtue of the
absolute mortification of her natural inclinations; the suppression of sexuality to the level of
unconsciousness in the heroine corresponds to a proportional increase in the erotic awareness of
spectators. Such unconscious eroticism permits the heroine to excite romantic interest as a means
of disseminating grace (Romero 22). But while Cummins fuses Gertrude's sexual and spiritual
influence on a plane parallel to that of The Wide, Wide World, she rejects Warner's Calvinist
insistence on total self-abnegation as precondition for this fusion and the organic angel's power.
Gertrude, accordingly, does not develop along a simple sanctifying trajectory from bad passion
to passionless purity, just as she does not develop along a simple physical trajectory from
ugliness to beauty; rather, her biological makeup, as both physical and temperamental profile,
actively shape her emergent spirituality.
The beauty and docility that attend Gertrude's maturation process do not displace her
childhood ugliness and excitability—rather, their contradictory coexistence opens up a space for
the passage of supernatural power. Cummins crafts a dialogic of spectacle that deconstructs
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Gertrude's physical appearance by refracting it through a network of overlapping and divergent
impressions. Because neither narrator nor characters can definitively articulate Gertrude's
appearance and its relationship to her moral attributes, her physical features and fashion choices
remain in constant conversational circulation, generating perpetual interest and ensuring that
Gertrude's attractiveness persists as an irreducibility. The very ambiguity of impression that
Gertrude produces becomes the portal for the organic angel's moral light, for the way her features
and deportment strike the spectator serves as a measure of that person's moral composition and
susceptibility to conversion. Cummins thus elicits the spiritual illumination associated with the
sentimental trope of corporeal abjection, but by disarticulating rather than abasing the body and
its attendant passions.
The first extended public exchange on Gertrude's appearance occurs in a relatively early
chapter which, by foregrounding spectatorship, anticipates the latter of half the novel in its
preoccupation with "the properly feminine 'art of getting looked at'" (Romero 23). Because the
novel concerns itself not merely with interior female development, but the relationship between
interior development and spiritual influence over others through attraction, emphasis on the
apparently superficial phenomena of physical features and self-presentation corresponds with
Cummins' project of illustrating how a girl matures physically into a Christian woman, and how,
as embodied female, she makes converts. Even this early instance of public scrutiny, therefore,
follows a vacillating course between exploration of Gertrude's physical and moral attributes, as
filtered through diverse perceptions.
The chapter opens with the musings of two farcical characters, "Miss Peekout" and "Mrs.
Grumble," as each from her private purview evaluates the tableau of an unnamed girl, whom the
reader may infer to be an older version of the Gerty left behind in the previous chapter, walking
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in support of a "feeble-looking old man" (86). Their respective reflections function both to
highlight their own moral condition and to generate an accumulative portrait of the girl's moral
prowess. Miss Peekout remarks her as a "slender girl" and a "nice child" and speculates on who
she might be and whether "she takes all the care of the old man" (86). The sight of the girl's
tenderness and the old man's helplessness elicits pity from the harmless old maid. By contrast,
Mrs. Grumble's speculations mark her self-preoccupation, even as they also recapitulate the
narrative of the young girl's extraordinary kindness: "'I wonder,' said old Mrs. Grumble [...] I
wonder if anybody would wait upon me, and take care of me, as that little girl does of her
grandfather! No, I'll warrant not! Who can the patient little creature be?'" (86, author's
emphasis). In spite of Mrs. Grumble's apparently default movement to self-consideration, even
she cannot resist speculating out of admiration on the girl's identity.
While Miss Peekout marks the girl's slenderness, a feature that will recur as denoting
inborn grace, the elder women prove chiefly interested in the tableau as moral exhibition.
Cummins, however, abruptly shifts from their points of view to those of two young girls, Belle
and Kitty, whose dialogue complicates the portrait of the girl by taking physical beauty as the
springboard for their assessment. While Belle and Kitty's interchange, as in the case with the
older ladies, underscores their spiritual dispositions, it also overtly introduces the problem of
Gertrude's inscrutable appearance and its interplay with her moral character.
Cummins deploys the girls' reaction to further establish Gertrude's exceptional moral
attractiveness while unsettling its relationship to her physicality: "'There, look Belle!' said one
young girl to another [...] on their way to school; 'there's the girl that we meet every day with the
old man. How can you say you don't think she's pretty? I admire her looks'" (86). Here
Cummins tacitly discloses this tender ritual as a daily occurrence, but she also indicates as a
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parallel the recurrent anatomization of Gertrude's qualities on the part of onlookers. Belle and
Kitty have apparently been in regular dialogue about Gertrude's relative merits, and Kitty's open
admiration signals her future susceptibility to Gertrude's influence, which will one day secure her
a clergyman husband and her own orphaned protégé (414). When Belle retorts, "You always do
manage, Kitty, to admire people that everybody else thinks are horrid-looking" (86) Kitty
provides as countervailing evidence Gerty's affective disposition, saying, "'she's anything but
horrid-looking! Do notice, now, Belle, when we meet them, she has the sweetest way of looking
up in the old man's face'" (87, author's emphasis). Sweetness, as in the case of Emily's sweet
smile, provides an ambiguous meeting-point between physical and moral expression and can
thus, in spite of its status as a "way of looking," function to offset Belle's epithet regarding
physical attributes.
Kitty, indeed, implies this point of ambiguity by returning in her next question to Gerty's
perplexing features: "Don't you think she has an interesting face? (author's emphasis). Belle
concedes only a single definable attraction—"She's got handsome eyes [...] I don't see anything
else that looks interesting about her" (87)—but her concession is important for two reasons.
First, it puts into circulation a particular attractive physical feature that will recur in conversation
to undermine avowals against Gertrude's attractiveness as originating with physical beauty. At
the same time, however, the feature she selects allows for the most mystique in terms of the
association between eyes and the soul; the rest of Gertrude's features can disappear around the
large eyes that mediate divine light directly from within. Like a sweet expression, "handsome
eyes" straddle the border between interior and exterior affect, leaving Gertrude's attractive
influence just beyond definition.
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In order to link spiritual influence with unconscious eroticism, Cummins must
simultaneously orient the reader towards Gertrude's body while discounting such orientation.
The importance of at once categorizing Gertrude as not beautiful and leaving an impression of
her beauty thus proves both thematically and structurally important to the novel. Early on in a
conversation with Gerty over Belle's cherubic beauty, Willie, Gerty's handsome young adoptive
brother who will ultimately choose her over Belle as his wife, provides a classic example of
Cummins' slight of hand in this respect. Gerty has just sadly revealed how she "heard Ellen
Chase tell Lucretia Davis, the other day, that she thought Gerty Flint was the worst-looking girl
in the school" (69). When Gerty adds in some desperation, "Oh, Willie! [...] it's true," Willie's
response leaves the reader with the knowledge that Gerty is not beautiful coupled with the
impression that she is:
"No, it an't true," said Willie. "To be sure, you haven't got long curls, and a round
face, and blue eyes, like Belle Clinton's, and nobody'd think of setting you up for
a beauty; but when you've been running, and have rosy cheeks, and your great
black eyes shine, and you laugh so heartily [...] I often think you're the brightestlooking girl I ever saw in my life [....]" (69, author's emphasis)
The concrete references to Gerty's rosy cheeks and great black shining eyes leap out from
Willie's description to conceptually overpower the abstract references to Gerty as "the worstlooking child in the school" and someone "nobody'd think of setting [...] up for a beauty." Belle's
typecast beauty contrasts unfavorably with the luminous fusion of feature and spirit that makes
Gerty "the brightest-looking girl," and which, as physical and moral spirit develop together, will
result in a preeminently attractive illumination of faith.
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In the chapter following Gertrude's climactic conversion step at age fourteen, the narrator
provides yet another introduction to the now matured young woman, this time inviting the reader
to share the narrator's spectatorial evaluation. Through the narrator's purview, Cummins
negotiates with painstaking delicacy between avowing and denying Gertrude's physical
attractiveness following puberty. The occasion of introduction begins at a quiet moment with
Emily, who hears a "new comer" whom, the narrator explains, "We must pause to introduce, for,
though an old acquaintance, time has not left her unchanged, and it would be hard to recognize
in her our little quondam Gertrude [...] [who] has now become a young lady" (128). The
narrator's initial description balances vigor and stature against delicacy and transparence, so that
Gertrude emerges as a purified yet robust, sensual woman: "She is some inches taller than
Emily," we learn, "and her figure is slight and delicate. Her complexion is dark, but clear, and
rendered brilliant by the rosy hue that flushes her cheeks; but that may be the effect of her rapid
walk from the railroad station" (128-9). The narrator emphasizes her own provisional role as
spectator, assessing Gertrude from the outside and speculating on the ambiguous origins of her
flushed cheeks. Gertrude's' complexion, like her eyes "dark, but clear," likewise mediates an
inner brilliance whose origins remain loosely linked to physical exercise but hearken to the
effects of her intense spiritual discipline. Without yet directly addressing the question of beauty,
the narrator marshals every resource to establish Gertrude's attractiveness in terms of a peculiar
luminosity, exoticized through her dark complexion and colorful cheeks.
In preparation for her announcement that Gertrude is not "a beauty," the narrator takes
every care to enhance the desirability of select features, which again stand out in luminous
contrast to the vague allusions made to her physical imperfections: "Gertrude's eyes have
retained their old lustre, and do not now look too large for her face; and, if her mouth be less
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classically formed than the strict rule of beauty would commend, one can easily forgive that, in
consideration of two rows of small pearly teeth, which are as regular and even as a string of
beads" (129). The attenuated image of a mouth which fails to obtain to "the strict rule of beauty"
yields to the precision of small, pearly, and regularly strung teeth, the shining counterpart to
Gertrude's lustrous eyes. But in putting these features together, the narrator only creates an
infinite regression of contradictory assertions and evidence: "Is Gertrude a beauty?" she inquires
rhetorically, "By no means. Hers is a face and form about which there would be a thousand
different opinions, and out of the whole number few would pronounce her beautiful" (129).
Gertrude has, in effect, transcended the spectrum of mere physical beauty to generate
kaleidoscopic impressions that partake unevenly of spiritual and physical criteria. Thus even in
definitively stating that Gertrude is "by no means" a beauty, the narrator leaves open the
consideration of those few who would pronounce her beautiful; any combination of impressions
is possible as physical and moral attributes mix to illuminate the spiritual character of the
onlooker. Gertrude's discrete features find their framework, not in a categorical kind of physical
beauty, but through her inner light: for, "there are faces whose ever-varying expression one loves
to watch [...] faces that now light up with intelligence, now beam with mirth [...] and now, again,
are sanctified by the divine presence [...] Such a face was Gertrude's" (129).
Cummins' efforts to disengage Gertrude's spirituality from her features after accessing it
through her features leads, however, to one of many instances of implicit and explicit
contradiction: for, after learning of Gertrude's "slight and delicate" figure, we are told, "There are
forms too, which, though neither dignified, queenly or fairy-like, possess a grace, an ease [...] a
power of moving lightly and airily in their sphere [...] such a form was Gertrude's" (129).
Visualizing the distinction between a "slight and delicate" figure that "possess[es] a grace, an
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ease" and a "power of moving lightly and airily in [its] sphere," and a "dignified, queenly and
fairly-like" form proves conceptually challenging, to say the least. At this point, Cummins' effort
to navigate between physical and moral beauty simply breaks down, leaving the reader with a
diffuse impression of luminosity and elegance, contextualized by the weight of communal
approbation, for "whatever charm these attractions might give her [...] there were those who
estimated it highly" (129). And yet the narrator has officially established, with a kind of triumph,
the fact that Gertrude is "by no means" a beauty—lest the reader be tempted to mistake
converting powers for seductive ones.
With Gertrude's entrance into sexual maturity, a third ingredient enters the mix of her
compound appeal, that of her habits of dress. Cummins makes explicit Gertrude's instinctual
predilection for middle-class tastes in ornament and apparel as biologically derived, thus further
complicating her depiction of "the relationship between the natural, the cultivated, and the
divine" (Fisher 63). Even prior to the young Gerty's first efforts at self improvement, she
recognizes the concept of "flowered head-gear" on a widow as absurd, for, as the narrator
reports, "Good taste is inborn, and Gerty had it in her. She felt that Mrs. Sullivan, attired in
anything that was not simple, neat, and sober-looking, would altogether lose her identity" (47).
The matured Gertrude's identity comprises a self-identical whole that purports to extend
seamlessly through spirit, body, and attire. In this sense, the divine, the natural, and the
cultivated prove mutually derivative, as Gertrude's outermost expression of holiness, her
elegance of dress, turns out to fulfill an inborn sense of taste. This nimble negotiation of
categories on the part of the author perpetuates the novel's tension between democratic choice
and divine election, for, while the prospective disciple of Gertrude as moral exemplar may
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imitate her fashion choices, by definition she can never willfully reproduce an "inborn" sense of
taste—a taste which the novel conflates with Gertrude's converting powers.
In order to affirm Gertrude's preeminent attractiveness as organic angel among people of
all walks of life, Cummins must restage her powers of enchantment among the urban and
fashionable as well as the country rustics. In the latter half of the novel, Cummins has Gertrude
travel with the wealthy Graham family to the fashionable resort at Saratoga, and thereby creates
the ideal setting for testing the viability of Gertrude's charm as merely provincial or truly
transcendent. Once Gertrude and the Grahams have settled into life at the resort, the narrator
reports that, "in the circle of high-bred, polished, literary and talented persons," Gertrude "found
much that was congenial to her cultivated and superior taste, and she soon was appreciated as she
deserved" (286). Having established Gertrude's good taste as "inborn," Cummins here begs the
question of whether Gertrude has cultivated an inborn taste or was, paradoxically, born with a
"cultivated" taste. Either way, her early years as a "wild child"—nature—and her maturation
into an angelic intercessor—the divine—have worked together to fit her for "fashionable life"
(286), the height of social artifice. Fisher notes that Cummins presents Gertrude as "a figure of
natural perfection when compared with the worldly, sophisticated women of high society" (68);
but in order for Gertrude's natural perfection to triumph over worldly sophistication, it must
sublimate the affect of fashion into a charismatic holiness—otherwise the erotic fascinations of
worldly charm would overshadow her spiritual light.
Because high society centers on the cumulative effects of repetitive self-exhibition, while
domestic ideology demands self-forgetful reticence, in order to unite the affect of the former
with the virtue of the latter, Cummins stages a dramatic debut for Gertrude as an act of
impassioned sympathy. Seeing a small, friendless child tormented on the other side of the
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Congress Hall, Gertrude "sprung from her seat [...] and hastily crossed the room" (289),
triggering the precise kind of spectacle necessary to put Gertrude's features, morals, and style
simultaneously on display for public assessment: "Gertrude's excited and enthusiastic manner of
starting on her benevolent errand [...] together with the unusual circumstance of her crossing the
large and crowded room hastily and alone, drew the inquiries of all the circle whom she had left,
and during her absence she unconsciously became the subject of discussion and remark" (289). A
barrage of appraising remarks follow, as the spectators attempt to engage the source of
Gertrude's singular attractiveness from a variety of angles. Ellen Gryseworth observes that "It is
n't every girl [...] who could cross a great room like this so gracefully as Gertrude can" (289),
while Madame Gryseworth adds, "She has a remarkably good figure [...] and knows how to
walk" (289). Dr. Gryseworth attempts to tie these compliments to a more profound conclusion,
saying, "She is a very well-formed girl [...] but the true secret of her looking so completely the
lady lies in her having uncommon dignity of character, being wholly unconscious of observation
and independent of the wish to attract it" (289). Gertrude's sexual allure, as inscribed upon her
walk and "well-formed figure," does not, Dr. Gryseworth certifies, hold the "true secret" of her
appeal; the spectator's gaze must, accordingly, be redirected to a hidden interior of "dignity of
character" and unconsciousness. But this interior remains carefully embedded in a discourse of
surface appeal, such that even Dr. Gryseworth abruptly and unaccountably adds, "She dresses
well, too;—Ellen, I wish you would imitate Miss Flint's style of dress; nothing could be in better
taste" (289).
In fact essential, rather than supplementary, to her attractiveness, Gertrude's "good
figure" and tasteful style of dress mediate an ultimately irreproducible sanctity; Gertrude as
moral exemplar may be an everywoman, but she "is n't every girl." In spite of having counseled
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his daughter to imitate Gertrude's style, even Dr. Gryseworth concedes the fact that "in a certain
sense [...] the two girls are not sufficiently alike to resemble each other, if their dresses were
matched with Chinese exactness" (290). This "certain sense," unsurprisingly, will turn out to be
an ineffable bio-spiritual charisma. When a Mrs. Petrancourt challenges Dr. Gryseworth for
wishing his "beautiful daughter" to resemble "one who has not half her attractions," he replies
that, as Mrs. Petrancourt has spent little time with Gertrude, "it is impossible you should have
any idea of her attractions, as they certainly do not lie on the surface" (290). Gertrude's
attractions, however, certainly do lie on the surface; or rather, they appear there, kindled by a
bio-spiritual luminosity and the capacity of the spectator's gaze for illumination. As Madame
Gryseworth reports,
'One must see her under peculiar circumstances to be struck by her beauty at
once;—for instance, as I did yesterday, when she had just returned from
horseback-riding, and her face was in a glow from exercise and excitement; or as
she looks when animated by her intense interest in some glowing and eloquent
speaker, or when her feelings are suddenly touched, and the tears start into her
eyes, and her whole soul shines out through them!' (290)
An excess of physical and emotional energy fuse into a supernal light that transcends but
integrally includes Gertrude's discrete features, those "great dark eyes," that "splendid head of
hair" (291). This mysterious magnetism further extends to every tasteful choice in clothing, from
her broad-brimmed hat (136), to her white cape-bonnet (190), to her gingham morning-gown
(190), and to her rubber overshoes (271), which prove, Cinderella-like, too tiny for the largefooted Belle. Because of her inborn sense of good taste, Gertrude unfailingly selects what is
tasteful; because of her cultivated spiritual discipline, whatever Gertrude selects becomes
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tasteful. Her attractiveness invites imitation that cannot reproduce her attractiveness, deriving as
it does from je ne sais quoi.
Gertrude's attractions thus do and do not lie on the surface, and because she is and is not
beautiful, no one can match her for fascination. As an admiring but perplexed lieutenant
observes, "Something becomes her; she makes a fine appearance" (198). By staging Gertrude's
presence as a complex web of interpenetrating and irreducible phenomena, Cummins precludes
the tracing of her magnetism as the organic angel to explicitly erotic sources—rather, each
source redounds on to another, ensnaring the spectator into a round of perpetual contemplation
that opens the door to conversion.
Through its conflation of female sexual development with sanctification, sentimental
fiction attempts to harness erotic power for spiritual ends and thereby purge sexual love of its
self-interested dimension without forfeiting its influence over the heart. This conceptual splicing
of sexual interest with spiritual ends encapsulates liberal Protestantism's effort to reconcile desire
with duty in the "religion of the heart." Lang speaks to this configuration in sentimental fiction as
the "literary analogue" to "the doctrine of the harmony of interests" which "subsumes differences
into one harmonious whole by means of a kaleidoscopic substitution of terms" (24). This
remarkable substitutionary network allows Cummins to embed the novel's most eroticallycharged scenes into a narrative of male conversion, while demanding a complete displacement of
outcome from means. The erotic pleasures of male conversion by female attraction culminate in
filial and spiritual outcomes, thus ensuring the retention of female eroticism for religious ends.
By thus repurposing pleasures and freedoms associated with self-interest as othercentered and spiritually-oriented, progressive sentimental authors like Cummins tried to solve the
problem of competing interests in an age when competing interests functioned as the emerging
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capitalist commercial paradigm. Accordingly, Cummins reproduces this substitutionary structure
at an economic level, so that male characters whose self-formation in the marketplace revolves
around competing rather than harmonizing interests, can nevertheless reintegrate into a
benevolent spiritual sphere through their devotion to saintly women at home. Just as female
spirituality converts sexual capital into spiritual influence, so it converts financial capital into
benevolent service. The respective male protagonists in the novel who accrue material assets
abroad on behalf of Christian woman thereby redeem themselves and their spoils from
complicity in the "nation's increasingly expansionist economic and territorial policies," which
many Americans read "as signs of the moral decay of the 'city on the hill'" (Fisher 55). To
paraphrase the narrator of Melville's White Jacket, the men cannot do a good for their women,
without giving alms to the world.33 This substitution thus functions as a tacit reinforcement of
antebellum America's midcentury imperial expansion, apparently so at odds with a moral
mission of "disinterested benevolence" (Gura, "Truth's" 51). Assimilating material wealth
accumulated beyond national boundaries back into the domestic space provided one way for
sentimental discourse to manage the tensions between America's economic structures and
imperial activities and its avowed religious values.
The Lamplighter's primary narrative of male conversion provides a test case for the
organic angel as reconciler of sexual and economic interests with disinterested ends. Philip
Armory, Gertrude's long-lost biological father, will officially come to faith through the perduring
influence of Emily, subsequent to their marriage near the novel's conclusion. Gertrude, however,
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"[N]ational selfishness is unbounded philanthropy; for we cannot do a good to America, but we give alms to the

world." See White Jacket, p. 151.
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through her magnetic attractiveness, initiates his processual conversion before Cummins abruptly
but necessarily diverts the passionate attachment of father and daughter. Cummins withholds
knowledge of the biological connection between Philip and Gertrude till close to the novel's end,
a veiling which makes possible an astonishingly free interplay of erotic and filial cues, in the
context of Gertrude's wooing her father into faith.
Philip makes his first appearance at the Saratoga resort, as a handsome stranger with eyes
for Emily, whom he recognizes as the sweetheart he inadvertently blinded in a desperate effort to
restore from a fainting fit. Having mistakenly believed for decades that Emily reserves an
undying resentment towards him for his act, he does not attempt to identify himself. When
Gertrude joins the group around Emily, however, Philip shifts his gaze to the woman he knows
to be his daughter but also fears to approach. The reader, as yet unapprised of Philip's identity,
can only follow the cues laid down by character and narrator with respect to the origins of his
interest in Gertrude, cues which point unequivocally to romance; as the narrator reports, "the fine
color which mantled her countenance, and the deep brilliancy of her large dark eyes [...] were,
perhaps, the cause of the stranger's attention being at once transferred from the lovely and
interesting face of Emily to the more youthful, beaming and eloquent features of Gertrude"
(258). The narrator, in fact, contrasts this interest with the "affectionate admiration" the same
features evoke from Gertrude's long-time friends, Dr. and Mrs. Jeremy. Gertrude's reaction to the
stranger's attention further intensifies the moment's erotic charge, for "she became aware of the
notice she was attracting" and "it embarrassed her" (258). Cummins has taken great care through
the course of the novel to emphasize Gertrude's lack of embarrassment in moments the reader
might expect an erotic crisis; as a result, the narrator's notice here operates with heightened
suggestibility. When Philip departs, Gertrude and company take the opportunity to dilate on his
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appearance and age. Whereas Mrs. Jeremy calls him "queer-looking" and puts his age at "about
fifty," Gertrude remarks him as "elegant-looking" with "beautiful" hair and puts his age at "about
thirty" (258-9).
Amidst this compendium of cues suggesting mutual sexual attraction between Philip and
Gertrude, Cummins interjects a mitigating but crucial signal of benevolent interest; even as she
calls the stranger's hair "beautiful," Gertrude adds, "I wish he didn't look so melancholy; it makes
me quite sad to see him" (258). Philip's evident sadness, a sadness which will turn out to involve
not only his loss of Emily and others but his loss of faith, destabilizes the erotic trajectory
enough to pave the way for the vital redirection of emotional energy at the novel's conclusion. In
the meantime, this attractive sadness or "melancholy" provides the benevolent pretext that allows
Gertrude to maintain the otherwise potentially illicit intimacy of private interviews. Repeatedly
after their first encounter, Gertrude "betray[s] [...] confusion" under the gaze of the stranger; his
"look" "disconcert[s]" her (267), his "handsome" yet "melancholy" face causes her to blush
(266). In one of these instances of his intense "scrutiny of her features" and her correspondent
"embarrassment," Philip "turned away, and a shadow passed over his fine countenance, lending it
for a moment an expression of mingled bitterness and pathos, which served at once to disarm
Gertrude's confusion at this self-introduction and subsequent remarks" (267). As Gertrude is
alone with a handsome stranger who is gazing earnestly at her face, presumably her "confusion"
partakes of the situation's erotic charge, out of which Philip's expression of sadness provides a
teleological escape; she can stay at the private interview because she has now has benevolent
cause. Thus when Dr. Jeremy comes upon the two and subsequently teases Gertrude about "her
grey-headed beau," the narrator can proclaim that Gertrude's interest in Philip "which she did not
deny, was quite independent of his personal appearance" (268).
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Gertrude's first exercise of spiritual influence over Philip occurs in a conspicuously
romantic context and setting; she comes upon him asleep at the end of a long climb to the edenic
"pine gardens" (274) high on a Saratoga mountain. But the romantic aura of the occasion doubles
as the same kind of hyper-naturalism suggestive of the divine that Gertrude beheld outside her
window at the climax of her own conversion, for "the foliage of the oaks, the pines and the
maples, which had found root in this lofty region, was rich, clear, and polished, and tame and
fearless birds of various notes were singing in the branches" (273). Furthermore, this encounter
between Philip and Gertrude occurs, like the young Gerty's spiritually instructive sessions with
Emily, on a Sunday—but now explicitly in place of church as institutional agent of conversion.
Cummins underscores this point through a dialogue on the previous day, in which Dr. Jeremy
remarks, "There will be no church for us to-morrow, Gerty," and Gertrude responds, "gazing
about her with a look of reverence", "how can you say so?" (271, author's emphasis). Philip, with
a kind of embittered playfulness, then adds, "There is no Sunday here, Miss Flint; it does n't
come up so high" (271). But Gertrude will, in fact, comprise through her own spiritually
luminous presence the intersection of church and nature, divine and natural beauty; in coming up
"so high" on the mountain to where he takes his troubled sleep, she will be "Sunday" to Philip,
the beauty that mediates conversion.
Because in his sleep on the mountainside Philip evinces dreams troubled by grief, a
profoundly intimate moment between attractive and mutually attracted strangers proves an
occasion for consecration and spiritual instruction. Hearing Philip's mournful, childlike cry,
"Oh, dear" from out of his dreams, Gertrude recognizes her role as maternal consoler; she
"leaned over him" to brush away an insect from his forehead, "and, as she did so, one of the
many tears that filled her eyes fell upon his cheek" (275, author's emphasis). Gertrude's pity
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allowed her to overlook the compromising aspect of her actions, for "she forgot that he was a
stranger; she only saw a sufferer" (215). Nevertheless, as Philip awakens from his sleep, she
awakens to her action: he "looked full in the face of the embarrassed girl, who started, and would
have hastened away" (275). Gertrude remains because Philip alludes, not to the fact that he finds
her leaning over him, but to her tear, saying, "My child, did you shed that tear for me?" (275)
The holy tear, hearkening back to the baptismal tear Emily sheds for Gerty, binds the moment's
erotic charge to spiritual intent; the two must pursue the meaning of the tear to its sacred end.
In the subsequent exchange, they engage in a kind of metaphorical contest, where nature
stands in for their respective spiritual states; Philip points out, from their lofty mountain outlook,
the "curtain of thick clouds" that spreads darkness over the world, while Gertrude enlarges on the
light "shines brightly above the clouds" (277). When the light then breaks through the clouds,
Gertrude, "her eyes glowing with the fervour with which she spoke," triumphantly draws
attention to this symbolic representation of conversion. Anticipating that nature may be
mediating her spiritual message to Philip, Gertrude turns, only to find him "watching, not the
display of nature in the distance, but that close at his side. He was gazing with intense interest
upon the young and ardent worshipper of the beautiful and the true; and, in studying her features
and observing the play of her countenance, he seemed [...] wholly absorbed" (277). This is
aesthetic conversion at its most powerful because it simultaneously harnesses the emotional
registers of awe, erotic passion, and mystical devotion. As Gertrude in this moment stands in for
nature, God, and lover, no wonder Philip finds himself "wholly absorbed" in contemplating "the
play of her countenance," whose very instability of expression allows for this outbreak of allinclusive radiance; his penetrating gaze signifies his own susceptibility to divine light. Finding
herself yet again the object of intense scrutiny, Gertrude begins to turn away, when, also once
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again, Philip's response signals the spiritual telos of his fascination: "Go on, happy child!" he
exclaims, "Teach me, if you can [...] to love and pity, as you do, that miserable thing called man"
(277, author's emphasis). And Gertrude first, then Emily, becomes the stepping stone by which
that "miserable thing called man" gains access to faith. When he cannot yet subscribe to
"religion," Philip can nevertheless attach himself to the organic angel as his first step toward the
divine; in his words to Gertrude, "I will try and have faith in you" (305, author's emphasis).
Divine light radiating through the body of the organic angel pierces the spiritual darkness
of "miserable" man, a darkness Cummins links directly to the male-dominated world of
commercial competition with its attendant selfishness and distrust. Philip's accidental blinding
of Emily—and with it, the dashing of his domestic aspirations and attendant faith—is the
culmination of a heated argument with her father and employer in which Mr. Graham falsely
accuses Philip of attempting to usurp his fortune and of committing "forgery of a large amount"
under his name (TL 319; Fisher 74). Fleeing abroad, Philip spends decades in misadventures,
"following strongly contrasted employments, and with fluctuating fortune" (384), a journey
which teaches him "the sad lesson that peace is nowhere, and friendship, for the most part, but a
name" (384). It is small wonder, then, that Philip thinks of the world as a place of "heartless
strangers" (278), all "selfish" and "unkind," and trusts "no one" (304, author's emphasis). But it is
from that world that Philip returns with the fortune that will enable him to reclaim his paternal
estate, "repair and judiciously modernize the house, and fertilize and adorn the grounds" (419).
Philip's backstory affords Cummins the opportunity to purify his representative
prosperity in two ways; first, by disentangling his material success from the self-consciously
competitive environment from which it derives and, secondly, by redirecting it into the service of
the organic angel, whose moral imperatives drive her to "fulfill her charities" and "do good on
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earth" (421). Philip's profits from outside his home territory provide the means for both
enjoyment and sacrifice at home—Cummins' gesture toward reconciling her nation's evident
burgeoning prosperity, directly resultant from aggressive expansion, with her belief in the
fundamental compatibility of human and divine interests. While Philip and Willie, as Fisher has
noted, both perform "successful American manhood in imperial trade" by "battling Bedouins in
the Arabian desert," (67), Philip's actual windfall could not occur in a more overtly passive
manner. In a letter to Gertrude in which he identifies himself as her father, Philip details how,
while he had earned "a decent maintenance" in his travels, "Accident [...] at last thrust upon me a
wealth which I could scarcely be said to have sought" (385). This "accident" transpires in the
California Gold Rush following the United States' wresting of the state from Mexico, but Philip
distances himself from this "land of falsehood and deceit," saying "For me [...] who sought it not,
it showered gold" (385). In perhaps the most competitive economic context of the antebellum
era, Philip underscores the absence of both effort and intention in his achievement, declaring,
"without effort, almost without my own knowledge, I achieved the greatness which springs from
untold wealth" (385).
In the last pages of the novel, this accidental, "untold" wealth finds its proper end in
liberal Protestantism's evangelical economy, with its affirmation of private and collective
interests as mutually inclusive. The male conversion initiated by the organic angel ensures the
orientation of potentially compromised means toward divinely-sanctioned ends; she becomes
heir to his wealth and he to her works of charity. Emily, whose erotic appeal Cummins
studiously diminishes in the latter half of the novel in contrast to Gertrude's, becomes the fitting
agent for finalizing Philip's conversion as spiritual consummation terminating in benevolent
service:
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The blind girl's prayers are answered; her last, best work is done; she has cast a
ray from her blessed spirit into his darkened soul; and, should her call to depart
soon come, she will leave behind one to follow in her footsteps, fulfill her
charities, and do good on earth, until such time as he bee summoned to join
her again in heaven. (421)
All the means of Philip's newfound happiness, "his beautiful home, his wide possessions, and
honorable repute among his fellow-men, [and] even the love of the gentle Emily," prove, by
virtue of his conversion, stepping stones to philanthropic labor.
In the narrative of Philip's conversion, Cummins brings together the two greatest
challenges to a moral mission of disinterested benevolence: erotic and material enjoyment. By
putting both the attractiveness of wealth and the attractiveness of the body into the service of
charity, Cummins boldly grafts America's contemporary prosperity onto liberal Protestantism's
religion of the heart. In The Lamplighter, disinterested ends purify means—not in a retroactive
sense, but immanently, as the body of the female saint and the sphere of her active charity
redirect all human interests toward holy ends, converting men and the money they make.
Conclusion
In an era when "violent boundaries were in violent flux" and the nation "doubled its
national territory, completed a campaign of Indian Removal, fought its first prolonged foreign
war, wrested the Spanish borderlands from Mexico, and annexed Texas, Oregon, and California"
(Kaplan 583) sentimental authors like Cummins were writing about the harmonizing of selfinterest with benevolence as the fundamental outcome of conversion. In The Lamplighter,
Cummins demonstrates one strategy female Christian authors deployed for addressing the
paradox of antebellum culture's simultaneous emphasis on gentle persuasion in religion and
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competition and coercion in business—figuring the organic angel as microcosmic utopia, the
incarnational representation of reconciled interests.
Cummins' rendition of the organic angel thus invests Christian conversion with an
imperializing tendency through its grafting of male economic success onto female benevolent
labors. However, attention to her specific articulation of the organic angel should caution us
against overgeneralizing about the relationship between sentimentalism and domesticity.
Kaplan, for instance, argues that sentimental fiction "regulates the traces of savagery within
itself" (582) and, in this vein, contends that Gertrude must "purge herself of both her origin in a
diseased uncivilized terrain and the female anger identified with that 'dark' realm" (601).
Weinstein and Fisher rightly challenge this conclusion, with Fisher stressing Cummins'
participation in the antebellum "attraction to the figure of the noble savage" (53) and the novel's
concomitant celebration of "a savage in the house" (53). Indeed, in contrast to contemporary
sentimental authors like Susan Warner who depicted conversion as the extinction of human will
by divine will, Cummins creates an organic angel whose erotic power stems uniquely from her
exoticized origins as dark, peculiar, and impassioned orphan. In so doing, however, she
complicates the democratic reproducibility of her moral exemplar, whose holiness remains
ambiguously rooted in free-will and natural election.
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III. AESTHETIC PERVERSION IN HAWTHORNE'S THE MARBLE FAUN

The organic angel figures in antebellum fiction as an aesthetic intersection between
human inclination and divine beauty, a living icon who translates individual and national desires
into the sphere of spiritual consummation. In Chapters 1 and 2 I demonstrated how the
development of the organic angel structures the narrative movement of the female
bildungsroman; as she unfolds from natural child to supernaturalized woman, the heroine bridges
the principle of organicism with the conversion narrative structure. While many sentimental
novelists of the period engaged this dynamic trope, a few tested her purifying powers and found
them wanting. Chapters 3 and 4 of this study trace the malformation of the organic angel in its
impact on the narrative trajectories of romance novels by Nathaniel Hawthorne and Herman
Melville, respectively.
In her positive figurations, the organic angel serves as a millennial trope that opened up a
purified purview of the future and translated her witnesses into a postlapsarian harmony between
nature and divinity. She thus encapsulates antebellum America's optimism regarding an
imminent fulfillment of its combined idealized origins as "Nature's nation" and the "City on a
Hill"—as grounded in the innocence of nature and privileged with divine election. But while the
trope of the organic angel thus functions as a harbinger of futurity, she likewise signals an
incipient return to an ancient past, that of Medieval Christianity, with its compounded hierarchies
of intercession and its treasuries of art.
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By the middle of the 19th century, American Protestantism had nearly made an aboutface in its attitude toward the role of art, beauty, and the human imagination in matters of faith,
with liberal Protestant tourists showing a "tendency to identify art with religion" (Vance 195).
James Jackson Jarves, for instance, in his 1864 treatise The Art-Idea, contended that art "brings
down the incomprehensible, by a species of incarnation, to the range of finite faculties," further
calling it "the spiritual representative of Love" and announcing that the "'scope and direction of
Art is 'GODWARD'" (qtd. in Vance 195). Author of the massive two-volume study America's
Rome, William Vance argues that the "religion of Beauty for more than two centuries has filled a
void created by the absence of adequate ritualistic and aesthetic satisfactions in Protestant [...]
faiths" (183). The "religion of Beauty," however, did not simply displace a minimalist
Protestantism; it grew out of Protestantism's own new investment in imagination and intuition as
facilitators in the interaction between human and divine life, an investment centered on the
transformative figure of the organic angel.
As a result of America's ascetic religious heritage by way of Puritanism, critics have
traditionally depicted the antebellum confrontation between Protestantism and Catholicism as an
encounter between related but inversely gendered religions. The industrial revolution and
commercialism of the 19th century further entrenched a notion of American Protestantism as a
masculinized religion in contradistinction to the feminized decadence of Catholicism. Annamaria
Elsden, for instance, remarks that "precisely what Americans found offensive about
Catholicism—its ornamentation, idolatry, ritual—was also subordinated as feminine and placed
in contrast to the more masculine values of Enlightenment Protestantism" (xii). While both
Puritan sensibility and utilitarian ideology unquestionably informed the antebellum confrontation
with Rome, antebellum Protestantism had developed an unprecedented veneration for the divine
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feminine as a material mediator between human and divine natures. Consequently, as American
tourists crossed the threshold of Italy in unprecedented numbers beginning in the 1850s, their
newer, liberal feminized faith collided with the older, institutionalized feminine faith of Rome.
In Roads to Rome, Jenny Franchot argues that the "Protestant cult of domesticity [...] enabled a
partial recovery of a repudiated incarnational and intercessory 'aesthetic'" (253), one centered on
the female saint as agent of conversion. Because Catholic iconography so closely mirrored this
emergent aesthetic—woman-as-art mediating divine life—it threatened to merge the two faiths
in the mind of American tourists and, as a consequence, often triggered a violent effort at selfextrication from aesthetic influence. For those Americans who "saw in Mary the same
transfigurative powers as those claimed for American Christian domesticity" (253), Catholicism
seemed like the consummation of liberal Protestantism's movement toward a more aesthetically
and emotionally satisfying religion. In the next moment, however, it seemed like a contamination
of Protestantism's purity through the very forms of religious mediation that attracted them.
When American Protestant tourists encountered Rome, they were approaching the very
roots from which their own faith had been birthed through recoil (Vance xx). As Franchot notes,
"animus against Romanism was a central determinant in colonial Puritan identity" (xix). What is
more, they were approaching it out of interest in the very aspects of Catholicism that had
triggered that recoil: devotional decadence, material excess in religion, feminine mediation—art.
As America's fledgling mid-century religion of art came into contact with the aesthetic
decadence of Roman Catholicism, the encounter produced a deadlock of what has been variously
called the "attraction and repulsion" and "approach and retreat" (Natterman 55) of the New
World's reunion with the Old. The danger of idolatry meant that even as Americans brought a
"hunger for communion" with divine goodness through the material consolations afforded by the
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Catholic religion, they felt compelled to continually register their "fear of corruption" (Franchot
xxiii).
Art conceived as icons threatened to expose Protestant viewers to the sensual
contaminations of idolatry associated with Marion and saint-worship, even as it seemed to offer
the logical culmination to their nascent belief in the transfigurative role of the organic angel.
Upon the confrontation of Protestant consciousness with "the 'foreign faith' lodged at the heart of
American Christendom" (Franchot xviii), the organic angel revealed as her hidden oblique the
"Whore of Babylon," divine womanhood's intercessory influence morphed into powers of
seduction and idolatry. When, in the "era's most significant Protestant fiction of Rome" (350),
Hawthorne's 1860 novel The Marble Faun, the organic angel encounters a more fully
materialized mirror of her transformative capacities, her suppressed powers of sexual and
spiritual seduction accordingly return with a vengeance.
In The Marble Faun, the pressure of competing feminized aesthetics causes the figure of
the organic angel as art to split into two separate incarnations—one magnetic, sensual, and
transformative, but damned; the other pure, static, ineffectual, and saved. Miriam, sensual by
nature can only transform her spectators by contaminating them with illicit sexual desires. Hilda,
innocent by nature, altogether resigns her transformative powers in favor of simple selfpreservation. As his Italian Notebooks demonstrate, Hawthorne preoccupied himself during the
months he spent in Italy with finding a means to extract the sensual vitality of Catholicism to
serve purified Protestant ends; the novel's bifurcation of the organic angel into equally nonredemptive avatars of idealized womanhood reflects his ultimate inability, against a Catholic
backdrop, to conceive of the purified sensual vitality typified by the trope of the organic angel.
For Hawthorne, the soluble sexuality of the organic angel in sentimental fiction found too

119

thorough and persistent a concretization in Rome, with its promiscuous aggregations of nude
sculptures and sacred icons. In place of her redemptive and millennial role, he aggressively
separated out the natural seductress from the natural saint, the latter stripped down to domestic
ornament, a mere self-contained cipher of divine womanhood.
Hilda and Miriam both stand as natural women, wholly contiguous with their respective
origins in Catholic Europe and Protestant New England. But because Miriam emerges from
Rome's staggeringly ancient and prolific religion of art, the spiritual magnetism and
transformative powers of the organic angel accrue to her body, rather than to Hilda's. Miriam, an
unwilling but "natural" seductress, represents female sexuality as inherently damning, the source
and conduit of Catholicism's overpowering illicit sensuality. She embodies in the novel the
dangers of aesthetic intimacy, a work of art that ensnares and pollutes the innocent votary
unawares.
Apposed to the charismatic and sensual Miriam, Hilda embodies the safety of a
puritanical aesthetic distance. As she navigates through the museums and streets of Rome, Hilda
repels the dangerous influences of sensuality, eluding the snare of idolatrous Rome with its
powers of "instant conversion" (qtd. in Franchot) by way of transformative art. A congenital and
incorruptible innocent, Hilda can neither transform nor to be transformed, convert others or be
converted, in the tradition of the female bildungsroman. Her organic intimacy with divine life
remains a thing apart, magnifying rather than collapsing the distance between pure divinity and
fallen humanity. A conceptually polarizing figure, Hilda rejects any form of redemptive contact
between saint sinner and insists that the power of transformation lies only on the side of the
sinner to pervert the saint.
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In the antebellum sentimental novel, narrative development takes its shape along the lines
of transformation experienced and enacted through the trope of the organic angel as female saint.
Accordingly in The Marble Faun, the static trajectory of Hilda's innocence serves to neutralize
the story's thematic and structural investment in the felix culpa, a redemptive storyline whereby
the fall into sinful knowledge enables an ultimate elevation of character. This ostensible
structural incompatibility within the novel prompted Franchot to call The Marble Faun a novel
"hostile not only to the 'flesh' but to itself as organic narrative" (351). Hilda's non-developmental
passage through the contaminating city of Rome has, more than any other aspect of the book,
frustrated critics counting on Hawthorne's reputation for insisting on the importance of the
"flesh" in its capacity to vitalize human relationships and religion. But projecting a sacred
vitalized woman against the backdrop of Rome proved a different matter than projecting her
against a backdrop of New England Puritanism, and resulted in "strenuously segregated" (351)
and mutually deconstructing storylines.
As a product of Catholicism and what Protestants viewed as its sanguine and sensual
history, the aesthetics of Rome seemed as likely to spread perversion as to facilitate communion
with the sacred, and The Marble Faun is a nightmare drama of trying to navigate between the
liability of the one and the longing for the other. Perhaps the most profound anxiety for
Protestant spectators lay with the uncertain overlap between pagan and sacred representations of
the ideal woman.34 Sacred icons and nude images alike purported to idealize and therefore
divinize the female body, and these inverse representative types often mingled in the same
34

Leonardo Buonomo notes that "it may be difficult for the uninformed to distinguish between statues (or pictures)

of [...] pagan goddesses and those of the Madonna. As subjects [...] they are treated with equal reverence and
devotion in that they all inspire the portrayal of noble and beautiful features." See Backward Glances: Exploring
Italy, Reinterpreting America (1831-1866), p. 23.
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galleries. As residual Puritan fears of idolatry competed in the Protestant imagination with
aesthetic veneration, sensual pagan sculptures raised questions that mapped onto sacred icons. If
depictions of pagan deities "represented idolatry, indecency, and lies," then "How could they be
ideal?" (Vance 184). And to what extent did similarly perverse human impulses infiltrate
purportedly sacred Catholic art?
Hawthorne expresses this anxiety both in the Italian Notebooks and in narrative
commentary of The Marble Faun, where the problem of "impure pictures" proceeding from the
same "impious hands" as apparently "Heaven-descended likenesses" (MF 263) threatens to
destroy the trust the spectator places in divine inspiration as the source of art. "Who can trust the
religious sentiment of Raphael," he complains, "after seeing, for example, the Fornarina of the
Barberini palace, and feeling how sensual the artist must have been, to paint such a brazen
trollop of his own accord, and lovingly!" (263).35 Implicit in the example of Raphael's works is
the danger of masquerade, the sensually-conceived work presenting as spiritual and ensnaring
the unwitting Protestant viewer's idolatrous, rather than reverent, gaze.
The threat of inadvertent idolatry stemmed from the possibility of a spectator's
involuntary sensual resonance with a work of art's hidden, corrupt origins. Representations of
bodies, even toward the end devotional reverence, necessarily involved the viewing of actual
bodies—by embodied artists—and the viewer could not determine the degree of separation
between aesthetics and sexuality in the relationship between maker and model. As T. Walter
Herbert explains, "The Hawthornes had been startled by the nudity of the pictures and statues
they viewed in Italy, and their minds insistently formed a judgment concerning the sexual
interaction between artist and model" (Dearest 231). Although he tried to disguise his objections
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See also French and Italian Notebooks, p. 93.
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as philosophical and aesthetic, Hawthorne resented nude statuary "on moral grounds" (Vance
191).36
Questioning the ethical grounds of the process of aesthetic production lead Hawthorne as
narrator37 to speculate on the potentially perverse origins of all affective iconography. With some
cynicism he remarks that "If the artist sometimes produced a picture of the Virgin, possessing
warmth enough to excited devotional feeling, it was probably the object of his earthly love, to
whom he thus paid the stupendous and fearful homage of setting up her portrait to be
worshipped" (MF 263).38 When it comes to representations of a viable, vital divine womanhood,
Hawthorne suggests, categories of spiritual and sensual "warmth," devotional and sexual
"excitement," hopelessly interfuse, and the affective success of the former may depend on the
latter. Creating and consuming any affective feminine aesthetic would then involve a
contaminating sensual indulgence.39

36

Buonomo observes that for American tourists, the "evaluation of Italian art could hardly be, in most cases, the

result of merely aesthetic considerations." He further contends that "What needs to be considered, then, is not only
the way in which this art is described and appreciated by the Protestant observer, but also his or her awareness (or
lack of it) of the particular difficulties involved in the matter," p. 23.
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For treating the perspective of the narrator of The Marble Faun as synonymous with Hawthorne's, see Stern p.

146, n. 7. See also Millicent Bell's "The Marble Faun and the Waste of History," p. 359.
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The narrator concludes this passage somewhat tongue-and-cheek, saying, "But no sooner have we given

expression to this irreverent criticism, than a throng of spiritual faces look reproachfully upon us. We see Cherubs,
by Raphael, whose baby-innocence could only have been nursed in Paradise [....] and withdraw all that we have
said," p. 263.
39

My reading here stands in opposition to Sabine Metzger's claim that Hawthorne "assigns the primacy to 'earthly

love' by making it a precondition of both religious art and religious devotion." Metzger takes the quote on "earthly
love" out of context when she contends that "Giving a work of art 'the warmth [....] to excite spiritual feelings' [...]
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At the outset of The Marble Faun, Hawthorne sets up a tentative community of tourists, a
circle of tenuously linked, isolated figures, with the character Miriam as this sensual and
contaminating feminine aesthetic at its heart. Hawthorne establishes Miriam's background in
terms evocative of the hidden, potentially corrupt origins of a voluptuous piece of art. "There
was an ambiguity," the narrator explains, "about this young lady, which, though it did not
necessarily imply anything wrong, would have operated unfavorably as regarded her reception in
society, anywhere but in Rome" (19). Although "nobody knew anything about Miriam, either
for good or evil" (19), rumors abound regarding her as Jewish, German, or even Southern
mulatta in origin (20). Miriam's past cannot be definitively ascertained, but her exotic physicality
invokes speculations on sexual deviance having had a hand in her destiny, whether through an
act as taboo as miscegenation or merely the abandoning of her marriage out of devotion to art
(20). As if she were in fact an aesthetic object, the narrator asserts that she "was a beautiful and
attractive woman, but based, as it were, upon a cloud" (20). While the base/basis of Miriam's
magnetism remains uncertain,40 the effect of it does not: Miriam's "nature had a great deal of
colour, and, in accordance with it, so likewise had her pictures," which exude "warmth and
passionateness" (18).
The "colour" and "warmth" of Miriam's artwork and personality suggest an anterior
perversion effected through the process of artistic production. Thus, while the narrator for a time
encourages playful speculation regarding Miriam's colorful "nature," he develops a more sinister
tone at the appearance of a male figure from Miriam's past, a stalker subsequently designated
becomes the source from which religious art and religious devotion spring." See "'That Indefinable Nothing, That
Inestimable Something': Empathy and the Miraculum of Art in The Marble Faun," p. 104.
40

Near the conclusion of the novel, Miriam reveals some details from her past, including that she is of "mixed race,"

English and Italian, and her aura of guilt can be traced to her effort to free herself from an "odious" marriage p. 334.
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"the Model." This epithet derives from the fact of his "being often admitted to her studio," and
leaving "his features, or some shadow or reminiscence of them, in many of her sketches and
pictures" (27). Vance observes that "the past they share [...] is one obviously characterized by
sexual guilt" (122), and sexual guilt in the novel finds representation largely through allusions to
bloodshed—a displacement of lust into bloodlust. In a fragmentary conversation that occurs
between Miriam and the model, he accordingly torments her with inferences of an "imaginary
blood-stain," concluding of her hand, "It looks very white [...] but I have known hands as white,
which all the water in the ocean could not have washed clean!" (76). Miriam's reply—""It had no
stain [...] until you grasped it in your own" (76)—indicates the compromise of aesthetics with
sensuality, material become bodily contact.
The details of Miriam's prior involvement with the model, however, remain ambiguous,
the facts of their relationship inaccessible through the textual frame; the narrator goes so far as to
insist he has imaginatively generated their conversation to fill a gap in facts (72). This avowal in
the context of a work entirely fictional seems redundant and highlights Hawthorne's point that
the facts of the sexual relationship, including the distribution of culpability, are of secondary
importance. The primary importance of the conversation lies rather with its disclosure of a
dynamic of sensual resonance between model and artist: "Of so much we are sure," the narrator
attests, "that there seemed to be a sadly mysterious fascination in the influence of this ill-omened
person over Miriam; it was such as beasts and reptiles, of subtle and evil nature, sometimes
exercise upon their victims" (72).
While the narrator speculates on the degree of Miriam's culpability for this entrapment,
the contagiousness of illicit association ultimately subsumes the distinction between guilt and
victimization. Has an external stain "attach[ed]" itself to Miriam, or has her own nature "evoked"
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its corresponding "spectre" (76)? Regardless, this irremediable resonance between artist and
model obtains a quasi-pathological status, diffusing the taint of sensuality into the very
atmosphere: "In their words, or in the breath that uttered them, there seemed to be an odour of
guilt, and a scent of blood" (76). Because only quarantine can prevent the transmission of sensual
resonance through aesthetic consumption, the one person who achieves intimacy with Miriam,
closing the gap between sensual desire and aesthetic embodiment, will fall. In contrast to this
hapless erstwhile innocent, the Italian Donatello, the two Americans maintain a fixed aesthetic
distance from Miriam at the crucial moment and thereby elude her adulterating touch.
Kenyon, American tourist and artist, first brings to bear the principle of aesthetic
detachment in his role as sculptor of the exoticized Cleopatra, an enmarbled Miriam; he will
deploy analogous discretion in his climactic encounter with Miriam as woman of art come to life.
By means of Kenyon's masterpiece Cleopatra, Hawthorne tests the potential of the exercise of
aesthetic distance to channel sexual vitality without compromising the moral integrity of the
artist or work of art.
Fashioned after Octavius' jilted lover, Cleopatra epitomizes sexual vitality as feminine
aesthetic. Captured in a moment poised between seduction and self-murder, Cleopatra "might
spring upon you like a tigress, and stop the very breath that you were now drawing, midway in
your throat" (98). Suppressing nothing, Kenyon has shaped "all Cleopatra—fierce, voluptuous,
passionate, tender, wicked, terrible, and full of poisonous and rapturous enchantment" (99),
clothed with "a garb [...] best adapted to heighten the magnificence of her charms, and kindle a
tropic fire in the cold eyes of Octavius" (98). Cleopatra's scarcely-contained sultry grandeur
ensures aesthetic immortality, for "she would be one of the images that men keep forever,
finding a heat in them, which does not cool down, throughout the centuries" (99).
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But the intensity of this "heat" immediately calls up the question of its inception, whether
it derived from the sensual contact of flesh with flesh, or whether the sculptor managed to
maintain an aesthetic distance that interposed cold marble between his actual flesh and the
sculpture's implicit flesh. When Miriam, the living type of Cleopatra, makes an appearance at his
studio, she immediately seizes on the implications of Kenyon's apparent intimacy with such a
prepossessing woman and demands the circumstances of this latent knowledge: "Tell me, did she
never try—even while you were creating her—to overcome you with her fury, or her love?
Were you not afraid to touch her, as she grew more and more towards hot life, beneath your
hand?" (99). Kenyon does not directly address any of these more sensitive questions, but only
her last, "How have you learned to do it?" (99). In itself, this last question implies the others,
namely, how has Kenyon learned to conceive a sexually-vital yet uncontaminated art?
His answer discloses a process of simple displacement from generative body to
generative mind: "I know not how it came about, at last. I kindled a great fire within my mind,
and threw in the material—as Aaron threw the gold of the Israelites into the furnace—and, in the
midmost heat, uprose Cleopatra, as you see her" (99). Kenyon makes a rhetorical move parallel
to that of the Biblical Aaron, who, accused of leading the Israelites into idolatry through the
sculpting of a golden calf, disclaims any intimate contact with the defiling materials, saying,
"they gave me the gold, and I threw it into the fire, and out came this calf!" (Ex. 32.24).
Hawthorne's selection of this allusion as the analogue for Kenyon's defense advertises the act of
material creation as one of repression. Because Cleopatra emerges independent of any actual
artist-model collusion, Kenyon can more easily suppress any correspondence between
intellectual and bodily "fire."
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Although Richard Brodhead has attempted to read The Marble Faun as a critique of
repression (Intro xxiv), Hawthorne's purpose in highlighting Kenyon's act of repression does not
bear resolving into satire. The alternative—sensual contact between artist and sculpture/model—
clearly alarmed and offended him—so much so, that, when a friend objected to his idea of fullyclothed statuary, Hawthorne confided to his journal, "Then let the art perish" (FIN 209). In the
chapter "Cleopatra," Hawthorne has Miriam echo his journaled sentiments contrasting a bygone
era's primeval chastity with illicit present-day reenactments: unlike the case of "an old Greek
sculptor" who, "no doubt, found his models in open sunshine, and among pure and princely
maidens," the modern sculptor, he suggests, must entertain the volatile intimacy of a privatized
gaze. The "guilty glimpses" endemic to the artistic conception then bleed into the work of art
itself, and "the marble inevitably loses its chastity under such circumstances" (96). The infamous
"coloured Venuses" (96) of the period further literalized this crossover, their flesh-tones
disclosing the sensuality of their conception. By contrast, Hawthorne counted on the coldness
and whiteness of the traditional bare marble to interpose its inanimateness between the
metaphorical warmth inhering in a naked statue and the warmth inhering in the body of the
viewer.
In "The Erotics of Purity," Herbert suggests that for men operating within the confines of
the paradigm of the cult of domesticity, "struggles to contain their own sexuality make them
deeply fearful of the power of women to arouse them, such that only when the woman is
portrayed as passionless and helpless can masculine erotic feeling be allowed to surface" (124).
Kenyon, in this vein, represses any erotic resonance with the statue of Cleopatra, displacing the
need to be fearful of touch onto the implicitly unresponsive sculpted hand of Hilda, which, as
part of the virginal Hilda, rather than "all" the seductress Cleopatra, inversely calls forth
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Kenyon's most scrupulous reverence—as if it, rather than Cleopatra, might come to life.
Encased in an "ivory coffer," the hand "had assumed its share of Hilda's remote and shy
divinity," so that Kenyon "dared not even kiss the image he himself had made" (95). By
projecting a lack of resonance onto his virginal love-object, Kenyon can successfully contain the
energies invoked by his creation of Cleopatra. Concentration on virginal purity thus allows for a
subconscious passage of sensuality from artist to image that escapes contaminating contact with
the surface of the conscious mind.
By his act of displacement, Kenyon has successfully, if barely, locked Cleopatra's
warmth into a purely aesthetic realm. But on the occasion of Miriam's visit, he obtains
prospective access to Cleopatra's model as live woman, the chance for the knowledge of
sexually vital womanhood implicit in the statue (99) to find its corresponding object in the flesh.
Patricia Pulham notes how the contrast between Cleopatra and the sculpture of Hilda's hand
"suggests a passion for Miriam that is channeled into sculpture" (95), implicating Miriam as the
unacknowledged model in the artistic process. Miriam's provocative questions regarding the
statue's inception, then, take on a more dangerous dimension in the context of her presence alone
with Kenyon in his studio, and he will reenact the original repression that made possible the
statue's detached purity possible, this time by directly thwarting contact with the contaminating
secret of Miriam's past. Burdened with the secret of her resurfaced sexual entanglement, Miriam
seeks to confide in Kenyon as the one person who, based on his creation of Cleopatra, surely has
a sympathetic knowledge of "womanhood" not of the "ethereal type" (99).
Miriam cannot lure Kenyon, who has emphatically attached himself to Hilda, across the
aesthetic distance that keeps her corresponding statue Cleopatra locked in the purity of marble,
while she herself, the woman-as-model, writhes in the agony of her isolation. The very intensity
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of Miriam's need for an intimate to relieve the isolating impact of her secret past ensures
Kenyon's interposition of a prudential barrier. When Miriam cries out, "Ah, if I could but
whisper it to only one human soul! And you—you see far into womanhood! [....] Perhaps [...]
you might understand me! Oh, let me speak!" (100), she associates her secret with the problem
of female passion itself, seeking a counterpart. Kenyon's "perfectly frank and kind" response—
"if I can help you, speak freely, as to a brother"—accordingly sends her into a tailspin of despair:
"Help me? No!" (100) she retorts. In her search for a consolatory intimacy, Kenyon's offer to
"help" "if" he can and as a "brother" signals an introduction of distance as willful lack of
understanding.
Even though Miriam initially rages over the "gush of passion [...] thus turned back upon
her," and accuses Kenyon of being "cold and pitiless as [his] own marble" (100) she ultimately
sanctions his act of self-preservation. Upon leaving the studio she reflects, "Unless I had his
heart for my own, (and that is Hilda's, nor would I steal it from her,) it should never be the
treasure place of my secret. It is no precious pearl [...] but my dark-red carbuncle—red as
blood—is too rich a gem to put into a stranger's basket!" (101). The heart of a friend here
transforms into a "stranger's basket," but, in the terms of the novel, necessarily so, if Kenyon is
to remain the "clear-minded, honorable, true-hearted young man" (101). Only the man willing to
immerse himself in an illicit atmosphere of sensuality and blood, "plunging" into the associations
deriving from Miriam's sexuality, ultimately to "drown" there, will prove the fit correspondent of
her womanhood (101).
Only Donatello, the novel's titular "marble faun" and prelapsarian natural man, crosses
the distance to Miriam, unaware that her attractiveness corresponds with her power of
contamination. Although the novel iconically locates Donatello's "fall" at the moment when,
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half way through the novel, he throws the Model down from a precipice, his fall into the
aggressive passions that fuel his murderous act corresponds with his growing intimacy with
Miriam. Nancy Proctor contends that Donatello's commission of murder in facts "masks the
novel's other, far more central crime [...] a crime of passion, a crime of desire" (62). Miriam, like
the other protagonists and the narrator himself, likes to construct Donatello as incapable of
sexual passion. But the attribution of primordial innocence to Donatello proves tragic because
the very combination of his "natural" sexuality and "natural" naiveté ensures his failure to
maintain a requisite aesthetic distance from Miriam as an object of spontaneous attraction.
Miriam's infantilization of Donatello's sexuality allows her to briefly suppress the
knowledge of her contaminating powers and enjoy a temporary respite from her isolation. When
Donatello passionately avows, "I am glad to have my lifetime while you live; and where you are,
be it in cities or fields, I would fain be there too" (33), Miriam responds, "Hilda would never let
you speak so, I dare say," adding, to herself, "But he is a mere boy [...] a simple boy, putting his
boyish heart to the proof of the first woman whom he chances to meet" (35). Recognizing that
Hilda, like Kenyon, would assert a prudential distance in the face of sexual passion, Miriam
rationalizes her consent by denigrating Donatello's pronouncements of love to a mere "toy," and
their erotic interaction she compares to "playing with a young greyhound" (64). Buonomo notes
that Miriam "seems to describe sinister consequences that may result from simple physical
contact or proximity with her person" (48) when she provides Donatello with a token "warning
against imaginary peril" (MF 63), saying, "If you were wiser, Donatello, you would think me a
dangerous person. " She nonetheless readily consents to his stubborn attachment: "'I speak in
vain,' thought Miriam within herself, 'Well, then, for this one hour, let me be such as he imagines
me'" (65). She thus chooses to imagine herself free of contagion and Donatello of susceptibility.
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But, at the sudden reappearance of the Model, Miriam discovers she has excited a far
greater than "boyish" passion. When Donatello catches sight of the Model, "the expression of
his face was fearfully changed, being so disordered, perhaps with terrour—at all events, with
anger and invincible repugnance—that Miriam hardly knew him" (71). At that moment, the fatal
resonance of sexual passion occurs, displaced into the realm of sanguinary aggression. After they
both on impulse articulate their hatred for the Model, the narrator notes that Miriam "had no
thought of making this avowal, but was irresistibly drawn to it by the sympathy of the dark
emotion in her own breast with that so strongly expressed by Donatello" (71). The narrator then
characterizes this sympathetic resonance as a transaction of bodily fluids evocative of
intercourse: "Two drops of water, or of blood, do not more naturally flow into each other, than
did her hatred into his" (71). While Donatello makes the inaugural exclamation of hatred, the
source of illicit aggression lies with Miriam, whose prior hatred flows "into his." Because the
resonance as yet remains unsealed by the act of murder, Miriam attempts unsuccessfully to
reinstate the quarantine of her contamination by sending Donatello away (71).
The murder itself occurs as the spontaneous flaring up of contagious passions, an
involuntary transference that obscures Miriam's culpability as the contaminating agent. Having
followed a company of tourists to the Tarpeian Rock, Miriam and Donatello discover themselves
alone at the edge of a precipice—but "not entirely alone": Miriam's "strange persecutor"
approaches (132). Caught up in the crossfire of passions, Miriam "beheld herself as in a dim
show, and could not well distinguish what was done and suffered; no, not even whether she were
really an actor and sufferer in the scene" (132). Donatello, however, having pitched the Model
over the precipice, asserts, "I did what your eyes bade me do, when I asked them with mine"
(134). Here Miriam discovers, to her horror, that she has apparently acted the part of catalyst in
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the crime, holding a kind of mesmeric sway over Donatello as victim in reenactment of the
Model's hold over her own passions: "Could it be so? Had her eyes provoked, or assented to this
deed. She had not known it. But alas! [...] she could not deny—she was no sure whether it
might be so, or no—that a wild joy had flamed up in her heart, when she beheld her persecutor in
his mortal peril" (134). Susan Manning notes that "Action" in The Marble Faun "is reduced to
glances": "'[Miriam's] crime', as Hawthorne's conclusion puts it, 'lay merely in a glance', but one
caught, like a fever" (xxxi).
Initiated by passionate glances, the murder serves as the transposed consummation of
Miriam and Donatello's sexual desires and signals a fatal collapse of aesthetic distance.
Officially sealed together in the realm of "sin, sexual guilt, and death" (Vance 123), subject and
object of desire dispense with boundaries, replacing guilty glances with ecstatic touch: Miriam
"pressed him close, close to her bosom, with a clinging embrace that brought their two heart
together, till the horrour and agony of each was combined into one emotion, and that, a kind of
rapture" (135). Though the consolation of their union in crime will prove short-lived, and the
narrator will censure the sin-born rapture as illusory, the moment nevertheless stands out as the
novel's first and only instance of physical and emotional intimacy, a hasty release of tensions
that, through the remainder of the narrative, will reassert themselves with a vengeance.
By inflaming and subsequently consummating Donatello's sexual desires, Miriam's
sensual body completes its function as a corrupt and corrupting feminine aesthetic. Her inherent
affective powers operate on Donatello's instinctive predilection for female beauty to invite and
initiate a radical transformation in his nature. This 'fall,' indeed, represents the only such
transformation to occur in the novel and, as such, suggests Hawthorne's skepticism towards the
idea of the female body as efficacious medium of Christian conversion. As Herbert explains,
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"after intimating the inward dialectic of innocence and contamination," Hawthorne "insists
finally upon a rigid separation between them" (126), foreclosing the role of redemptive
mediation.
Sentimental domestic novelists had deployed the figure of the organic angel as a means
of binding together the spheres of flesh and spirit, appropriating the affect of the body on behalf
of Christian salvation. By dislocating sexual and emotional desires from carnal ends, the organic
angel reintegrated those selves cut loose by midcentury religious disestablishment into a new
kind of Protestant communion of saints, where her aestheticized body purported to mediate
rather than adulterate the ascetic purity of Protestantism. Her cohesive quality thus functioned as
an antidote to the heroic individualism valorized by American Renaissance nonfiction writers
like Thoreau and Emerson, whose creative landscapes reflect what Franchot calls the
"imperatives of the antebellum Protestant imagination to dissolve the mixtures of human
intimacy into the purity of the solitary self" (211). But when Hawthorne tested New England's
version of the female saint against her Old World rivals, the pressure of Rome's baroque
commingling of sacred and sensual aesthetics forced these puritanical imperatives to resurface in
fictional form, dissevering transformative sexual body from ornamental saint.
Hilda's sacral but unapproachable body forbids the kind of affective mediation of the
aesthetic female imagined by sentimental domestic authors, and effectively shuts down the
conversion process and its corresponding structural movement in the novel. Critics have
struggled to reconcile the storyline of Hilda's immutable innocence with the dynamic trajectory
of Donatello's fall from an animal innocence into a human culpability, and his subsequent
movement toward redemption. In Contexts for Hawthorne, Milton Stern outlines the long
history of this tension, noting that "At least since F.O. Matthiessen's American Renaissance,

134

there has been little disagreement about the general theme of the book, the felix culpa, and
Hilda's role within it" as standing in direct opposition to the thematic and structural thrust of the
narrative (106). Hilda, "putatively the moral arbiter of the Romance," rejects the very premise of
the felix culpa, "that the effects of sin can lead to an anguished but ennobling understanding of
isolation from and community within the magnetic chain of humanity" (106). Stern objects to
those readings that "seek to vindicate Hawthorne as an ironist" (107)41 and explains the novel's
obtrusive formal and thematic contradiction in terms of Hawthorne's capitulation to the
ideological demands of the marketplace, with its appetite for affirmations of the perpetual
innocence of "respectable, Protestant, young America" (107).
In "The Choice of Innocence: Hilda in The Marble Faun," Emily Schiller attempts to
recuperate Hawthorne's authorial integrity by protesting that Stern too easily "surrenders the
story to Hilda and her unrelenting mediocrity" (373). Her resolution to Hilda as formal and
thematic disturbance lies in detecting hidden satire, but this approach forces her to confront a
daunting collection of apparently non-satirical counter-strains, with which she defensively
challenges the critic who would read the novel with the grain rather than against it:
If we hate Hilda so much, why do we assume that Hawthorne likes her? Is it
because she seems to represent country, home and wife to a homesick author? Is
it because she ends up in the happy couple at the close of the novel? [...] Is it
because she silences "heretical" voices [...] Is it because she is said to be
"innocent"? [....] Or is it because the narrator takes her part? (373)
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The answer to these many rhetorical questions—yes—nevertheless glosses over a foreclosure
within Schiller's first provocative question. Hawthorne may not, in many respects, "like" Hilda,
but both the aspects of the novel that Schiller delineates and the testimony of Hawthorne's
personal and private correspondences during his expatriation implicate him in the struggle that
Hilda represents, of passing unscathed through the contaminating influences of foreign sensuality
and history.
When read as the breakdown of the figure of the organic angel as transformative
aesthetic, the apparently contradictory storylines of Miriam/Donatello and Hilda/Kenyon in fact
form a complementary whole, centered on Hawthorne's final incredulity over the prospect of a
revitalized Protestantism. As affective female aesthetic, Miriam can initiate Donatello's
perversion, but ultimately both her and Donatello's "redemption" must be worked out in solitude
as an infinite penance without absolution. Hilda, by preserving the kind of absolute distinction
between sinful and holy humanity characteristic of Calvinist election, can only effect her own
and Kenyon's return to an uneasy but unaltered Protestantism, centered on a regressive feminine
aesthetic of divine woman as domestic ornament. Juxtaposed, these plots disclose the breakdown
of the organic angel as foundation for a renewed Christian community and its reconciliation of
human and divine interests.
In Hilda, Hawthorne imagines the female saint as congenitally incapable of experiencing
or effecting a transformative erotic resonance; rather she stands as an aesthetic piece of
uncompromised origins and therefore radically reduced affect. The lack of sensual resonance
associated with virginal interiority forms the basis of Hilda's character and accounts for her
ability to "pass" through "corrupt environments" without "being passed through" (Franchot 357).
In Hawthorne: Calvin's Ironic Stepchild, Agnes McNeill Donohue observes that the "often
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covert and furtive references to women's virginity and chastity" in Hawthorne's earlier writing
"become almost obsessive in the European notebooks" (230), and adds that "Hawthorne's search
for the perfect virgin, as recorded in the Italian Notebooks, permeates [The Marble Faun]" (268).
While Donohue focuses on this preoccupation as a function Hawthorne's residual Calvinism,
midcentury sentimental Protestantism better accounts for his anxiety over the intercessory female
body, and the failure of the trope denotes his disillusionment with liberal Protestantism's
proposed means of reconciling flesh and spirit.42
Set against Miriam's powers of perversion through aesthetic intimacy, Hilda's perennial
chasteness encapsulates the principle of aesthetic distance as a means for cleaving flesh and spirit
into mutually repellent, static spheres. Hilda both embodies and deploys the strategy of aesthetic
distance: the "clear, crystal medium of her own integrity" (298) serves, not as medium of divine
light, but as a controlling mechanism for redirecting sensual and sexual knowledge back through
the gates of her gaze. The "moral arbiter" of the novel, she herself determines the appropriate
distance between subjects and objects of desire, between spectator and art, and between
Protestant and Catholicism. Her gaze can effectually return a contagious intrusion of idolatrous
desire back through the marble gates of art, disincarnating the contaminated model. In this vein,
Miriam will complain to Hilda, "Your very look seems to put me beyond the limits of mankind!"
(162), and Kenyon will later declare, "Had you condemned Cleopatra, nothing should have saved
her" (294). Even where Miriam as model-in-the-flesh will find herself on the wrong side of
Hilda's judgment, she ultimately assents to Kenyon's conclusion that "the white, shining purity of
Hilda's nature is a thing apart; and she is bound, by the undefiled material of which God moulded
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her, to keep that severity which I, as well as you, have recognized" (225). Kenyon here depicts
Hilda as the literal "undefiled material" of the chaste statue, the uncompromised white marble
that relieves the spectator of sensual pressure by advertising its strictly spiritual conception.
Having come all innocent into the world, straight from the uncorrupting hand of God,
Hilda maintains an unqualified vertical access to the divine, but at the expense of a horizontal,
intercessory role. The strictly skyward dimension of Hilda's spirituality finds literal
representation in her residence in Rome—Hilda inhabits and tends a "lofty shrine" of the Virgin
Mary (42). While such an abode and service might suggest an intercessory function, the narrator
specifically notes that Hilda occupies "a shrine of the Virgin, such as we see everywhere at the
street-corners of Rome, but seldom or never, except in this solitary instance, at a height above
the ordinary level of men's views and aspirations" (42). In an early visit to the shrine, Miriam
remarks to Hilda, "You breathe sweet air, above the evil scents of Rome; and even so, in your
maiden elevation, you dwell above our vanities and passions, our moral dust and mud, with the
doves and angels for your nearest neighbors" (43-4). The ethereal, detached quality of the shrine
takes on added importance in light of the fact that Hawthorne considered titling his novel St.
Hilda's Shrine (Stern 110). This is, in fact, Hilda's shrine, rather than the Virgin's: she employs it
not to implore Mary's mediation for humankind but to "pay honour to the idea of Divine
Womanhood" (44), an "idea" ultimately mirroring her own isolate purity.
Unable to serve any intercessory function, Hilda's moral obligation lies with simple
perpetuation of her natural-born "Christian innocence" (Vance 125). After inadvertently
witnessing the impassioned glance exchanged between Miriam and Donatello, as well as the
ensuing crime, Hilda finds herself poisoned by the knowledge of human passion—its origins,
tendencies, and expressions. Hilda fears that her witness of the murder may have "impugned" her
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"spotlessness" (257), and therefore recoils rapidly and irrevocably from Miriam's body as
infected and infecting flesh. Pulham investigates the locus of Hilda's perceived guilt and asks
whether "the murder, while triggering an eroticized moment of heterosexual desire between
Miriam and Donatello" may also have "provoke[d] Hilda's tacit recognition of her own love for
Miriam" (97). Certainly in the gap between the witness of the sin and the diffusion of a feeling
of sinfulness within the spectator lies an implicit invitation to the pursuit of illicit desire—to a
heightening of intimacy through shared knowledge both cognitive and carnal, mediated through
the vulnerability of the gaze. But the difference lies in Hilda's deliberate exercise of a virginal
insensibility, a dynamic pictured in the novels' opening paragraph as "the pretty figure of a child,
clasping a dove to her bosom, but assaulted by a snake" (7). Sexual temptation for Hilda
represents, not the natural resonance between sensual bodies, but a forcible penetration by an
exterior evil. As a result, Hilda's sudden recognition of Miriam's sensuality sparks an
instantaneous recoil and closure that cuts off the contaminating interpenetration of eye and flesh,
reasserting the power of aesthetic distance.
This boundless capacity for self-preservation, however, comes at the cost of conversion,
of the reconciliation between human and divine natures that forms the basis of Christian
community. When, the morning following the murder, Miriam climbs the steps to the Virgin's
Shrine, Hilda will offer her nothing but a reinforcement of the hopeless gulf between their
natures, and the priority of her own purity over Miriam's rescue. Miriam herself recognizes the
necessity of detachment, but, given over to her yearning for physical and emotional intimacy,
determines to risk Hilda's innocence just as she did Donatello's. The narrator and Miriam muse
together over the risks of contamination through bodily contact, whether Miriam, "guilty as she
was" could "permit Hilda to kiss her cheek, to clasp her hand, and thus to be no longer so
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unspotted from the world as heretofore" (159). She first resolves to prevent this transgression of
her "white-souled" (158) friend, saying, "I will never permit her sweet touch again [...] if I can
find strength of heart to forbid it" (159); but, overcome by an instinct urgency for touch, Miriam
crosses the distance anyway.
In the charged moment of encounter, Miriam's aesthetic and sensual appeal appear at
their most formidable because disguised as a medium of divine light: "she appeared to have
dressed herself up in a garb of sunshine, and was disclosed, as the door swung open, in all the
glow of her remarkable beauty" (161). Like Raphael's renditions of the Virgin Mary, Miriam
captivates through her beauty even as she threatens to translate the vulnerable viewer to a
sensual, rather than spiritual locus of conception. As polluted and polluting model come to life,
Miriam imperils Hilda with the prospect of actual fleshly embrace, an invitation exponentially
magnified through her real human need for intimacy: "She forgot, just one instant, all cause for
holding herself aloof. Ordinarily there was a certain reserve in Miriam's demonstrations of
affection, in consonance with the delicacy of her friend. To-day, she opened her arms to take
Hilda in" (161). The narrator stresses the invitation as an enfolding into Miriam's flesh; she
seeks, not to be taken in by Hilda, but "to take Hilda in," a forced translation into a contaminated
sphere and a reenactment of her gesture to serve as animated model for Cleopatra, immersing her
artist in the deadly depths of her "secret" womanhood.
A copyist by trade and therefore lacking the creative vitality of Kenyon as sculptor, Hilda
cannot displace her knowledge of Miriam's secret into the realm of art; her encounter with
Miriam accordingly necessitates a more rigorous strategy of containment. To counter Miriam's
summons to intimacy, Hilda transmutes the space between viewer and desirable object into a
medium of separation rather than communion: "When her friend made a step or two from the
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door," Hilda "put forth her hands with an involuntary repellent gesture, so expressive, that
Miriam at once felt a great chasm opening itself between the two" (161). Hilda as surely as
Miriam acts on instinct, her protest the "involuntary" backlash of an innocent nature deflecting
assault by evil. As the narrator pictures it, the two women inhabit states as absolute and
inexorable in their separation as that of the saved and the damned in the afterlife: "They might
gaze at one another from the opposite sides, but without the possibility of ever meeting more; or,
at least, since the chasm could never be bridged over, they must tread the whole round of
Eternity to meet on the other side" (161). Hilda's repellant gaze here cleaves human nature from
intercessory aid as mercilessly as Calvin himself; material bodies and aesthetic appeal can no
more mediate reconciliation across the "chasm" of natures than the damned can remove an elect
soul from the hand of God. Hilda accordingly "expressed a kind of confidence" in commanding
Miriam's aloofness, "as if the girl were conscious of a safeguard that could not be violated"
(161). This inviolable inheritance comprises a virginal sensibility that recoils by instinct from the
same force of appeal that ensnares those subject by nature to human passions.
In spite of its interest in the Christian arc of redemption, across The Marble Faun
questions of repentance and purification yield to this implacable fact of quarantine between
human beings as subjects and objects of desire. The effect of this puritanical "imperative"
consists ultimately in a concession to sensuality in aesthetics as superior in affect to the sacred,
and, by extension, the sensual woman as overpowering the sacral essence of the female saint.
Hilda herself openly justifies her detachment from Miriam in these terms, saying,
If I were one of God's angels, with a nature incapable of stain, and garments that
could never be spotted, I would keep ever at your side, and try to lead you
upward. But I am a poor, lonely girl, whom God has set here in an evil world,
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and given her only a white robe, and bid her wear it back to Him, as white as
when she put it on. Your powerful magnetism would be too much for me. The
pure, white atmosphere, in which I try to discern what things are good and true,
would be discoloured. (162-3)
Hilda sets up her defense in terms of the discourse characterizing antebellum Protestants' sense
of tension between Catholicism and their native faith as a choice between deprivation and
excess, whiteness and color, original purity and intermediary corruption.43 In the moment of
Miriam's profound deprivation of any human solace, Hilda sets up a counter-deprivation, the
poverty and loneliness of having "only a white robe." But this very deprivation constitutes the
negative power of her virginal sensibility, representative of a larger religious and cultural
heritage: Hilda will at least remain pure—she can at least anywhere, anytime reassert the
boundaries of her innocence, born out of a fusion of Puritan election and Unitarian optimism
about human goodness.
The fallout of this discrimination between vitality and purity is the failure of the organic
angel as transformative trope; Hilda cannot "lead" Miriam "upward"—she can only escape or
succumb to the perverting magnetism of the sensual woman. But while transformative power lies
with Miriam, the force of moral definition lies with Hilda, who can denounce and quarantine the
source of contamination but can neither redirect human passions to higher ends nor countenance
the redemption of a nature compromised by misdirected sexual desires.
Counterfeit Confession and Failed Transformation
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Hilda's implacable consignment of the sinner to perpetual isolation corresponds directly
with Hawthorne's anxiety about the Roman Catholic version of reconciliation between penitent
and God, one which involved the capacity of a priest as mediator to confer the absolution of sins.
Hawthorne, who spent "long hours" at confessionals, "meditating and musing or timing
confessions" (Donahue 259), praised what he saw as the confessional's psychologically purgative
capacity. Nevertheless, the intimate exchange within the confessional echoed that of the art
studio in its interposition of sensual flesh between seeker and medium of divine inspiration, and
it bred in Hawthorne's imagination a two-fold fear: first, that the hidden dynamic between
confessor and penitent would facilitate the spread of contamination by producing an illicit
resonance between them, and secondly, that the Church's claims regarding the spiritual efficacy
of absolution would encourage an idolatrous attribution of moral purification to human agency.
The confessional's "notorious powers of seduction" had long scandalized "conservative
Protestants" (Franchot 212), a trend exacerbated midcentury by proliferating anti-Catholic
publications. The fabricated Awful Disclosures, by Maria Monk, of the Hotel Dieu Nunnery of
Montreal, for instance, first published in 1836, sold more than three hundred thousand copies
over the next twenty-five years (Gutjahr 167) and purported to disclose confessionals as a mere
pretext for sexual exploitation on the part of lascivious priests (175). Stowe's 1862 novel Agnes
of Sorrento, though sympathetic towards Catholic aesthetics, would similarly stage the tortured
sexual desires awakened in a priest by the guileless confessions of a young female penitent.
To Hawthorne, the confessional represented a potentially ideal arrangement compromised
by the humanity of its parties: in The Italian Notebooks, he reflected that the "relation between
the confessor and penitent might, and ought to be, one of great [55] tenderness and beauty [...] If
its ministers were themselves a little more than human, they might fulfill their office, and supply
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all that men need" (91). In The Marble Faun as narrator he would echo this sentiment, declaring
that "If there were but angels to work it [...] the system would soon vindicate the dignity and
holiness of its origin" (268). To solve this complicating factor of flesh within the novel,
Hawthorne alters, not the character of the "class of engineers who now manage its cranks and
safety-valves" (268), but the character of the penitent—rather than sending sinful flesh to priestly
flesh, he sends angel to priest, thereby eliminating the risk of contaminating sensual resonance
between human beings.
Hawthorne permits Hilda among all the characters to approach the sacramental heart of
the Church, not only because she lacks a threatening sexual interiority, but because, by
extension, she has no occasion to mistake the psychological and emotional resources of the
Church for divine clemency of sexual sins. Ironically, the actual Catholic characters and iconic
sinners of the novel—Donatello and Miriam—Hawthorne consigns to work out their salvation
through a harsh and lonely pilgrimage, contemplating in perpetual isolation the import of their
sins at private shrines, and never pictured in communion with either the Catholic Mass or the
Sacrament of Reconciliation, lest they find themselves, "kneeling for a little while at the
confessional, and rising unburthened, active, and incited by fresh appetite for the next ensuing
sin" (320). Under the illusion that the Church's absolution has cleansed them from the
contaminating effects of sin, mercenary penitents rise up to sin more, compounding
contamination and producing that "mass of unspeakable corruption, the Roman Church" (284).
Idolatrous practice and sensual appetite thus work hand in hand: availing themselves of a
blasphemous absolution, Donatello and Miriam might mistakenly believe themselves purified
and reintegrate within the Christian community, instead of seeking by quarantine what Hilda
enjoys by nature—a strictly vertical, unmediated access to spirit. Precisely because Hilda lacks
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by nature the capacity and desire to sin, Hawthorne can test his speculations on the possibility of
isolating out the psychological efficacy of the sacraments from what he saw as their perverse
tendency toward sensual and idolatrous indulgence.
Hawthorne creates the occasion for Hilda's visit to the confessional by mirroring actual
culpability and her feelings of violation, the search for mercy and the search for comfort. As
Hilda broods over her cognitive fall from innocence, an emotional torpor ensues that resembles
"a half-dead serpent knotting its cold, inextricable wreaths about her limbs," a type of "that
peculiar despair [...] which only the innocent can experience, although it possesses many of the
same gloomy characteristics that mark a sense of guilt" (256). The "snake" of "Evil" (7) assaults
her as alien element, necessitating only an extraction of "the dark story which had infused its
poison into her innocent life" (277). Herbert describes how "Beset by such consternations, Hilda
seems to drift along the edges of actual contamination, as though her innocence were a twin
sister of Miriam's defilement" ("Erotics" 127-8). Unfallen from grace but in desperate need of
psychological purgation, Hilda ventures from her dovecote to wander through St. Peter's
Cathedral, in search of a strictly maternal figure who, unlike Miriam, can console her with
uncontaminated flesh. When, shortly before, Hilda knelt "before the Virgin's shrine" in prayer,
Hawthorne took care to interpose this distinction between maternal and blasphemous flesh: "was
Hilda to be blamed?" he ventured, "It was not a Catholic, kneeling at an idolatrous shrine, but a
child, lifting its tear-stained face to seek comfort from a Mother!" (259).
But Hilda who, as she proceeds through the Cathedral, "lingered before the shrines and
chapels of the Virgin, and departed from them with reluctant steps" (270), cannot find the
consummation of the Protestant domestic mother in Catholic iconography. Unlike the figure of
the organic angel, 19th century representations of the domestic mother, typically absent in body
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and present only in spirit, stressed her intercessory powers as maternal rather than erotic, and
therefore sanctioned as wholly self-effacing and spiritual. If Hilda could find the domestic
"Mother" fulfilled in Catholic iconography, then, Hawthorne suggests, Catholicism could
revitalize Protestant aesthetics without a dangerous sensual affect; instead, however, Hilda
instinctively recognizes the eroticism at the root of the images' power:
If the painter had presented Mary with a heavenly face, poor Hilda was now in the
very mood to worship her, and adopt the faith in which she held so elevated a
position. But she saw that it was merely the flattered portrait of an earthly beauty,
the wife, at best, of the artist, or, it might be, a peasant-girl of the Campagna, or
some Roman princess to whom he desired to pay his court. (270)
The material base of aesthetic production belies, for the Protestant Hilda/Hawthorne,
iconography's claim to divine mediation. "Here," the narrator explains, Hilda's "delicate
appreciation of Art stood her in good stead, and lost Catholicism a convert [...] She never found
just the Virgin Mother whom she needed" (270).
Unable to access the domestic mother as comforter through aesthetic means, Hilda turns
irresistibly from shrines to confessional. Upon her discovery of a confessional designated for
English-speakers, the narrator declares that "If she had heard her mother's voice from within the
tabernacle, calling her, in her own mother-tongue, to come and lay her poor head in her lap, and
sob out all her troubles, Hilda could not have responded with a more inevitable obedience" (277).
The anonymity of the confessional and the purity of the "penitent" allows Hawthorne to set up
the interchange as an unmediated relation between the domestic Mother and her troubled,
innocent daughter, so that at the apparent heart of a sacramental matrix Hilda actually reinforces
the boundaries of her ascetic Protestant subjectivity. The voice of the priest "acted like a
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magnetism in attracting the girl's confidence to this unseen friend" (277), but the magnetism lies
not between flesh and flesh, but between angel (278) and the invisible.
For, as Hilda will shortly demonstrate, she has placed no confidence at all in the priest as
spiritual authority; in passing through the confessional, she simply cleaves the Sacrament of
Reconciliation into unrelated acts of confession and absolution, separating out the psychological
efficacy from the falsely imputed spiritual efficacy, the psychology from the sacrament.44
Notably, Hawthorne has the priest emerge from behind the screen in order to administer
absolution, so that at the crucial moment any "magnetism" between Hilda and "an unseen friend"
has been broken. Hilda who assents to a "voice" in its role as confessor recoils from the man in
his role as priest, affirming that she has resonated with nothing extrinsic to her "New England
birth" (278). When the priest demands on what basis Hilda, as self-confirmed heretic, has come
to "avail" herself of the "blessed privileges [...] of Confession and Absolution," Hilda reacts with
horrified astonishment to the implied idolatry and responds with a prescription of salvation
worked out in isolation:
"Absolution, Father?" exclaimed Hilda, shrinking back. "Oh, no, no! I never
dreamed of that! Only our Heavenly Father can forgive my sins; and it is only by
sincere repentance of whatever wrong I may have done, and by my own best
efforts towards a higher life, that I can hope for His forgiveness! (279)
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Hilda's declaration seems rather gratuitous for a context of which she insists, "It was the sin of
others that drove me thither, not my own" (285)—but her definition of redemption proves the
operative one for the novel in its emphasis on sustained private effort toward an uncertain goal.
But unlike Donatello and Miriam, consigned to this lonely and ambiguous pilgrimage,
Hilda can reunite with the spirit of the lost domestic mother, who collapses flesh and spirit into
the original harmony of the unbroken divine/human continuum which Hilda inhabits as born
innocent. Hilda's stint in the confessional represents a psychological rebirth (283) into primordial
unity, the subsuming of art's duplicity into an aboriginal wholeness with the immaculate mother.
She thus defends her appropriation of the sacrament in terms of her motherlessness, an extension
of her Protestant expatriation: "I am a motherless girl, and a stranger here in Italy. I had only
God to take care of me, and be my closest friend; and the terrible, terrible crime, which I have
revealed to you, thrust itself between Him and me" (279). Hilda's joy and the "soften[ing]" of
her "virgin pride" (287) subsequent to the confession point to her recovery of the maternalinfantile tenderness contained within the mother-child bond. This regressive reification of purity
purges her of the knowledge of sexual desire attendant upon maturation into womanhood and
triggers Hilda's initiation from lonely girl into household goddess, from virgin daughter to chaste
wife (357). As such, it will preclude the need for any further interaction with the Church (285),
or ultimately with Rome and its art, as forms of aesthetic mediation between divine and human
natures.
Because Hilda represents Hawthorne's experiment with revitalizing Protestantism
through Catholicism's material resources, he takes care to emphasize the infiltration of her
virginal purity with a novel warmth following her receptivity to the confessional's solace. But
what appears to be an incipient transformation of Hilda's character turns out to be merely an
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enlargement of a preexisting ascetic Protestant subjectivity.45 Having witnessed Hilda's entrance
to the confessional, Kenyon challenges her on her apparent perversion from an inherited
Protestant innocence through a defection from sacred aesthetics, unaware of her invincible
capacity to evacuate the sensual from the sacred: "You were a creature of imagination, and yet as
truly a New England girl as any with whom you grew up in your native village," he laments,
If there were one person in the world, whose native rectitude of thought, and
something deeper, more reliable than thought, I would have trusted against all the
arts of a priesthood—whose taste, alone, so exquisite and sincere that it rose to be
a moral virtue, I would have rested upon as sufficient safeguard—it was yourself!
(285)
As a "creature of imagination," Hilda inhabits a world of aesthetic appeal, but as provincial
"New England girl," she inhabits a world of ascetic allegiance to a disincarnate divine. She
represents, in other words, Hawthorne's desire to have his cake and eat it too, to consume a
decadent aesthetics without a spiritual compromise.
But Hilda—unlike Kenyon or Hawthorne himself—entertains as safeguard "something
deeper, more reliable than thought," a virginal lack of resonance with Rome's sensuality.46 She
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can thus artlessly protest, "But what have I done that a girl of New England birth and culture,
with the right sense that her mother taught her, and the conscience that she developed in her,
should not do?" (285). To reassure Kenyon, Hilda uses a rhetoric he will recognize and
reverence, the language of maternal domesticity, with its transference of virginal sensibility from
immaculate mother to vestal daughter. Franchot notes that midcentury discourses promoting
"maternal nurture" tended to pit "Protestant (especially Unitarian and orthodox Calvinist)
'coldness' against Catholic 'warmth'" (246). Hilda's revitalization, her sudden "flow of spirits"
(287), stems not from an infusion of Catholic sensuality but a reconnection with the sanitized
tenderness of an imputed domestic mother; she takes on only the "warmth" of the Protestant
maternal even as she passes through the portals of a more dangerous Catholic "warmth."
As a result, when Kenyon tests Hilda for spiritual defection by checking her aesthetic
preferences, he finds her apparent foray into the "colour" of Catholic worship has in fact left her
"love" for "the white light" untouched (284). As bait, Kenyon disingenuously proposes that St.
Peter's "ordinary panes of glass" be replaced by "painted windows," saying, "Daylight, in its
natural state, ought not to be admitted here. It should stream through a brilliant illusion of Saints
and Hierarchies, and old Scriptural images, and symbolized Dogmas, purple, blue, golden, and a
broad flame of scarlet" (284). This adulteration of light would then "be just such an illumination
as the Catholic faith allows its believers" (284). With a mournful flourish he adds, "But, give
especially when compared with the dynamic Miriam, in fact, Hawthorne takes care to suggest that his pragmatically
refashioned but still idealized [Hilda] had been brought to an 'intimate' way of knowing that 'sin' or crime palpably
exists and that this 'consciousness' had become a permanent element of her being" pp. 47-48. But Hilda resists
transformation precisely because this knowledge remains extrinsic to her own nature and can therefore be repelled
without compromising her ideal purity.
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me—to live and die in—the pure, white light of Heaven!" (284). In place of this distinction,
Hilda, who insists that she "love[s] the white light, too," offers an imaginative "allegory," 'The
Recovery of the Sacred Candlestick,' which absorbs all colors into an unpolluted white flame:
"As each branch is lighted," she imagines, "it shall have a different coloured lustre from the other
six; and when all the seven are kindled, their radiance shall combine into the intense white light
of Truth!" (288).
Hilda's allegory, which Kenyon heralds as "magnificent," at once reflects Hawthorne's
ideal and his imaginative failure. The "intense white light of Truth" purports to absorb, and
therefore include and transcend, "the richness of colour" (284). But the result of this purifying of
color through consumption, as the allegory itself reveals, proves symptomatically identical with a
simple colorless purity. No trace of color remains, only an imagined intensification of a
preexisting whiteness. Rome and its richness of color is thus, in Franchot's words, "killed off to
unleash the self-purifying mobility of Protestant subjectivity" (356). The enlargement of the
"white light of Truth" to include all of Catholicism's beguiling colors, its "purple, blue, golden,
and [...] broad flame of scarlet," serves as a conceptual sleight-of-hand, a non-transformative
development that mirrors Hilda's untenable trajectory from congenital innocent to sexless wife.
Just as Hawthorne finally resists imagining a colored purity, so he will finally resist the
construction of a female sexuality concurrent with piety. Hawthorne, as Herbert rightly argues,
insists on "looking upon Hilda's purity as an absolute, kept entirely free of the womanly sexual
power [...] that betokens its loss" (128). As a result, even when Hilda undertakes an epic journey
through Rome's most notorious "precincts of contamination," a symbolic parallel to her passage
through the confessional, she resurfaces both "unbesmirched" (128) and "tenderer than she was"
before (MF 333), ready to yield to Kenyon's proposal of matrimony. This paradoxically static
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maturation of Hilda from girl-child to girl-wife takes the form of what Herbert identifies as "a
scenario" that Hawthorne "cannot describe" (128). Because the relation between husband and
wife necessarily implies female sexuality, "the testing from which Hilda emerges [...] is
explicitly designated as unimaginable" (128).
So far from suggesting that Hilda has descended into the realm of earthy sexuality, the
narrator commends to the reader's imagination a narrative of Hilda in an aesthetic afterlife of
reunion with artists and their masterpieces "painted in heavenly colors" (351). Safely ensconced
above the world which requires its conciliatory powers, art at last finds its ideal viewer. In this
realm of substance purged of sensual associations, even the dubious Raphael can take Hilda "by
the hand" (351), for celestial art mediates only "higher scene[s]" painted, "not from imagination,
but as revealed to [...] actual sight!" (351). Here, finally, Hilda finds the perfect sacred feminine
aesthetic, the Virgin Mother she had been looking for: through a glance at Perugino's easel "she
discerned what seemed a Woman's face, but so divine, by the very depth and softness of its
Womanhood, that a gush of happy tears blinded the maiden's eyes, before she had time to look"
(351). Just as "heavenly colors" enjoy no analogue in the human imagination, so Hawthorne at
once presents and withdraws this "unimaginable" Woman from the field of representation. She is
at once seen and not seen, because not seeable. We can only infer her presence and Hilda's
complete resonance with her affect—so complete that a gush of tears forecloses her view.
The hypothetical moment of resonance between "maiden" viewer and Virgin Mother of
art secures Hilda's passage from enshrined virgin above the streets of Rome to enshrined virgin
mother/wife at home, a softening process initiated by her sojourn through the confessional. The
night of Hilda's return to "the actual world" (351), the "lamp beneath the Virgin's shrine burned
as brightly as if it had never been extinguished" (352), belying the loss of maidenhood intimated
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by Hilda's mysterious desertion and the going out of the shrine's eternal flame. Indeed, so far
from having attained the "womanly sexual power" that bespeaks the "loss" of virginity (Herbert
128), Hilda responds to Kenyon's plea for lifelong "guidance" by crying and protesting, "I am a
poor weak girl, and have no such wisdom as you fancy in me" (357). Kenyon, of course,
maintains his exalted view of Hilda as one clothed "with white wisdom" as with "a celestial
garment" (357), counterpart to her enmarbled chastity. The conceptual distance perpetuated by
this sanitized aesthetic makes possible the fulfillment of Kenyon's wish to "draw her down"
without "sin" to "an earthly fireside" (289), as the simple relocation of her untouchability from a
foreign to a domestic space. In the narrator's words, "Hilda was coming down from her old
tower, to be herself enshrined and worshipped as a household Saint, in the light of her husband's
fireside" (357).
In spite of its hallowed aura, this forecast of Hilda's static future as domestic ornament
signals a radical reduction of the powers of the female saint as envisioned by domestic novels'
representations of the organic angel, and it clinches the novel's rejection of a transformative
feminine aesthetic. Hilda fails to undergo the combined physical and spiritual transfiguration that
would mobilize the affect of mature sexuality for religious ends, and liberal Protestant
figurations of Christian conversion depended on the female body's capacity to transform and be
transformed. Absent the impetus of this trope, The Marble Faun's narrative stutters to an
inconclusive close, caught between its illusory development and a final settled reality of simple
self-preservation.
Franchot observes that of all Hawthorne's works, The Marble Faun "has been judged the
most ambitious failure of his career" (350). Stern, for instance, contends that the novel comprised
an attempt on Hawthorne's part to illustrate the daring doctrine of the felix culpa but regressed
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into affirmations of facile piety: "The Marble Faun," he declares, "was Miriam and Donatello's
book, but Hilda and Kenyon inherited the stage and the narrative commitments demanded by an
ending" (125). I would argue, however, that Hawthorne's investment in the primacy of Hilda and
Kenyon's destiny preexisted any emergent concerns about marketplace viability. Charles Swann
provides a useful insight into the novel's narrative structure when he suggests that The Marble
Faun constitutes at once "a partial figure" and "a finished product" (194), "bearing as it does the
signs that it has been laboured over, and that the labour (in conventional terms) has been
abandoned" (195). Conceived of as Hawthorne's experiment with revitalizing Protestantism
through a Catholic aesthetics centered on the figure of the affective female body, The Marble
Faun's narrative failure proves a logical extension of its thematic thrust, rather than a
contradiction. The exhaustion of its plot signals the collapse, not of Hawthorne's authorial
control, but of the conceptual labor of a project whose outcome left him where he began.47
The redemptive movement of the novel depended on the spiritual efficacy of the sacred
feminine to redirect sexual energies toward a higher purity, reconciling human and divine nature.
This figuration, however, proved untenable for Hawthorne against the backdrop of a sexualized
and sanguine Rome. As a result, the divergence of two unsustainable storylines find reification at
the novel's end, with Hilda and Kenyon destined for a chaste union preservative of aesthetic
distance, and Miriam and Donatello destined for permanent exile from each other and Christian
community. If, as Donahue asserts, "in his best works, Hawthorne sees redemption for no one"
(273), then The Marble Faun might well be judged the most ambitious success of his career. For
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so far from serving as a reinvigoration of Protestant aesthetics, The Marble Faun concludes by
imposing ascetic proscriptions onto its Catholic characters. Robert Milder observes of
Hawthorne's works generally that "whatever Hawthorne might hypothesize about a higher
innocence [...] it is notable that none of his fictive sinners is allowed [...] to find happiness in
later life (11).48 A certain exile and an uncertain quest for mercy mark the fates of Miriam and
Donatello, while a retreat from aesthetic mediation and an accompanying sense of defeat mar
Hilda and Kenyon's official happiness.
In the absence of a conciliatory female body, "the figure who emerges with final
authority is [...] Hilda" (Dearest 269): absent redemption, innocence triumphs over
contamination. Miriam, therefore, must follow the prescriptions for penance as set forth by Hilda
in the confessional, and her journey toward (potential) forgiveness for sin in the next life
dovetails with a journey deeper and deeper into temporal exile. Miriam's final appearance before
Kenyon and Hilda in the Pantheon so completes this process of estrangement that Kenyon and
Hilda have at first to speculate on the identity of the "figure of a female penitent, kneeling on the
pavement, just beneath the great central Eye, in the very spot which Kenyon had designated as
the only one whence prayers should ascend" (356). Miriam enjoys no other recourse to the divine
than the unmediated opening to white light—no companion, no saint, no Virgin Mother, no
Christ.
Her quest for mercy necessitates a radical suppression of the body and its famed beauty;
as a consequence, "the upturned face was invisible, behind a veil or mask, which formed part of
48
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the [penitential] garb" (356). Only when "the kneeling figure, beneath the open Eye of the
Pantheon, arose [...] looked towards the pair, and extended her hands with a gesture of
benediction," do Hilda and Kenyon recognize Miriam with certitude. So far from rushing into
their arms in search of a renewed intimacy, however, Miriam adopts the attitude of submission to
her fate as outcast that Hawthorne imputes to the painting of Beatrice Cenci when he writes, "not
that she appeals to you for help and comfort, but is more conscious than we can be that there is
none in reserve for her" (FIN 93). Hilda and Kenyon indeed make no offer of help and comfort;
rather "they suffered her to glide out of the portal [...] without a greeting; for those extended
hands, even while they blessed, seemed to repel, as if Miriam stood on the other side of a
fathomless abyss, and warned them from its verge" (357).
Miriam, whose transformative sensual body has ushered Donatello into "the world of sin,
sexual guilt, and death" (Vance 123), can neither redirect his fallen passions nor accommodate
their mutual desires by way of a marriage grounded in fleshly love—a union that would involve
a sacralizing of Miriam's sexuality that the novel declines to envision. Thus when Kenyon takes
the part of initially authorizing their companionship, he does so in terms of radical proscription,
saying "Take heed; for you love one another, and yet your bond is twined with such black
threads, that you must never look upon it as identical with the ties that unite other loving souls
[....] There would be no holy sanction on your wedded life" (251). The implicit mention of
sexual intimacy sets Donatello "shuddering," and Miriam "also shuddering" (251), as they adopt
a deportment of radical self-containment. Donatello may have acquired a higher intellectual
nature as a result of his fall into sin, but this fall remains circumscribed by the implacable fact of
his contamination.
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Not in spite of but because of his deepened human capacity for sin and love, Donatello
and Miriam by the story's conclusion have already undergone separation from one another.
Kenyon anticipates and in fact prescribes this ultimate segregation when, after blessing their
companionship "for mutual elevation and encouragement towards a severe and painful life," he
adds one final consideration—that "If ever, in your lives, the highest duty should require either
of you the sacrifice of the other, meet the occasion without shrinking" (352). Donatello and
Miriam instinctively "shrink from happiness" (251) as the corollary of human intimacy,
specifically sexual intimacy, and prove obedient to Kenyon's challenge to sacrifice one another
for the sake of "the highest duty." The conclusion of the novel leaves them stranded apart in
ambiguity and isolation: "For, what was Miriam's life to be? And where was Donatello?" (358).
Cordoned off from the narrative by virtue of their irremediable contamination, Miriam and
Donatello move to the periphery of a Protestant gaze directed beyond, rather than through, the
colored windows of Catholicism, for "Hilda had a hopeful soul, and saw sunlight on the
mountain-tops" (358).49
Just as Miriam and Donatello must forgo every material resource in their effort to
vertically apprehend the divine, so Hilda and Kenyon, upon reaching the end of their sojourn
through "The Land of Picture," relinquish the role of aesthetics in worship as a perversion of
direct ascetic contemplation of an abstract God. As they walk in the final chapter through the
Pantheon, prior to their encounter with Miriam, Kenyon notes the solemnizing effect of the
"aperture in the Dome—the great Eye, gazing heavenward" (354) and directs Hilda's gaze to the
mossy pavement beneath. In response, Hilda turns his attention to an aesthetic of uncorrupted
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light: "'I like better,' replied Hilda, 'to look at the bright, blue sky, roofing the edifice where the
builders left it open [....] Look at that broad, golden beam—a sloping cataract of sunlight—which
comes down from the aperture upon the shrine, at the right hand of the entrance!'" (354-5). The
couple then investigate whether the sunlight's "strong illumination" of the shrine signals the
divine inspiration of its accompanying picture. Not only does the icon instead reveal itself "a
picture little worth looking at," but an unfortunate peasant unwittingly directs his prayers to a
"very plump and comfortable tabby-cat" sleeping amongst the shrines' candles (355). This
combined evidence of an absurd material misdirection of human adoration prompts Kenyon to
"seriously" announce,
Then Hilda [...] the only place in the Pantheon for you and me to kneel is on the
pavement beneath the central aperture. If we pray at a Saint's shrine, we shall give
utterance to earthly wishes; but if we pray, face to face with the Deity, we shall
feel impious to petition for aught that is narrow and selfish. (355)
To do otherwise than confront the invisible "face to face" comprises, Kenyon concludes, a
scenario "very tempting!": namely, "the delight" Catholics take "in the worship of Saints" as a
"canonized humanity" ready to patronize their sinful indulgences (355). In the very moment
Kenyon sums up Catholic aesthetics as venal and seductive, Miriam makes her appearance to
confirm the grim consequences of a misdirected gaze.
The holding out of a veiled Miriam's hands in a combined gesture of benediction and
repulse (357) dramatizes Hawthorne's Protestant subjugation of Rome's counter feminine
aesthetic. Transformative body circumscribed by an opaque seal, Miriam discloses only enough
flesh to ward off her aesthetic successor from the "fathomless abyss" of sensuality. Miriam at
once forbids further recourse to Catholic art and sanctions Kenyon and Hilda's reduction of
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sacred aesthetics to domestic ornament. Rather than representing a transfer of Miriam's
transformative powers onto Hilda's New World purity, the gesture creates an iconic "moment of
stasis [...] reached by the pressure of opposites" (Swann 211). In this moment Hawthorne
forcibly rectifies the imbalance of power resulting from the confrontation of unequal feminine
aesthetics, as Miriam relinquishes through concealment the power of influence that Hilda never
had.
The subjugation of Miriam operates as a substitute for the transformation of Hilda and
completes the novel's regressive structure as a kind of "de-conversion narrative" (Franchot 259),
a retreat from prospective conciliatory aesthetics. By superimposing its own heritage of ascetic
proscription onto Rome's representative irresistible woman, Protestantism rejects the logical
trajectory of its emerging interest in an affective aesthetics centered on the female body.
Brigitte Bailey has pointed out that,
In spite of [the] habitual polarization of a Catholic Italy and a putatively
Protestant United States, tourist writings suggest that under the surface of this
opposition the example of "Romanism," as an organization that shaped a
community through powerfully consolidating aesthetic experiences, spoke to an
evolving concept of U.S. as a nation which was attempting to affectively bound
community, secured through a national "religion." (69)
In The Marble Faun as tourist fiction, the breakdown of this prospective imitation triggers a
breakdown in the "national imaginary," "marked" in the "antebellum period" by "a turn to the
visual " (Bailey 69). Vance explains how midcentury Americans conceived of Rome as "a city
with no future," and therefore "antithetical to what America was and (in all ways except
aesthetic) to dreams of what it might become" (xx). Because America's "dreams of what it might
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become" as national community relied on the power of conciliatory aesthetics that Rome seemed
at once to consummate and degrade, the failure to appropriate that power disrupted its futuritycentered self-conception.
Benedict Anderson has argued for a "strong affinity" between national and religious
"imaginings" (18), and that the genre of the novel "provided the technical means for 'representing' the kind of imagined community that is the nation" (30). For the United States, the
burden of millennialism, with its drive to immanently reconcile the spiritual and material worlds,
served as the lynchpin of a nascent antebellum national identity,50 and the trope of the organic
angel as both subject and agent of spiritual transformation afforded a concrete means of
envisioning this vertical and horizontal consolidation of interests. Stripped of capacity either to
convert or be converted, Hilda as failed organic angel empties out the heart of this national
imaginary, supplanting the prospect of development with an uneasy blankness—the future as
exile between rival unsustainable interpretations, between Rome, a "city with no future" (Vance
xx), and the United States, a nation with an unimaginable one. Swann reflects on the absence of
an imagined future within the novel as a perplexing anomaly, saying, "What The Marble Faun
does lack is, oddly, any real notion of the future [....] Despite the fact that the action takes place
in the very recent past, there is virtually no consideration of a future history" (218). But this
structural and thematic privation follows necessarily from the novel's retreat from a liberal
Protestant millennial vision, where aesthetic mediation provides the means of advancing into a
spiritually and materially transformed communal life.
The representational strength of the organic angel lay with her dramatized capacity "to
establish community," in contrast to the ethic of "fortified solitude" set out by Emersion and
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other Transcendentalist authors of nonfiction.51 In The Marble Faun, however, the dramatization
of aesthetic power results in just such a "fortified solitude," with no communion envisioned
within or beyond the domestic space. For even as he asserts Hilda and Kenyon's expectations of
happiness through repatriation, Hawthorne evacuates both the land of their leaving and the land
of their return, in a profoundly melancholy meditation that introduces and overshadows the
novel's final paragraphs:
And, now that life had so much human promise in it, they resolved to go back to
their own land; because the years, after all, have a kind of emptiness, when we
spend too many of them on a foreign shore. We defer the reality of life, in such
cases, until a future moment [...] but, by-and-by, there are no future moments; or,
if we do return, we find that [...] life has shifted its reality to the spot where we
deemed ourselves only temporary residents. Thus, between two countries, we
have none at all, or only that little space of either, in which we finally lay down
our discontented bones. (358)
In the same breath that he pictures his protagonists on the verge of returning to their homeland to
set up a household, Hawthorne forecloses the prospect of home itself, and by extension
community, syntactically grafting his own despair onto his characters' purported "human
promise." Hawthorne indeed can barely finish positing Kenyon and Hilda's prospects before he
undercuts them as hopelessly untenable, so that the proposition "life had so much human promise
in it" falls in the same passage, and ostensibly with respect to the same subjects, with the remark
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that "by-and-by, there are no future moments." Though Hamilton suggests that "At last this paler,
less passionate, but now 'sturdier' couple [...] are prepared to turn their steps toward their
manifest, if not untroubled, destiny" (50),52 this destiny proves not so "manifest," after all.
Conclusion: The Civil War
The dissolution of an imaginable future speaks and corresponds to an additional
significant omission in the novel. In his 1990 introduction, Brodhead points out that "The Marble
Faun was written on the eve of the American Civil War, and was contemporaneous with the
Lincoln-Douglas debates and John Brown's planning of his famous raid"—"a history," he
observes, "so thoroughly absent from the book that one might regard its exclusion as one of the
book's active aims" (x). Brodhead explains how "the intensely politicized slavery conflict that
many of his contemporaries found morally exhilarating Hawthorne felt as sheer historical
nightmare" (Intro x). Thomas Woodson, editor of The French and Italian Notebooks, similarly
notes that "the agitation over slavery in America" caused Hawthorne to "shrink from his native
land" (907). It comes as some surprise, then, that The Marble Faun's preface avowedly
pronounces the United States as free from the burden of history, and Hawthorne enters only one
oblique reference to the country's impending fratricidal violence into the narrative.53
But the looming absence of the "actualities" (MF 4) of contemporary history plays a key
role in the self-advertised untenability of the novel's conclusion. Set against the ancient backdrop
of Rome, Hilda as representative American innocent can exude an aura of New World naiveté,
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the same aura that would prompt Henry James to envision Hawthorne as "strolling through
churches and galleries as the last pure American—attesting by his shy responses to dark canvas
and cold marble his loyalty to a simpler and less encumbered civilization" (qtd. in FIN 935). But
once the decisive act of repatriation approaches, awareness of an already-compromised national
innocence rushes in to usurp the nuptial optimism attending Kenyon and Hilda's destiny,
stranding the authorial consciousness "between two countries." If the religious aesthetics of the
one, in Hawthorne's mind, facilitated a cycle of seduction and bloodshed, the other had long
forfeited its claims to a special access to the divine prerogative. Shumaker sums it up best when
observes that "We never really see Hilda and Kenyon in America because the country for which
they departed would never exist" (83). Unlike Hilda, Protestant America could not even at least
reassert the boundaries of its own innocence. Absent innocence, absent redemption, it remained
for Hawthorne to wander ambiguously between desire and despair.
In Hawthorne, Melville, and the Novel, Richard Brodhead argues that the "study of form
involves consideration not so much of what happens as what sorts of things can happen" (10).
The Marble Faun, for its part, provides a study in what sorts of things cannot happen in the
antebellum Protestant imagination, at the meeting of two conflicting but mirrored aesthetics of
conversion. That religious aesthetic least anchored in material representation cannot risk change,
even though precisely the pattern for Anglo-Saxon "desire of Italy is [...] yearning for change
and emotional transformation" (Martin and Person 1). As a consequence, in Hawthorne's foreign
novel the transformative features that characterized a liberal Protestant aesthetic centered on the
trope of the organic angel contract into a simple principle of resistance. Across their aesthetic
pilgrimage, Hilda and Kenyon not only fail to apprehend the sought-for vitality of their historical
'Mother' religion, they effectively empty out the embryonic aesthetic life of their own. In the
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end, Italy serves once again as "a reminder of what the founding fathers had meant to leave
behind them on their way to the New World" (Buonomo 18).
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IV. HOLY SEDUCTION IN MELVILLE'S PIERRE

When Hawthorne stages an American male's encounter with magnetic female influence
in Rome, the unifying function of the organic angel dissociates into the competing attractions of
the light woman and the dark woman, the ornamental angel and the hapless, earth-bound
seductress. The Marble Faun's setting abroad enables Hawthorne to preserve an unqualified
correspondence between the angelic Hilda and the purified spirituality of the New World,
purported to originate in the spiritual innocence of nature in contrast to the corrupt civilization of
Rome.54 Hilda's "natural' innocence," however, never integrates with a magnetic eroticism, so
that even as Kenyon and Hilda prepare to return to America, that return constitutes an abdication
of the converting powers of the mature female body, the premise of the organic angel. Kenyon
and Hilda return to America as the only and ideal intersection of "nature and natural civilization"
(Jehlen 15), but at the cost of bracketing the power of the sexual body as incommensurable with
purified "nature" in general and female nature in particular.
Eight years earlier, Melville had similarly dramatized an American male's competing
desires for contrasting women, the golden-haired Lucy and the dark-haired Isabel. But Melville's
Pierre takes as its point of departure the idealized American estate of Saddle Meadows, and, as a
result, the novel's devastating invocation of lust redounds onto both "nature" and "nature's
nation." The 1850s sentimental novel postulated a preexisting natural harmony that saw its
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climax in the flowering of American Protestant culture. In American Incarnation, Myra Jehlen
argues that "Americans saw themselves as building their civilization out of nature itself": by
"[f]using the political with the natural," they "imagined an all-encompassing universe that in
effect healed the lapsarian parting of man and his natural kingdom" (3).55 The organic angel, as a
refined and refining outgrowth of nature, came to serve in these novels as an emblem of natural
and therefore uncorrupted civilization, the United States as the democratized (universally
accessible) "kingdom" of heaven on earth. Her ties to the earth's body legitimated and sanctified
the body of the nation as a spontaneous expression of the harmony between natural processes
and divine will.
Rather than undercut this consonance between nature and divinity, as mediated by the
attractive female, Melville exploits it to confound the antebellum vision of a fundamentally
benevolent universe: in Pierre, the origins of the organic angel in nature, and by extension, in
nature's God, becomes the problem, as neither nature nor the supernatural return the hero to a
purified ontological ground. Like Hawthorne, Melville structures his novel around rival
influential females, but in the case of Pierre both women advertise their capacity to purify the
titular protagonist's desires, and with them, his estate. Likewise, in the end, both women prove
avatars of an identical ontological paradox—the coincidence of disinterested benevolence and
proprietary desire, of charitable and sexual love. The trope of the organic angel, designed to
mediate between primal innocence and supernatural grace, cleaves in Pierre into mirrored
figures mediating the same perverse confluence: "nature" as both physical phenomena and
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human inclination proves a conduit to moral perversity, not divine purity, combining at once the
highest impulses and the lowest material actions.
Jehlen identifies Melville's Pierre along with Hawthorne's The Marble Faun as "arguably
their authors' most troubled works" (19), and this contingency manifests in the malformation of
narrative shape.56 The stunted narrative trajectory in both novels derives from their introduction
of female figures who denote a unified continuity between natural desire and supernatural grace,
but who fail to complete the process of sentimental conversion for the male protagonists. But
where Hawthorne effects a separation of sexual and spiritual affect in the form of the
etherealized Hilda, a move which provides the novel its token "happy ending," Melville
ruthlessly subjects his hero to escalating degrees of the same irreducible mixture of sexual and
spiritual passion—a paradox he links to national origins. By staging the bifurcation of the
organic angel at home, in the "nation that was, above all other nations, embedded in Nature"
(Miller 201), Melville forecloses the possibility of flight to an alternate ontological, political, or
theological ground—and thereby paralyzes the narrative trajectory of Pierre as well as that of the
United States.
In the novel's first chapter, Melville goes to great lengths to establish Pierre Glendinning
as a natural aristocrat, heir to America's special provenance in the "kingdom" of nature itself.
Using the protagonist as a metonymy for the nation, the narrator announces that "In the country
[...] Nature planted our Pierre, because Nature intended a rare and original development in
Pierre" (13). The narrator carefully interpolates Pierre's development into the body of the
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landscape itself, noting it "had been [Pierre's] choice fate to have been born in and nurtured in
the country, surrounded by scenery whose uncommon loveliness was the perfect mould of a
delicate and poetic mind" (5). Redundantly "planted" in nature by "Nature," Pierre in his "natal
lot" (5) represents the flowering of a vital, organic culture, his "delicate and poetic mind" the
rarefied product of that culture. The authenticity of Pierre's refinement derives from its origins in
a primitive aristocracy; the narrator traces Pierre's legacy in the paternal estate of Saddle
Meadows back to "three Indian Kings, the aboriginal and only conveyancers of those noble
woods and plains" (6). The Native American "cyphers" on the estate deeds of ownership serve to
ratify the Glendinning line as a perpetuation of Native American intimacy with the land—
sanctioning the heirs as both offspring and proprietors of nature.
Nature, however, as the narrator will wryly remark, proves an "ambiguous" (13)
progenitor; and even as Melville composes lavish idylls on the beneficence of "rural light" (5),
he locates a necessary violence at the heart of the national legacy. The Glendinning estate's very
title, "Saddle Meadows," blends the pastoral with the martial: in an early description of Pierre's
"proudest patriotic and family associations," the narrator lightly references "an Indian battle
[that] had been fought, in the earlier days of the colony," in which "the paternal great-grandfather
of Pierre, mortally wounded, had sat unhorsed on his saddle in the grass, with his dying voice,
still cheering his men in the fray" (6). Where the great-grandfather warred with Native
Americans during colonial days, the grandfather had, during Revolutionary times, "for several
months defended [...] against the repeated combined assaults of Indians, Tories, and Regulars"
(6). Pierre's ancestors may have obtained the ratifying ciphers of Indian chiefs, but this
transmission culminates a violent expropriation of Native American landholding and protracted
efforts of self-preservation.
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Melville does not, however, suggest that this precondition for America's national
sovereignty undercuts its purchase in nature; rather, he presents Christian refinement as
grounded in a "natural" benevolence that unfolds directly from this "natural" self-interested
violence. In other words, Christian and specifically American Protestant culture as Melville
depicts it does indeed evolve from an organic connection with nature, but that organic
connection comprises an elemental struggle for proprietorship over natural resources. This
paradox emerges most poignantly in Melville's characterization of Pierre's grandfather, "grand
old Pierre" (30), as both ruthless military champion and Christian gentleman par excellence.
Melville's portrait of the grandfather combines the savage and the civilized within a
disturbing stylistic wholeness. The grandfather emerges as a figure of profound integrity, an
integrity that allows for, in fact necessitates, a correspondence between exploitation and
benevolence, obscene violence and tender affection. If, "in a night-scuffle in the wilderness
before the Revolutionary War, he had annihilated two Indian savages by making reciprocal
bludgeons of their heads," in fact "all this was done by the mildest hearted, and most blue-eyed
gentleman in the world [...] a forgiver of many injuries, a sweet-hearted, charitable Christian, in
fine, a pure, cheerful, childlike, blue-eyed, divine old man" (30). Twice "blue-eyed," "childlike,"
and pure," old Pierre takes on the stereotypical features of the sentimental uncorrupted innocent,
and the muted language applied to his actions imitates this playful simplicity, as if making
"reciprocal bludgeons" of two heads served as a kind of game. The narrator furthermore insists
on the correspondence amongst these terms, calling old Pierre one "in whose meek, majestic
soul, the lion and the lamb embraced—fit image of his God" (30). Melville's characterization of
old Pierre, though satirically edged, does not rely on a simple strategy of exposing distinctions
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between an ideal tenderness and a real brutality; instead, the ideal and the real lock together,
mutually implicating one another as correspondent without resolving their contradiction.
This paradox, however, eludes the youthful Pierre, who imagines his inherited landscape
in terms of a unified field of benevolence. The proprietary pleasure Pierre takes in the estate of
Saddle Meadows operates through a sublimation of the relationship between possession and selfinterested action: the very notion of inheritance suggests a natural or fated transmission of
property independent of any willful action on the part of the heir. Jehlen contends that in the
formation of America "the ideology of liberal, democratic individualism reached maturity as no
longer the historical dispossessor of past rulers but the natural possessor of its own world" (8-9).
Because Pierre has not himself battled to obtain Saddle Meadows, his ownership appears
"natural" in the sense of historically nonconflictive: "in Pierre's eyes, all its hills and swales
seemed as sanctified by their very long uninterrupted possession by his race" (P 8). Pierre's
sentimental imagination recreates ownership as ahistorical, transmuting three generations into a
"very long uninterrupted possession."
This transcendence, in turn, allows Pierre to conceive of material possessions as an
aesthetic medium for enlarging his affective life, rather than as an object of conquest. In this
vein, the narrator pictures Pierre's imaginative tie to the land in terms of an eroticized tenderness,
rather than domination, saying, "The fond ideality which, in the eyes of affection, hallows the
least trinket once familiar to the person of a departed love, with Pierre that talisman touched the
whole earthly landscape about him [...] Pierre deemed all that part of the earth a love-token, so
that his very horizon was to him a memorial ring" (8). Pierre sees in Saddle Meadows a
predestined perfect union of private desire and uncontested inheritance, an ideal marriage
arranged by nature and sealed with a "memorial ring." This memorial ring places the land outside
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the reach of consummation as an object of desire and so outside the range of competitive
interests; it belongs (has always belonged) as much to the past, the "departed love," as to the
future, and so invites fulfillment only in the form of expanding, unconsummated desire.57
Pledged to the land, Pierre need do nothing but expand the limits of his desire in a process of
ecstatic, infinite wooing.
Depicted in terms of an animating suspended eroticism, Pierre's relationship with the land
finds a mirrored expression in his courtly-love relationship with his mother Mary.58 This
"romantic filial love" (5), the narrator suggests, partakes of "That nameless and infinitely delicate
aroma of inexpressible tenderness and attentiveness which, in every refined and honorable
attachment, is contemporary with the courtship [...] but which, like the bouquet of the costliest
German wines, too often evaporates upon pouring love out to drink, in the disenchanting glasses
of the matrimonial days and nights" (16). The narrator goes so far as to propose the diffusion of
erotic sentiments into every human relation, saying, "this softened spell [...] seemed a glimpse of
the glorious possibility, that the divinest of those emotions, which are incident to the sweetest
seasons of love, is capable of indefinite translation into many of the less signal relations of our
many chequered life" (16). In this remarkable passage, the narrator celebrates the eroticization of
the mother-son relationship as a solution to the problem of marital eroticism's temporality and
sexual telos. Because filial eroticism (presumably) forecloses "that climax which is so fatal to
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ordinary love," it ensures the perpetuity of attraction and so potentially restructures all human
relationships around an affective warmth that overflows into benevolent action.
To have one's instinctive passions naturally accord with all that is also beneficent
anticipates for the narrator the experience of heaven: Pierre and his mother's attachment "seemed
almost to realize here below the sweet dreams of those religious enthusiasts, who paint to us a
Paradise to come, when etherealized from all drosses and stains, the holiest passion of man shall
unite all kindreds and climes in one circle of pure and unimpairable delight" (16). Here Melville
encapsulates the project of 19th century religious sentimentalism, to "realize here below" an
essential correspondence between the movement of spontaneous human desire and a democratic,
divinely-sanctioned fulfillment. An "etherealized" version of complex marriage, the narrator's
vision allows for a harmonious integration of self-seeking human passion with self-giving divine
love—because romantic attachment finds no terminus in sexual consummation ("that climax
which is so fatal to ordinary love"), it can redound infinitely from one object of desire to another
without "impairment" and without creating rivals for affection.59
The estate of Saddle Meadows from this angle recreates Sylvester Judd's vision in
Margaret of a spiritualizing circulation of erotic desire through cultivated land and "natural"
aesthetic objects, including attractive persons. Life at Saddle Meadows reflects what Lori Merish
terms a "pious materialism" (91), the antebellum conviction that America's rising economic
prosperity and increasing consumption of material goods comprised a spontaneous segue from
the nation's primitive origins to its millennial destiny. At the root of America's evangelical
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prosperity, Merish identifies an evolving confidence in "the 'civilizing' power of an array of
mediating material forms—including luxury commodities and the bodies of 'refined' gracious
women" (2). Pierre's idyllic manor and filial courtship serve as mirrored images of this
naturalized aesthetics in which all objects of desire serve to arouse and (apparently) ennoble the
protagonist's emotional life.
Pierre and his mother's eroticized but asexual relationship resonates in this way with the
purified erotics of the organic angel; Mary Glendinning's actual maternal relation to Pierre,
however, limits her potential role as agent of conversion. Because the womb of Pierre's inception
cannot also function as the portal of his transformation, a younger, sexually-viable candidate for
his affections promises to play the role of organic angel, drawing the "profane" love of male
sexual desire "toward the heaven in [her]" (4). Lucy Tartan, to whom Pierre becomes engaged as
a matter of course, typifies an organic aesthetic perfection, one which the narrator lightly
satirizes, saying, "owing to the [...] provisions of dame Nature, there always will be beautiful
women in the world [...] yet the world will never see another Lucy Tartan" (23-4). Her cheeks,
we learn, "were tinted with the most delicate white and red, the white predominating. Her eyes
some god brought down from heaven, her hair was Danae's, spangled with Jove's showers; her
teeth were dived for in the Persian Sea" (24). At once a "transcendent beauty" (24) and entirely
modest of her charms (25), Lucy enjoys a power over Pierre that partakes of rarefied nature; as
the narrator reports, "it was among the pure and soft incitements of the country that Pierre had
first felt toward Lucy the dear passion which now made him wholly hers" (26). Lucy in effect
represents an extension of Saddle Meadows as Pierre's natural inheritance, a conflation the
narrator suggests by insinuating her body into the landscape, and vice versa: "On both sides,
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from the hedges, came to Pierre the clover bloom of Saddle Meadows, and from Lucy's mouth
and cheek came the fresh fragrance of her violet young being" (33).
Unlike in Judd's Mons Christi, however, the aestheticization of nature in Pierre's world of
Saddle Meadows only leads to increasingly rarefied expressions of desire for the physical
body—not to spiritual fulfillment beyond it. Because Lucy's force of attraction at this stage only
conducts Pierre further into what he already possesses, Lucy also lacks the power to initiate a
spiritual transformation in the protagonist. In spite of Pierre and the narrator's prolific allusions
to heaven and the heavenly in the context of Pierre's romance, this heaven appears decisively as
the heaven "in" rather than through Lucy (4). When Pierre and Lucy take a morning sojourn into
the country, for example, the narrator highlights Lucy's celestial appeal as a function of
overwrought sexual desire: after "by sweet shock on shock, receiving intimating foretastes of the
etherealest delights on earth," Pierre falls on his back and, gazing into Lucy's eyes, declares,
"Thou art my heaven, Lucy; and here I lie thy shepherd king, watching for new eye-stars to rise
in thee" (36). Lucy seems to present access to the "etherealest delights on earth," but, as the
narrator has previously suggested, those "etherealest delights" terminate in a "fatal" climax—
fatal because reaching the telos of desire within the material body rather than beyond it.
Pierre has an omen of the immanent and exclusionary structure of erotic love when he
makes a pilgrimage to the "holy ground" of Lucy's bedchamber to retrieve her artist's portfolio.
Crossing the room, Pierre "caught the snow-white bed reflected in the toilet-glass" and "For one
swift instant, he seemed to see in that one glance the two separate beds—the real one and the
reflected one—and an unbidden, most miserable presentiment thereupon stole into him" (39).
Although the narrator does not venture to unpack this "miserable presentiment," the duplicate
beds suggest the fate of Pierre and Lucy's lofty, ritualized romance in the primal act of sexual
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intercourse— the "fatal" drink of those "disenchanting glasses of the matrimonial days and
nights (16). In addition, the image clearly foreshadows Lucy's death-like faint upon the bed
when Pierre makes a sacrifice of their impending marriage to secure a future with Isabel—the
white shrine of the bed become a shroud for "so fair a victim" (183). The mirrored bed thus
doubly undercuts Pierre's sentimentalized world where erotic desire transports the adorer beyond
material limits and thus outside the reach of competitive interests.
This problematic trajectory of erotic desire toward an exclusionary, material
consummation disrupts the novel's most stereotypical portrait of spiritualized female eroticism,
which takes place just after Mary Glendinning volunteers to sanction Pierre's wedding. In what
the mother drily calls "A very beautiful tableau" (58), Melville positions Lucy's body at the
threshold of the Glendinning home, her luminous flesh acting as fulcrum between heaven and
earth: "Lucy just upon the point of her departure, was hovering near the door; the setting sun,
streaming through the window, bathed the whole form in golden loveliness and light; the
wonderful, most vivid transparency of her clear Welsh complexion, now fairly glowed like rosy
snow" (58). The light so wholly interfuses Lucy's frame that it begins to pivot her and her lover's
gaze toward heaven, for Pierre "almost thought that she could only depart the house by floating
out of the open window [...] All her aspect to him, was that moment touched with an
indescribable gayety, buoyancy, fragility, and an unearthly evanescence" (58). A scene which
closely parallels tableaus of Eva's luminous, transparent form in Uncle Tom's Cabin,60
nevertheless leads ultimately not "out of the open window" into a sentimental contemplation of
the divine, but rather to the protagonist's disturbed reflection on his role of sexual conquest: "I to
wed this heavenly fleece?" he protests, "Methinks one husbandly embrace would break her airy
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zone, and she exhale upwards to that heaven whence she hath hither come" (58). Sexual
consummation as Pierre imagines it collapses spiritual possibilities into the strictures of the body
and so necessitates the divinized Lucy's escape to a suitably infinite realm.
Because sexual consummation seems to foreclose the possibility of eroticism opening
onto a spiritual plane, Pierre's imminent prospect of intercourse with Lucy diminishes her
transformative power over him.61 The more proximate their relationship appears to conquest, the
further it removes Pierre from that sense of boundless expansion that characterizes his
sentimental affective life. The beneficent mutuality of their wooing seems suddenly marred by
an ugly self-interest in the act of claiming Lucy's body, prompting Pierre to characterize
marriage as "By heaven [...] an impious thing!" (58). What Melville suggests that Pierre fails to
recognize, however, is that self-interest already structures the sentimental attachment Pierre
experiences as purely benevolent. Only because Pierre "inherits" Lucy and Saddle Meadows
without visible contest can he interpret his claims over them as an inevitable outgrowth of
nature's bounty rather than as proprietary action.
In her exploration of the antebellum culture of sentiment, Merish describes how
"sentimental sympathy promotes a deeply felt psychic investment in proprietary power over
objects of love," a phenomenon she terms "sentimental ownership" (4). An "eroticized formation
of proprietary and political desire" (4) sentimental ownership relies on a distinction between
"instrumental" and "sentimental" property—the former designated for use and consumption and
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the latter for love (21). Sentimental possession thus manifests as disinterested condescension,
concealing the contest of power that creates the conditions for unbounded tenderness.62
Ultimately, Melville's portrait of the sentimental refinements of Saddle Meadows mocks
the sublimation of the relationship between affective attachment and proprietary power. Mary
Glendinning, for instance, as the operative maternal figure of the novel ought to represent the
soul of disinterested affection; instead, she secretly cherishes Pierre's erotic attachment as
evidence of her sexual dominance. Although an icon of cultured grace, Mrs. Glendinning turns
out to approve of a marriage between Pierre and Lucy because she believes herself to have a
proprietary hold on his affections, illustrated by his "docility": "His little wife, that is to be, will
not estrange him from me," she muses, "for she too is docile,—beautiful, and reverential, and
most docile [...] How glad am I that Pierre loves her so, and not some dark-eyed haughtiness [...]
who would be ever setting her young married state before my elderly widowed one, and claiming
all the homage of my dear boy" (20). Hidden within Mary Glendinning's affective hold over
Pierre lies a calculated aggression, a territorial will to preserve sentimental ownership which the
narrator links to the violence of the nation's origins. Following her speech, the narrator remarks
62
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how, "Her stately beauty had ever somewhat martial in it; and now she looked the daughter of a
General, as she was, for Pierre's was a double revolutionary descent" (20).
Mary Glendinning's articulation of a rivalry implicit in the circulation of erotic desire
thus ramifies onto Melville's presentation of the primal struggle for the "natural" possession of
American land and resources. The benevolent landscape which offers itself up like a bride to
Pierre's gaze represents a combined family and national legacy of elemental conquest and
cultured sentiment, a paradox that will not manifest to Pierre until his discovery of a
disenfranchised half-sister Isabel. Pierre will then attempt to purge his estate by heroic selfsacrifice—only to discover that, like his grandfather a martyr to the expansion of territory, his
most benevolent gesture coincides with the ruthless expansion of territorial affections. As
Melville depicts it, the passion sufficient for ecstatic sacrifice entails self-interested desire for
possession.
Even before Pierre's sentimental world disintegrates, the novel forecasts the primacy of
violence in the American experiment with benevolent expansion.63 After ominously announcing
that "while thus all alive to the beauty and poesy of this father's faith, Pierre little foresaw that
this world hath a secret deeper than beauty," the narrator introduces the "one hiatus" in the
"sweetly-writ manuscript" of Pierre's life: "A sister had been omitted from the text" (7). This
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omission Pierre immediately conceives of in terms of a yearning for a rite of passage through
benevolent violence: "'Oh, had my father but a daughter!' cried Pierre; 'some one whom I might
love, and protect, and fight for, if need be! It must be a glorious thing to engage in a mortal
quarrel on a sweet sister's behalf!'" (7). Pierre's fantasized crusade on behalf of a sister implies a
contrast with, for instance, an imagined contest with a rival in the interest of securing his
sweetheart Lucy; a sister would call forth what he imagines as a passionate yet disinterested
sacrifice and so make him a worthy son of his heroic ancestry.
Sexual disinterest in the case of the sister purifies in Pierre's mind the act of violence, a
violence whose tender overtones weave it into a larger project of sacrificial benevolence. This
compound of aggression and altruism the narrator locates squarely in nature, remarking "This
emotion was most natural" (7) and elsewhere highlighting Pierre's impulse as the overflow of
natural inspiration: when "[Nature] lifted her spangled crest of a thickly-starred night [...] ten
thousand mailed thoughts of heroicness started up in Pierre's soul, and glared around for some
insulted good cause to defend" (14). But the filial dimension of Pierre's romantic fantasy does
not, Melville hints, negate the proprietary structure of its mobilizing desire; what Pierre "did not
at that time entirely appreciate," the narrator points out, is that "much that goes to make up the
deliciousness of a wife, already lies in the sister" (7). Here again Melville eroticizes a filial
connection in order to underscore an implicit configuration of self-interest, the desire to
appropriate the "deliciousness" of the object of charitable action by demarking an affective
territory. In fact, as the movement of the novel will disclose, it is the very altruistic properties of
Pierre's fantasy that exponentially intensify the will to affective expansion.
Absent the occasion to break actual new ground in his paternal estate and so reincarnate
his colonial and Revolutionary ancestors, Pierre craves a sentimental reenactment of their
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heroism. Jehlen identifies Pierre's predicament as that of antebellum Americans generally, who
found themselves trapped within a vision of the nation as already incarnating the telos of history;
"by presenting itself as the fulfillment of the past," she argues, the Revolution "left its children
no future but the fulfillment of the founding vision" (197-8). Because historical process within
the American context "did not mean transformation but expansion" (Jehlen 9), Americans could
only seek to fill out their legacy—to effect what had already been accomplished and claim what
had already been secured. Up to this point, Melville makes clear, Pierre has not filled out the
legacy of those benevolent imperial giants, his founding fathers: the diminished stature of the
grandson finds the pockets of his grandfather's military vest still "below his knees" (29). Pierre
yearns to reenact the defining gesture of America's formation through territorial expansion that
only encloses one's natural, predestined inheritance. But because Pierre already inhabits a
completed ideal world—the utopian civilization of Saddle Meadows—he lacks the catalyst for
action, the "insulted good cause to defend," the "sister" in need of rescue.
Although at first Pierre imagines merely expanding on his paternal legacy, once he
identifies "seams in the construction of Saddle Meadows" (Otter 207), he seeks a spiritual
transformation of his inheritance. Reckoning with his father's affair and abandonment of his
illicit offspring, Pierre's half-sister Isabel, forces Pierre to confront the "secret" of destructive
self-interest at work in the "beauty and poesy of his father's faith" (P 7), and thus create a
vacuum for the role of organic angel as divine intercessor. Lucy, of a piece with Pierre's
suddenly illicit—because unshared—heritage, cannot effect the reintegration of his fallen estate
with heavenly dictates. Instead, Isabel will serve as the touchstone between earth and heaven
that triggers his spiritual conversion and launches his benevolent program of Christian
democracy. Because she compels him to enact a purified version America's benevolent project,
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Isabel seems to provide the means for transitioning Pierre beyond a rarefied naturalized
aesthetics into a spiritual one—as Pierre will formulate it, from "Lucy" to "God" (181). Isabel's
converting power, however, ultimately derives from the same "nature" as Lucy and the luxury
estate; it accordingly provokes not transformation but ecstatic reenactment of the same
ontological perversity: the self-interested structure of benevolent passion. Nature, Melville
suggests, cannot lead the way out of itself—it can only escalate its own insoluble antagonisms.
I have suggested that Pierre opens with a variant of the aesthetic utopia with which
Judd's Margaret concludes; the material world of Saddle Meadows—whether as artistic relics,
the cultivated environment, or attractive persons—comprises a seamless circuit for
nonconflictive desire. While Margaret's evolution from child of nature to messianic icon
provides the momentum for Judd's novel, once she completes her function as organic angel by
reconciling nature and Christianity, in a real sense all that remains is an endless, ahistorical
affective expansion. The epistolary conclusion of Margaret signals this breakdown in plot, as
Judd creates a mere simulation of movement through kaleidoscopic impressions of the same
transcendent moment. This is the predicament of stasis with which Pierre opens.64
The spark for the narrative life of Pierre comes from its chronological reversal in the
presentation of the organic angel. Pierre moves from the refined aestheticism of Lucy to the raw
organicism of Isabel, and from utopia into history, a regression which seems to create a space for
Isabel to unfold into the messianic transformer of Pierre's marred legacy. It is the very revelation
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of Isabel, however, that initiates Pierre's fall into history; her emergence represents the return of
the "dispossessed" of Saddle Meadows, the resurrection of its status as the site of "intense
political, patriarchal and sexual anxieties" (Otter 173). The unacknowledged love-child from
Pierre's father's seduction of a beautiful impoverished French immigrant (P 76), Isabel appears
anonymously at the margins of the estate, eking out her survival through manual labor and driven
by emotional hunger to claim her rightful place in the Glendinning family.
Isabel makes her first appearance in the novel as a repressed memory, resurfacing to
disrupt Pierre and Lucy's transparent love-relation. Just as Pierre completes a paean to Lucy's
celestial attributes, the latter suddenly grows tearful and terrified, pressing Pierre to again relay
the story of "that face," that "mysterious, haunting face, which thou once told'st me, thou didst
thrice vainly try to shun" (37). Pierre in response curses "the hour" he "acted on the thought, that
Love hath no reserves" and bared the secret of his encounter to Lucy (37). Isabel's face
harbingers the disruption of Saddle Meadows' blissfully transparent—because perfectly
harmonious—relations by privatizing barriers. Lucy promptly intuits the face as a challenge to
her proprietary claim over Pierre's affections and declares, "Thou must be wholly a disclosed
secret to me; Love is vain and proud, and when I walk the streets, and meet thy friends, I must
still be laughing and hugging to myself the thought,—They know him not;—I only know my
Pierre" (37). By casting her relation to Pierre in terms of a possessive sexual conquest, Lucy
describes a hidden boundary within their heretofore unqualified exchange of sentiment; her
affective life can expand through Pierre only insofar as she retains exclusive absolute access to
his interior person: "Did I doubt thee here," she ventures, "could I ever think, that thy heart hath
yet one private nook or corner from me;—fatal disenchanting day for me, my Pierre, would that
be" (37). Pierre, however, much to his own horror, finds himself unable to pledge perfect future
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transparency (37), just as the occasion for the memory prompted him, for the first time, to
conceal his true feelings from his mother (48).
Isabel's face provokes a response of affective entrenchment in both Pierre and Lucy
because it destabilizes the ontological order on which their "disinterested" wooing rests. This
order belongs to sentimentalism's eroticization of Christian charity or "Love" as both origin and
end of the natural world. In its simplest formula, sentimental ontology suggests that—originally
and ultimately—only the beautiful exists, and that beauty, as the material expression of charity,
can only always conduct the adorer into communion with a beneficent nature and nature's God.
Eros, within this schema, serves "naturally" as the most powerful material expression of divine
charity, and beauty (including and especially of women) always bespeaks the benignant ground
of existence.
Shortly before the introduction of Isabel's face, Melville delivers a parody of the New
Testament chapter on love as "the greatest of these" (1 Cor. 13.13) in which he satirizes this
picturesque vision of romantic love as the ultimate beneficent force. Love, the narrator
pronounces, "is both Creator's and Saviour's gospel to mankind, a volume bound in rose-leaves,
clasped with violets, and by the beaks of humming-birds printed with peach-juice on the leaves
of lilies" (34).65 A charming gift-book, wrought with the most rarefied instruments of nature,
comprises the new sentimental "gospel," and it follows that beautiful women make such a
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gospel's most efficacious evangelists: "Love is this world's great redeemer and reformer," the
narrator expounds, "and as all beautiful women are her selectest emissaries, so hath Love gifted
them with a magnetical persuasiveness, that no youth can possibly repel" (34). William Braswell
notes Melville's use of "the word love in a very broad sense, so as to include not only the
affection of lovers, but also the spirit of beneficence reputed [...] to be an animating principle of
the universe" (213, author's emphasis). More precisely, Melville describes the "affection of
lovers" as the preeminent expression of the "spirit of beneficence," playfully reproducing the
trope of the attractive woman as the quintessential missionary. Product of a natural world already
anchored in divinity, this organic angel mediates at once a "Creator's and Saviour's gospel to
mankind."
Because within the sentimental purview nature and divinity thus perfectly align,
elemental antagonism and its resulting miseries move beyond the periphery of the created world.
The narrator lays the basis for this theodicy by declaring that, "All things that are sweet to see, or
taste, or feel, or hear, all these things were made by Love; and none other things were made by
Love" (34). This characterization of love asserts a simple distinction between comforting and
harsh realities that demands redemptive action on the part of love while disclaiming its role in
the production of the latter: "Love made not the Arctic zones, but Love is ever reclaiming them.
Say, are not the fierce things of this earth daily, hourly going out? Where now are your wolves of
Britain? Where in Virginia now, find you the panther and the pard?" (34). Here the redemptive
action of love finds its metaphorical equivalent in the "benevolent" expansion of Western
civilization, returning the reader to the complicated picture of violence underpinning old Pierre's
estate. The image of the "Arctic zones" points the reader still further backward, to the
"inhumanities" (130) established with the origins of the earth itself. By loudly disclaiming the
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role of "Love" in the creation of the adverse facets of nature and human life, Melville thus calls
out the question begged by its own omission—that of the origins of the "natural"
inhospitableness and hostilities of the earth.
Melville's parodic treatment of sentimental ontology sets the stage for its subversion in
the form of an irreducibly conflicted organic angel, Isabel. The disruptive power of Isabel's face
derives from its yoking of primitive beauty with primordial suffering, so that Pierre "seemed to
see the fair ground where Anguish had contended with Beauty, and neither being conqueror, both
had laid down on the field" (47). Pierre first encounters Isabel while patronizing a local sewing
society hosted on the Glendinning estate, and the sight of her face and sound of her scream of
recognition awakens Pierre to a repressed perversity at the core of existence, some "fearful
gospel" (43) of irresolvable conflict. The narrator's contemplation of the face dwells on its
disorienting mergence of contradictions: "ever hovering between Tartarean misery and
Paradisaic beauty [...] such faces, compounded so of hell and heaven, overthrow in us all
foregone persuasions, and make us wondering children in this world again" (43). Merging misery
and beauty, hell and heaven, Isabel's representative visage seems to cut the filial line of
benevolent paternity, leaving the "wondering" children to likewise wander, fatherless, having
lost the clarity of their own origin.
In Isabel, Pierre in effect encounters a grown-up child-Margaret,66 an orphaned innocent
of nature whose strange/estranged language seems to signal her liminality between the divine
and human and her capacity to mediate between them. Sacvan Bercovitch cites Margaret as a
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source in Melville's prodigious layering of allusions to "Romantic assertions about an original
relation to nature" (264) but does not explore any inverted resonance between Margaret and
Isabel, who likewise experiences a development of consciousness freed from the pressures of
human custom. As Isabel confesses to Pierre, "I have had no training of any sort. All my
thoughts well up in me" (123). But where Margaret's liminal status serves as a conduit within a
benign natural and benevolent supernatural order, Isabel's entraps her at the interstice of
competing and corresponding impulses, an electric compound of attraction and hostility that can
only facilitate a conversion to "mystery" as the inarticulate, non-benevolent ground of existence.
Isabel from the outset emits an apparently "supernatural light" (43), which—unlike the
rarefied lucidity of Lucy—partakes of an unrefined organicism that seems to collapse the stages
of the organic angel's development from child of nature to spiritualized woman. During two
consecutive visits to Isabel's quarters, Pierre listens to her halting and disjointed rehearsal of a
psychosomatic awakening that parallels Margaret's, but whose primitive expression persists in
the adult Isabel.67 As a result, although physically matured, Isabel in her integration with the flux
of elemental energies persists in more closely resembling the child Margaret than the picturesque
heroines of Mons Christi and Saddle Meadows.
Both Margaret and Isabel as children open onto a largely undifferentiated consciousness
of the natural world. Margaret's earliest memories bespeak a diffusion of shared sentience and
sustenance, an effortless mingling of discrete natures: "I used to sit here in my merry childhood
and think all was mine, the earth and the sky. I ate my bread and cider, and fed the ants and flies.
Through me innumerable things went forth [...] and my jocund heart kindled the twilight"
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(313).68 Isabel as a child likewise has difficulty distinguishing herself from other phenomena,
subject to the "fancy that all people were as stones, trees, cats" (122). Margaret's consonance
with nature further manifests through the intercessory capacity of animals—in the dog Bull
whom she insists can shield her from the devil (71) and in the bear who shelters her as one of its
own cubs, a creature of whom she "was no more afraid than if it had been her own Bull" (292).
In the case of Isabel, however, a violent contradiction inheres in her consonance with
nature, a chilling antipathy among people, stones, trees, cats. In her dreamy recollection of
inhabiting a "wild, dark house" removed from civilization, Isabel remarks on her fear "lest the
ghostly pines should steal near me, and reach out their grim arms to snatch me into their horrid
shadows" (114). In endeavoring to partake of bread and wine, the archetypical meal and
counterpart to Margaret's bread and cider, Isabel suffers a savage repulse from the human
tenants: "I went up to them, and asked to eat with them, and touched the loaf. But instantly the
old man made a motion to strike me, but did not, and the woman, glaring at me, snatched the loaf
and threw it into the fire before them" (116). Isabel does not even manage to engage the physical
contact of the old man's strike, and, desperate for "some intimacy," seeks out the house cat. She
endeavors to communicate by calling the cat's name, but it "only gazed sideways and
unintelligently." When Isabel persists in her calls, the cat "turned around and hissed," driving her
outside the house where she cannot even rest on a stone, for "its coldness went up into [her]
heart" (116). Isabel, humans, stones, trees, cats seem to correspond in their material existence,
yet their correspondence contains an integral mutual repulsion.
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Not until "a beautiful infant" comes into her care does Isabel register human
consciousness as unique in its experience of attraction to "Beauty" alongside "Sadness" (122),
the same duality that manifest in her face will mesmerize Pierre (107). But this discovery of "the
sweet idea of humanness," far from constituting a breakthrough into an awareness of an
underlying beneficence, intensifies the horror of the antipathies within nature: as Isabel recites to
Pierre, "Somehow I felt that all good, harmless men and women were human things, placed at
cross-purposes, in a world of snakes and lightings, in a world of horrible and inscrutable
inhumanities" (122). Melville's complicated imagery divulges layer after layer of divergence
within continuity: these "cross-purposes," like the snake's "fire-fork" of a tongue, and the flash of
lightening that "split some beautiful tree" (122), all stem from the same root—nature's
preexistent irreducible antagonisms. The knowledge that Isabel lacks, but will come to fear and
at last declare when she "recognizes her noxious effect upon Pierre" (Dillingham 229), lies in the
duality of her own "humanness" as contiguous with the surrounding "inhumanities" (P 123).
Where Margaret finds herself from infancy nurtured in the bosom of sympathetic nature, and
encounters as extraneous and revocable the cruelties of human customs, Isabel originates from
within a preexistent duality of nature itself, which Pierre will uncover as their shared heritage.
Because, for Margaret, evil lies extraneous to a purely benevolent human nature originating
transparently from benevolent divinity, she can reconcile already compatible human and divine
natures by expunging the contradiction of sin. Isabel, by contrast, cannot escape the antipathies
inherent in her consonance with nature, nor can she conduct Pierre beyond them.
Isabel transports Pierre to a plane of existential ecstasy which he mistakes for a divinelyinspired conversion but which in fact represents an escalation of tensions and attractions implicit
in nature itself. As Isabel recounts her gradual awakening to the knowledge of possessing a
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mortal father, she accompanies the narrative with melodies on a guitar which she calls both
"human" (125) and "mother" (149). Isabel's "magical" (150) mother-guitar incarnates her
ontological volatility; as Isabel summons the instrument, it plays of its own accord, throwing off
sparks that set her "tossed tresses" agleam "like a tract of phosphorescent midnight sea" (150).
These paranormal displays suggest to Pierre's mind something "not [...] entirely produced by
customary or natural causes" which "[binds] him to her by an extraordinary atmospheric spell"
(151). Isabel seemed to him "to swim in an electric fluid [;] the vivid buckler of her brow
seemed as a magnetic plate" (151). Melville's depiction of Isabel as electromagnetic converting
agent draws on the "conceptual scheme" of the German Romantics, for whom "the term 'love'
was extended beyond the human realm to all modes of cosmic connectivity, including the natural
forces of gravitation and electromagnetism" (Abrams 297). In M. H. Abrams' treatment of
Shelley's "Prometheus Unbound," for instance, he observes that the "earth's enhanced energy
manifests itself in a heightening of electromagnetic force and its radiated heat and light—those
forces which in Shelley's metaphysics are the spiritual correlatives of the attractive and lifegiving powers of universal love" (307).
Rather, however, than denoting a divine endowment in Isabel to effect Pierre's
conversion to "universal love," the cosmic static in Pierre bespeaks her entrapment at the
interstice of elemental attractions and repulsions. As Pierre falls under Isabel and the guitar's
combined enchantment, he hears the circulating chant, "Mystery! Mystery! / Mystery of Isabel! /
Mystery! Mystery! / Isabel and Mystery! / Mystery!" (150). This "Mystery of Isabel" comports
with her function as an organic angel, resembling, for instance, the mysterious source of
Cummins' Gertrude's entrancing qualities. But in the case of Gertrude, while the immediate
source of her influence—whether natural or supernatural—remains subject to speculation, her
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"mystery" proves a transparent one in its tendency to promote aspirations to holiness in her
admirers. Isabel's appeal, by contrast, seems to partake at once of divinity and diabolism,69
consecrate and converting to ambiguous forces. This spiritual irreducibility Melville roots in the
body itself, so that Isabel as the unqualified "natural" woman will inspire the pathos of both lust
and charity.
Melville sets up a tableau of Isabel that harks back to Lucy's threshold apotheosis but
which compounds rather than clarifies the insolubility of Isabel's moral essence. As Isabel, in the
presence of Pierre, kneels impulsively with her guitar before an open window, her voluminous
black hair "tent-wise invested her whole kneeling form" and "completely muffled the human
figure" (149). Shrouded rather than elucidated by her "unrestrained locks," Isabel's body
undergoes sacralization without a corresponding interior illumination: "To Pierre, the deep oaken
recess of the double-casement, before which Isabel was kneeling, seemed now the immediate
vestibule of some awful shrine, mystically revealed through the obscurely open window, which
ever and anon was [...] softly illumined by the mild heat-lightnings and ground-lightnings" (150).
The "heat-lightnings and ground-lightnings" suggest not a heavenly diffusion of holy light but
the superficial play of the "earth's enhanced energy" (Abrams 307); they do not penetrate Isabel's
body but only enhance its obscurity.
Facing away from Pierre with the electrical lights before her, Isabel's position heightens
Pierre's attention to the indecipherable surface of her body, rather than mediating a posterior
light—unlike with Lucy, Pierre does not see an apparently divine light shine through her but only
an immanent light play upon her. These surface lights afford no means of transcending matter
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through the "double-casement" of Isabel's body; instead, they mutually implicate: as the narrator
observes, "the physical electricalness of Isabel seemed reciprocal with the heat-lightnings and the
ground-lightnings nigh to which [the spell] had first become revealed to Pierre" (151). Rather
than serving as a "living icon" whose lucid physicality translates the adorer from a rarefied
material world into a sphere of spiritual light, Isabel binds Pierre to a perpetual circling of the
enshrined object, enthralling in its cosmic charge.
Isabel's electric organicism creates an illusion of the possibility of transcendence, but in
fact unleashes what Pierre comes to regard as "an extraordinary atmospheric spell—both
physical and spiritual" which becomes "impossible for him to break" (151). The supernatural
aura of Isabel's body derives from its compound of magnetic and antagonistic forces that
Melville traces to the primordial conditions of natural existence. As an organic angel, Isabel's
rootedness in the elements indeed intensifies her transformative powers, but those powers can
only mutate her convert into fresh incarnations of an irreducible ontological perversity.
Isabel's blended embodiment of beauty and sadness inspires Pierre's conversion to heroic
Christian charity because, as Melville depicts it, erotic passion and filial pity mutually intensify.
Eros, with its proprietary drive to possess, and pity, with its impulse to sacrificial nurture, fuse
for Pierre in a euphoric spiritual epiphany that masks its bipartite motive. That this problematic
proves so comprehensively devastating in the novel stems from Melville's invocation of the
sentimental correspondence between natural and supernatural principles. Put simply, by locating
the path to the divine in nature, sentimental theology forfeited any alternate ontological ground.
Because Pierre's compound of disinterested and self-interested passion extends backward into
nature itself, no "supernatural" inspiration can purify it. In the same way, because the nation's
dual commitment to evangelical and economic expansion springs from its very hallowed colonial
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and Revolutionary beginnings, no subsequent movement to recover a purified "true" mission
applies.
In seeking to compensate his illegitimate sister for her life-long economic and emotional
deprivations, Pierre attempts to effect just such a purification of his paternal legacy in its
perverse combination of disinterested charity and sexual passion. As a child Pierre hears from his
Aunt Dorothea that in the days of his father's youth "there arrived in the port, a cabin-full of
French emigrants of quality;—poor people [...] who were forced to fly from their native land,"
among them "a beautiful young girl" (75). Pierre's father, "with many other humane gentlemen
of the city, provided for the wants of the strangers, for they were very poor indeed, having been
stripped of every thing" (76). A rumor spreads among the friends of the elder Pierre that he has
fallen in love with the beautiful lady, and they attempt to dissuade him from marriage for social
and economic reasons. He finally abandons his attentions to the emigrants, and shortly thereafter
his suspected paramour vanishes—but not before his cousin appropriates Pierre's expression "as
a wooer" in a secretly drawn portrait (76-77), the suppressed counterpart to a portrait of the elder
Pierre as a "middle-aged, married man" (72-73). Subsequent to his reception of the letter from
Isabel which indicates their shared paternity, Pierre reapproaches the earlier portrait of his father,
which he has enshrined in his closet, out of his mother's reproachful sight.
His eyes now illuminated with an "unchastened light," the youthful father provokes
Pierre with the suggestion that the wooing portrait conveys, not simply an identity prior to that of
the sainted household patriarch, but rather one contiguous with it—not merely a contradiction,
but a correspondence: "Pierre, believe not the drawing-room painting; that is not thy father; or, at
least, is not all of thy father. Consider in thy mind, Pierre, whether we two paintings may not
make only one" (83, author's emphasis). The "mournfulness" of Isabel's face proves "not
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inharmonious" with the "merriment" of his father's; rather, "by some ineffable correlativeness,
they reciprocally indentified each other, and, as it were, melted into each other" (85). Isabel's
features of combined grief and beauty disclose the secret combination that made the father's
duplicity-within-wholeness possible: the self-interested structure of benevolent passion. The
revelation of this paradox prompts Pierre to cry aloud "that wonderful verse from Dante,
descriptive of the two mutually absorbing shapes in the Inferno": "'Ah! how dost thou change, \
Agnello! See! thou art nor double now, \ Nor only one!'" (85). Haunted by the irreducibility of
his father's representation into either simple unity or division, Pierre attempts an absolute
purgation of his moral, physical, and cultural inheritance through total sacrifice.
Most critics focus on the self-deception involved in Pierre's decision, after his moving
encounters with Isabel, to forfeit his fiancé and inheritance to take up residence with and support
her under the guise of marriage. Higgins and Parker in particular in Reading Melville's Pierre,
their book-length treatment of Pierre's religious idealizations as repression, consistently trace his
translation of sexual passion into spiritual ecstasy. But treating this self-deception as a factor in
the religious impetus behind the novel's composition allows for a fuller understanding of the
relationship between the two halves of the novel, a connection Higgins and Parker diminish by
approaching the novel strictly as a mangled "psychological" study in repression rather than a
"socio-ontological" foray (Stern 164-5). By contrast, highlighting the crucial fact of Pierre's
combined benevolent and erotic motivations throws into relief the novel's era-specific
preoccupation with the Christian ideal of disinterested love as reconciler of human divine
natures, alongside a renewed emphasis on the spiritual efficacy of beauty and the innocence of
natural desire.
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Elizabeth Barnes helpfully retains the tension of Pierre's genuine moral "frustration,"
which stems from "the fact that his greatest love is also his greatest crime" (19). David Reynolds
similarly observes that "most of the wrongdoing in Pierre results from [...] seemingly
Conventional virtues" (160)—adding that "Throughout the novel, pure love and virtuous motives
always give rise to illicit love and conflict" (161). But Pierre's motives with regard to Isabel do
not parse neatly into lust and "pure love"—rather, as Brodhead explains, "his feelings are both
genuinely disinterestedly noble and genuinely sexual" (235) and "not [...] simply a sexual desire
in disguise" (235). Early critic John Freeman perhaps captured Pierre's predicament with regard
to Isabel best when he observed that "incestuous passions seize him when he most pities her"
(114, my emphasis).
From the outset, Pierre's interested and disinterested love comprise mutually intensifying
aspects of the same impulse, so that his conversion to "a Christlike ethic of sacrificial love in his
acknowledgement and rescue of Isabel" (Brodhead 229) coextends with his fall into perverse
passion. Reynolds confirms that "Pierre is indeed a radical democrat in his [...] sympathy for the
poor and oppressed" (293) and Milton Stern concedes that "Melville finds no fault with either the
fact or the intentions of Pierre's heartfulness, for it is basic and necessary" (190). Pierre suffers a
truly agonizing crisis in anticipation of his exchange of one set of loves for another; the trouble
lies with his undertaking's compounding of self-interest and sacrifice. As Elizabeth Dill
observes, "Lust, violence, and democracy comprise a single thematic pull in the incestuous
attraction" (709) Isabel holds for Pierre. As a result, instead of his radical, heart-driven
democracy serving as recompense to the ghosts of the "dispossessed" that haunt the legacy of
Saddle Meadows (Otter 207), the Pierre's effort to purge America's flawed evangelical enterprise
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simply reinstates it in a new form, leaving, as Pierre will himself lament, "Corpses behind" and
"the last sin before" (P 206).
The slow formulation of Pierre's decision to rescue Isabel at the expense of all established
material and domestic prospects involves the gradual realization of his heretofore innocent Eden
as compromised at every turn, a realization that intensifies his determination to act as the
sacrificial victim and purify his world. Foremost, in his own mother he discovers the deadly
self-interestedness of a love he had taken to be unconditional: "Love me she doth, thought Pierre,
but how? Loveth she me with the love past all understanding?" (90) The agonizing recognition
that an attempt on his part to introduce Isabel to his mother to be received as a daughter would
prompt her to reject them both with "scornful horror" doubles in Pierre the crisis of orphanhood:
"now to me is it, as though both father and mother had gone on distant voyages, and, returning,
died in unknown seas" (90). Neither father nor mother have proved recognizable mediators of
divine love or charity, "the love past all understanding" in its comprehensive benevolence; as a
consequence, neither proves a fit parent for Pierre's mission to raise Isabel up from her lowly
condition regardless of the cost to himself.
But even as he inwardly censures his mother for her self-interested love, Pierre misses the
beginnings of his own reenactment of both maternal and paternal mixed motives: "She loveth
me, ay;—but why? Had I been cast in a cripple's mold, how then? Now, do I remember that in
her most caressing love, there ever gleamed some scaly, glittering folds of pride" (90). In the
conclusion of the same chapter, the narrator will knowingly remark on Pierre's own correlative
motive, "Was not the face [of Isabel]—through mutely mournful—beautiful, bewitchingly? [....]
How, if accosted in some squalid lane, a humped, and crippled girl, hideous girl should have
snatched his garment's hem, with—'Save me, Pierre—love me, own me, brother; I am thy sister!"
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The narrator's succeeding exclamation, "Ah, if man were wholly made in heaven, why catch we
hell glimpses? (107), ramifies most obviously onto Pierre's secreted self-interest as the glimpse
of hell; however, it also doubly ramifies onto providence as creator, first, of the tainted origins of
the man "made in heaven," and secondly of the hypothesized girls' condition of squalor and
deformity.70
This subtle indictment of providence intensifies in the meditation that follows, which
contemplates the general human predicament of desire and its predilection for corruption. The
accusation implicit in the narrator's complex reflection redounds first onto Pierre's father and
finally backward onto the divine Father as the progenitor of human nature:
Why in the noblest marble pillar that stands beneath the all-comprising vault, ever
should we descry the sinister vein? We lie in nature very close to God, and
though, further on, the stream may be corrupted, by the banks it flows through,
yet at the fountain's rim, where mankind stand, there the stream infallibly
bespeaks the fountain. (107-8)
The opening rhetorical question ties back to the elder Pierre's enshrinement at the heart of
Pierre's youthful religion, where "in this niche of this pillar, stood the perfect marble form of his
departed father; without blemish [...] Pierre’s fond personification of perfect human goodness
and virtue" (68). As Crimmins explains, his father stands in relation to Pierre as "a quasiapotheosis that confuses God and father in such a way that the imperfection of Pierre's deceased
father reverberates theologically" (444). The narrator's conclusion—that "further on, the stream
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may be corrupted"—seems at first to exonerate the sentimental view of nature and nature's God
as transparently pure, with the "banks" of human custom standing in as the force corrupting
congenital innocence.
The assertion, however, in its convoluted symmetry, in fact undercuts the very
explanation it seems to endorse. For, it is "at the fountain's rim" that "mankind stand"—there
"the stream infallibly bespeaks the fountain." The transition from "we lie" to "mankind stand"
suggests movement parallel with the stream which "further on [...] may be corrupted"; instead,
however, the movement corresponds with stasis, returning "mankind" to the fountain's
rim/bosom of God and nature, which underlies both the "natural" innocence and the "natural"
corruption. Crimmins argues that "the putative taint" of the elder Pierre's "premarital affair, and
Isabel the unacknowledged daughter, severs piety from purity" (444); in fact, however, the affair
reveals the "putative taint" to be fatally and originally coextensive with piety. As a consequence,
in his effort to purify his Christian inheritance, Pierre will instead aggravate its contradictions to
the point of approaching the commission of incest—"a sin anomalous and accursed, so
anomalous, it may well be the one for which Scripture says, there is never forgiveness" (P
206)—and finally of following through with murder and suicide.
Having espied "the sinister vein" of self-interest work in his biological parents, Pierre
turns for support to an alternate cultural representation of the uncorrupted fountain of divine
benevolence, the minister Reverend Falsgrave. Critics, taking among other cues his name, have
almost uniformly condemned Falsgrave as a simple representation of religious hypocrisy,
ultimately departing on this point from the narrator's own conclusions, in calling him a "really
amiable and estimable person" (166). Willard Thorp, for example, speaks of Melville's distaste
for Falsgrave's "worldly hypocrisy" (195) and Stern concludes that Falsgrave "reveals what he is
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supposed to believe, and reveals that he does not live according to that belief" (191). In his effort
to test the religious integrity of Falsgrave's character, Pierre abstractly poses the question of his
own position, whether in the case of a seduction "the legitimate child should shun the
illegitimate," and charges Falsgrave to offer his opinion of what "would have been our blessed
Savior's thoughts on such a matter" (101). Falsgrave declines to answer the question directly as a
mouthpiece of Christ or of the church; instead, he declares that "Millions of circumstances
modify all moral questions" (102). Stern points to this withholding as evidence of Falsgrave's
"cowardice," saying, "he cannot find a solution which is compatible with the realities of
humanity and also compatible with the appearance values of his benefactress," Pierre's mother
(190).
But the symbolism attached to Falsgrave points to a deeper problem than inconsistency
between appearance and ideal; it brings to light rather a contradiction within the ideal. At the
moment Mr. Falsgrave insists on the import of moral contingencies for each situation, "the
surplice-like napkin dropped from the clergyman’s bosom, showing a minute but exquisitely cut
cameo brooch, representing the allegorical union of the serpent and dove" (102). The exposure
of the union of serpent and dove, a contradiction within a correspondence, occurs through the
falling away of the "surplice-like napkin," itself a figure of intersection within cross-purposes.
Falsgrave as such evinces the kind of contradictory integrity demonstrated by Pierre's
grandfather, "in whose meek, majestic soul, the lion and the lamb embraced—fit image of his
God" (30).
Pierre's—and the critics'—mistake lies in seeing Falsgrave's reticence as a simple product
of his patronage rather than a comment on the inevitability of competitive interests. Pierre in
consequence believes that he himself can transcend the social structures that compromise
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Falsgrave's position and will into existence a purified microcosm of democracy. In a profoundly
antinomian gesture he therefore determines to set himself up in the minister's place as the conduit
of God's voice, saying, "I must seek [counsel] direct from God himself, who, I now know, never
delegates his holiest admonishings. But I do not blame thee, I think I begin to see how thy
profession is unavoidably entangled by all fleshly alliances, and can not move with godly
freedom in a world of benefices" (164).71 In preparing to undertake a divinely-sanctioned
mission of benevolence independent of the "world of benefices," Pierre imagines himself
reenacting the Christian atonement through a sacrifice wholly unstructured by the demands of
self-interest. Falsgrave's cameo, however, in its combined evocation of innocent sacrifice in the
lamb and sensual passions in the serpent,72 resists the misguided simplicity of Pierre's vision.
Pierre's religious enthusiasm typifies American confidence in its millennial role and the
deity who sponsors it—a confidence that leads Pierre to place his trust in a beneficent outcome to
his benevolent enterprise: "Is Love a harm?" he inquires rhetorically, "Can Truth betray to pain?
Sweet Isabel, how can hurt come in the path to God?" (159-160). As Pierre envisions it, God has
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inspired his plan to suppress Isabel's paternity and flee with her to the city under the false
pretense of marriage. This move, he believes, will maximize his own sacrifice while minimizing,
as much as possible, that of his mother, who may cherish untouched her revered image of her
deceased husband. Pierre forcefully represses, however, the cost to Lucy; in the midst of "his
scheming thoughts," the narrator explains, he "had substituted but a sign—some empty x—and in
the ultimate solution of the problem, the empty x still figured, not the real Lucy" (181). Even as
Pierre rejoices in the prospect of re-enfranchising Isabel, he enacts a corresponding sacrifice of
Lucy's material and emotional future. Only his confidence in the absolute disinterestedness of
his course mobilizes him to sever ties with Lucy as the paradoxical counterpart to his heroically
democratic gesture.
Gradually, however, Pierre begins to awaken to a terrible realization: he is in love with
his sister Isabel. And it is his passion for sexual possession that has animated his benevolent
enterprise from the beginning. Having sacrificed mother, sweetheart, and estate on the altar of
his purifying gesture, Pierre begins to suffer the influx of "horrid anarchy and infidelity in his
soul," as memory restages the contradictions within his act of benevolence. The "heartproscribing" words of his mother in disowning him (206), the "echoings" of Lucy's "agonizing
shriek 'My heart! my heart!'" (206) as he pursued as infallible the dictates of his own heart,
which "heaven itself, so he felt, had sanctified with its blessings" (167), combine with a
frightened "recurrence to Isabel, and the nameless awfulness of his still imperfectly conscious,
incipient, new-mingled emotion" (206). Having trusted in sentimental fashion the dictates of the
"earnest heart" (167) as "divine inspiration" (160), Pierre encounters with bewilderment the
collateral damages of his sacrifice: "Lo! I leave corpses wherever I go! [...] Can then my
conduct be right? Lo! by my conduct I seem threatened by the possibility of a sin anomalous and
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accursed, so anomalous, it may well be the one for which Scripture says, there is no forgiveness"
(206). In his attempt to create a democratic redistribution of resources, Pierre has only succeeded
in replacing material decadence with the moral decadence of incestuous passion. Not even by
rejecting the paternal birthright secured by lust and violence, by literally disinheriting himself
from the material fruits of America's expansion, can Pierre shed the self-interest implicit in the
nation's founding.
Melville composes an explicit if complex representation of this irreducible paradox in the
form of a pamphlet Pierre picks up and reads while journeying with Isabel to the city. The
reading of the pamphlet occurs at a pivotal point in the novel, marking its shift away from the
fallen sentimental world of Saddle Meadows and towards an urban environment characterized by
the harsh realities of poverty. Melville creates an elaborate preface to the excerpted pamphlet in
which the narrator abstracts from Pierre to a predicament that underlies the characterization of
Pierre and the impetus for the novel from the beginning: the West's conspicuous confluence of
illicit wealth and aspirations to Christian charity. "Sooner or later in this life," the narrator
propounds, "the earnest, or enthusiastic youth comes to know, and more or less appreciate" a
"startling solecism" unique to Western benevolent imperialism: "That while, as the grand
condition of acceptance to God, Christianity calls upon all men to renounce this world, yet by all
odds the most Mammonish part of this world—Europe and America—are owned by none but
professed Christian nations, who glory in the owning, and seem to have some reason therefore"
(207). Here Melville lays out most unequivocally Pierre's personal predicament as a function of a
larger cultural and ultimately theological paradox—How "the greatest real miracle of all
religions, the Sermon on the Mount" (207), should give rise to the "glorious gospel [...] as from
the "Mount" which characterizes the grandfather's portrait (30)—and the exploitative practices of
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a nation whose "glorious grape [...] swells with fatness" (31). Through the mechanism of the
pamphlet's logic, Melville will lay at the door of American millennialism—its pursuit of heaven
on earth—the "strange, unique follies and sins" (213, author's emphasis) of American
expansionism. 73
The pamphlet, titled "Chronometricals and Horologicals," develops a conceit around the
concept of human wisdom as "horological," or relative time, and divine wisdom as
"chronometrical," or absolute time, based on the metaphor of a ship attempting to maintain its
time keeping permanently according to Greenwich, in spite of its having sailed on to China:
"thus, though the earthly wisdom of man be heavenly folly to God," the pamphlet declares, "so
also, conversely is the heavenly wisdom of God an earthly folly of man" (212). The effort on the
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Ascertaining an authorial relation to the logic of the pamphlet certainly constitutes a formidable task, and critics

differ widely in their assessment of its relevance and import, some seeing it as an object of Melville's moral disgust
and others as the key to resolving Pierre's ethical dilemma. Dillingham, for example, sees it as "an excellently
illustrated restatement" of Pierre's personal problems, "his impulsiveness where there should be moderation, his
angry determination to defy the world, where he should exercise benign expedience, and his blindness to his own
deepest motives, where there should be intimate self-understanding," p. 207. Dillingham goes so far as to conclude
that the pamphlet comprises "essentially a handbook of survival whose principles, as far as they go, parallel
Melville's own convictions," p. 233. Higgins and Parker in their co-authored treatment of the pamphlet similarly
suggest it offers a timely but unheeded warning to Pierre, pp. 254, 264, and Braswell contends that "If Pierre had
thoroughly comprehended and had acted in accord with the teachings of [the] pamphlet [...] he would have escaped
disaster," p.81. Samuel Otter by contrast remarks that the pamphlet's "advice is endorsed neither by the narrator's
comments nor by Pierre's subsequent actions," p. 251, and in his individually authored article "Plinlimmon and the
Pamphlet Again," Higgins considers the pamphlet to be Melville's critique of "nominal Christianity," p. 225. I would
argue, however, that the pamphlet resists a simple distinction between "nominal" and authentic Christianity, rather
calling into question contradictions implicit in both sentimental and orthodox Christian ontology.
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part of human beings to live chronometrically, or in imitation of Christ as the wisdom of God,
"is, somehow, apt to involve those inferior beings eventually in strange, unique follies and sins,
unimagined before" (213). As an allegorical analogue the pamphleteer then references the "story
of the Ephesian matron," which describes how the self-sacrificing impulses of a widow
determined to permanently mourn at the coffin of her deceased husband lead to a sexual
encounter with a sympathetic guard in the presence of the corpse itself.74
The story of the Ephesian matron reenacts the dynamic of disinterested self-sacrifice and
sexual self-interest as mutually intensifying, a dynamic which the writer then explicitly connects
to a larger ontological problem: "where is the earnest and righteous philosopher, gentlemen," he
inquires rhetorically, "who has not been struck with a sort of infidel idea, that whatever other
worlds God may be Lord of, he is not Lord of this; for else this world would seem to give the lie
to Him, so utterly repugnant seem its ways to the instinctively known ways of Heaven" (213).
Referencing again the "chronometrical conceit," the pamphleteer then insists, however, that "this
world's seeming incompatibility with God, absolutely results from its meridianal correspondence
with him" (213). For, "it follows not from this, that God's truth is one thing and man's truth
another; but [...] by their very contradictions they are made to correspond" (212). The proper
moral conclusion, then, to be derived from this correspondence-within-contradiction consists in
the abandonment of the pursuit of benevolent sacrifice, in the rule that "a man [...] must by no
means make a complete unconditional sacrifice for himself in behalf of any other being, or any
cause, or any conceit"; instead, a "virtuous expediency" comprises "the highest desirable or
attainable earthly excellence for the mass of men" (214).
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See Dillingham, pp. 225-226 for the background to the pamphlet's allusion.
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Rather than simply serving as a critique of Pierre's self-interested sacrifice or its own
logic which undermines the sacrificial enterprise altogether (Otter 190), the pamphlet "describes
a problem that fascinated Melville throughout his career: how contradictions are made to
correspond" (252).75 The pamphlet brings to the fore the problem of correspondence-withincontradiction which sentimental discourses on love resolved by positing an original and
recoverable pure correspondence between nature and divinity. Citing Christ as an instance of
chronometrical revelation that cannot be emulated by "inferior beings," the pamphleteer by
contrast displaces reconciliation between human and divine natures indefinitely into the future,
saying, "When [men] go to heaven, it will be quite another thing. There, they can freely turn the
left cheek, because there the right cheek will never be smitten. There they can freely give all to
the poor, for there will be no poor to give to" (214). As Higgins rightly observes, this perspective
hardly represents Melville's own attitude toward the poor (224-5). The pamphlet, therefore, can
be best understood as raising a point that implies religious infidelity (the "horrible idea" that
"whatever other worlds God may be Lord of, he is not the Lord of this") and providing a
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In Reading Melville's Pierre, Higgins and Parker describe interpretation of the pamphlet as a "Janusian difficulty

for readers of Pierre," who must take into account Pierre's being "judged from the stance of absolute Christianity at
the same time that absolute Christianity is judged in the light of the horrors that follow any attempt to put it into
practice," p. 118. In effect, the pamphlet generates a kind of mind-bending triangular vision by sustaining a
simultaneous critique of oppositions that ought to provide a corrective distinction for each other but do not—a
correspondence within contradiction that comprises the very subject of the text. The logic of the pamphlet's
complacent moderation and the logic of Pierre's absolute sacrifice cannot correct one another because within their
visible contradiction lies a less obvious correspondence—they both fail to reconcile nature and divinity within a
purely beneficent whole.
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spurious solution that leaves divine benevolence—and the myth of the American millennial
mission—intact only because no longer accessible at all.
When Pierre first struggles toward a resolution with regard to Isabel, he conceives of it in
summary as a choice between "Lucy or God" (181), between self-interested satisfaction and
Christian charity. In the terms set out by the pamphlet, Pierre imagines that by embracing Isabel
he will effect an alignment between human and divine wisdom, between his heart and the divine
will. Instead of breaking free from self-interest into charity, however, Pierre finds himself deeply
plunged into both, a deadlock which at once prevents his abandonment of Isabel (as an escape
from eros) and the consummation of his lust (as a rejection of charity). The ecstasy of his intense
emotional connection to Isabel thus doubles as the torment of an inexorable ontological and
ethical paradox. Over time, the fusion of sexual passion and filial care that ensures Pierre's
ongoing proximity to Isabel fuels a deadly rage at the terms of his desire, his inability to
transcend its origin in both pity and lust. Isabel as organic angel thus indeed ushers Pierre into
accord with nature and the supernatural—but in so doing makes an atheist of her most ardent
convert.
Pierre cannot finally possess Isabel because sexual intercourse would collapse the tension
between sacrifice and desire that characterizes his love for her. Instead, the objects of Pierre's
eroticized benevolence shift and multiply: Lucy travels to the city and joins Pierre's household in
the guise of a "nun-like cousin" (310, 311) to double and invert the terms of the choice, Lucy or
God (Isabel), and/or Isabel or God (Lucy), signifying the infinite regression of the contradiction
between interested and disinterested love. Believing herself agent of redemptive resolution to
Pierre's mysterious dilemma, Lucy instead compounds to the point of absurdity his filial-erotic
interests, placing already cross-purposed desires onto cross-purposed objects. Her reappearance
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as an organic angel mediating divine love to Pierre in the same conflicted terms as Isabel brings
to an end the possibility of a conventional resolution to the narrative.
As Milton Stern points out, "Lucy duplicates exactly in relation to Pierre what Pierre did
for Isabel" (157)—but she does so in inverted terms. Where in taking Isabel nominally as wife
Pierre sought to disguise a platonic connection through a sexual one, Lucy suggests the disguise
of an erotic connection through a platonic one. Writing to her erstwhile sweetheart whom she
believes to be embroiled in a marriage solely through the goodness of his heart, Lucy proposes
her admission to the household on duplicitous terms, saying, "Let it seem, as though I were some
nun-like cousin immovably vowed to dwell with thee in thy strange exile" (310). The mirrored
arrangements depend on an ecstatic sense of divinely-ordained mission; like Pierre, Lucy pleads
her case in terms of supernatural imperative, announcing, "I feel that heaven hath called me to a
wonderful office toward thee" (310) and—more dramatically, "God himself cannot stay me, for
it is He that commands me" (311). Lucy's confidence that her desire to territorially demarcate
Pierre's affections coincides with the "call" of "heaven" signals her assent to the terms of
sentimental possession: without ever consummating her passion for Pierre, she may nevertheless
enjoy a boundless expansion of her proprietary power over him. In fact, her forfeiture of the
instrumental possession of his body creates the conditions for her ecstatic expansion of power,
mirroring Pierre's "sacrificial" appropriation of Isabel's heart.
Lucy rightly intuits the sacrificial impulse that prompted Pierre to rescue Isabel and in
some measure restore her birthright, but she places her faith in the purity of that act of
benevolence as unmixed with erotic desire. Unbeknownst to Lucy, erotic desire mediated Pierre's
charitable love for Isabel, and when Lucy offers herself up as a sacrifice on the altar of an
eroticized celibacy, she introduces the same deadlock of self-interested "unselfishness":
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Our mortal lives, Pierre, shall henceforth be one mute wooing of each other [...]
till we meet in the pure realms of God's final blessedness for us;—till we meet
where the ever-interrupting and ever-marring world can not and shall not come;
where all thy hidden, glorious unselfishness shall be gloriously revealed in the
full splendor of that heavenly light; where [...] she, she too shall assume her own
glorious place, nor take it hard, but rather feel the more blessed, when, there, thy
sweet heart, shall be openly and unreservedly mine. (310, author's emphasis)
In the terms set up by Lucy's letter, the practice of celibacy on earth will find erotic
consummation in heaven; erotically-charged sacrificial love in time paradoxically leads to a
spiritualized sexual exclusiveness in eternity. For Lucy, privatizing barriers persist into and in
fact intensify in the afterlife; the only difference consists in their evoking pleasure rather than
resentment from the ostracized. Heaven, she intimates, will resolve as extraneous the problem of
competing loves, but only because there Isabel will "feel the more blessed" to discover the
absolute disinterestedness of Pierre's attachment.
Lucy's vision of a spiritualized love triangle contrasts notably with that of Jane
Girardeau's in Judd's Margaret,76 where the latter imagines herself "the servant" of both her
fiancé and his deceased beloved Margaret:
[Gottfried] seemed for his devotion to Margaret Bruneau, purer, greater, diviner.
He and Margaret constituted to [Jane's] mind a delightful company. She entered a
magic circle when she came into their communion. She became one of a glorious
trio. Then she saw herself interpreted and symbolized in Margaret; and acted as a
conjuration to bring that delightful vision from the shades. (109)
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See Chapter 1, p. 207.
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The Jane/Margaret/Gottfried "magic circle" instantiates the sentimental millennial vision of a
completely harmonious hotbed of unconsummate erotic passion. Unlike Lucy, Jane anticipates
the dissolution of discrete material boundaries that preclude universal access to the beloved
object; she looks forward to absolute identification among subjects and objects of desire. Far
from seeking Gottfried's heart to be "openly and unreservedly" hers, Jane entertains an ardor
whose original fascination derives precisely from Gottfried's romantic attachment to Margaret
(106). Pierre also appears to Lucy "purer, great, diviner" for his devotion to Isabel, but only
because Lucy imagines that devotion to be categorically distinct from his emotional subjection to
her own womanly powers.
With Lucy transformed from his erstwhile predestined sweetheart into "yet another
incestuous lover" (Dill 728), Pierre proves unable to resist her newly supernaturalized eroticism.
Following the excerpted letter from Lucy, the narrator adopts Pierre's ecstatic naiveté in a
protracted meditation that figures Lucy as the incarnation of divine radiance: "When [...] man
[...] suddenly is brushed by some angelical plume of humanity, and the human accents of
superhuman love, and the human eyes of superhuman beauty and glory, suddenly burst on his
being; then how wonderful and fearful the shock!" (311). With the complicit character of his
own motives daily driving Pierre nearer to despair, a refined woman's gesture toward celibate
intimacy presents itself as an alternate ontological ground. Lucy's proposal in effect renews
Pierre's conscious belief in the possibility of an "absolute motive" (316): "For infallibly certain
he inwardly felt, that whatever [...] her secret and inexplicable motive, still Lucy in her own
virgin heart remained transparently immaculate, without shadow of flaw or vein" (317). Higgins
and Parker point out how, from a psychological perspective, Pierre's infatuated response to
Lucy's letter of self-invitation seems to nullify the periodic insight he has demonstrated into the
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sexual undercurrent of his idealized attachment to Isabel ("Reading" 262-3). But because Lucy's
proposition derives from the last stronghold of iconographic purity—the "transparently
immaculate [...] virgin heart"—Pierre confronts the illusion of unmixed moral essence as from an
untried angle.77 And it is for this reason that Lucy—far from serving as "a mediating principle
that strives for health and peace," (231) as Milton Stern has argued—collapses the last marble
pillar of Pierre's ideological temple.
In order to join Pierre's household, Lucy reenacts Pierre's comprehensive immolation of
material prospects by spurning a suit of marriage proffered by Pierre's cousin Glen, heir to
Pierre's forfeited Saddle Meadows. And as with Pierre, her totalizing sacrifice seems to plunge
her beyond the bounds of human nature into the immediacy of divine will. "In vain" does her
mother assault the citadel of Lucy's bizarre resolve to take up residence with her married former
fiancé and his new wife: "To all this, Lucy [...] replied in the gentlest and most heavenly manner
[...] What she was doing was not of herself; she had been moved to it by all-encompassing
influences above, around, and beneath" (327). On the one hand, Lucy's allusion to "allencompassing influences above, around, and beneath" suggests her confidence in the combined
benevolent sanction of natural and supernatural powers; on the other hand, it ominously harks to
the same perverse mixture of "heaven" and "hell" that activates Isabel's "supernatural" aura
(43).
Parallel with her letter to Pierre, in the presence of her mother Lucy articulates her
sacrifice in terms of a boundless expansion of proprietary power: "Concerning the loss of
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By contrast, Pierre has no difficulty imagining self-interested motive on the part of his cousin Glen, who might

with Pierre's absence approach Lucy "as a deeply sympathizing friend, all wishful to assuage her sorrow, but hinting
nothing, at present, of any selfish matrimonial intent," p. 288.
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worldly wealth and sumptuousness [...] these were no loss to her, for they had always been
valueless. Nothing was she now renouncing; but in acting upon her present inspiration she was
inheriting everything" (327). In keeping with the ethos of "pious materialism," Lucy values
material goods strictly for their affective content; she therefore conceives of her exterior
dispossession as an exchange for absolute interior possession of Pierre, whom she identifies as
"all the world, and all the heaven, and all the universe to me" (311). But the dynamics of
sentimental ownership allow Lucy to construe her most aggressive act as simultaneously her
most retiring: "She looked for no reward, the essence of well-doing was the consciousness of
having done well without the least hope of reward" (327).
Lucy's defiance of conventional values in favor of an apparently heaven-instigated
benevolent mission completes her transformation into an organic angel whose spiritual command
rivals that of Isabel. Once, Lucy's rarefied natural beauty transported Pierre to the limits of
solely erotic arousal; now, her transfigured aspect transports him beyond "natural" experience
into a state of ecstatic adoration:
The mere bodily aspect of Lucy, as changed by her more recent life, filled him
with the most powerful and novel emotions. That unsullied complexion of bloom
was now gone, without being in any way replaced by sallowness [...] as if her
body indeed were the temple of God, and marble indeed were the only fit
material for so holy a shrine, a brilliant supernatural whiteness now gleamed in
her cheek. (328)
Lucy's body appears to have closed the gap between nature's most exquisite expression—"That
unsullied complexion of bloom"—and matter as sheer medium of celestial light. With her
"chiseled statue's head" she has morphed into Hawthorne's purified marble sculpture, purged of
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sensual flesh tones. Unlike with Hawthorne's Hilda, however, Lucy's bleached aesthetics
corresponds with a powerful magnetic charge that comes to exceed that of her dark-haired
counterpart, so that Lucy's voice can inadvertently trigger a "submissively-answering note" from
Isabel's magic guitar (328); and the elemental Isabel herself, "without evidence of voluntary
will," yields to Lucy's overpowering magnetism by falling "on her knees before Lucy" and
making "a rapid gesture of homage" (328).
The competing magnetic charges of Isabel and Lucy spark a contest of erotic power that
Lucy gradually comes dominate by virtue of her transparently disinterested aura, a transparency
made possible by her serene confidence in her hold over Pierre. Believing that Isabel poses no
challenge to her proprietary conquest, Lucy in turn makes no effort to lay claim to Pierre: she
"seemed entirely undesirous of usurping any place about him, manifested no slightest
unwelcome curiosity as to Pierre, and no painful embarrassment as to Isabel" (337). Lucy's
transparent altruism, however, comprises the more irresistible erotic force: in spite of her evident
indifference, "more and more did she seem, hour by hour, to be somehow inexplicably sliding
between [Pierre and Isabel], without touching them" (338). Lucy's genuine relinquishment of
sexually possessing Pierre paradoxically suffuses her with a supernatural force of attraction and,
therefore, of affective control. Pierre experiences this force as "some strange heavenly influence
[...] near him, to keep him from some uttermost harm," while "Isabel was alive to some
untraceable displacing agency" (338). Merish contends that in sentimental texts "becoming
civilized"—and I would argue here "supernaturalized"—"entails a willing renunciation of power
over others, cast in bodily terms, and marks the sublimation of aggression into sympathetic
desire" (3). By ceding her rights to Pierre's sexual body, Lucy renders her erotic interest
"untraceable," exponentially increasing its power.
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In spite of Pierre's implicit trust in Lucy's simplified essence, the mounting pressure of
competing and conflicted affective demands drives him toward madness. He encounters
bifurcated versions of his own moral character in Lucy and Isabel, who hail him as angel in
human form, and Lucy's brother and erstwhile fiancé, who pronounce him a "monster" (335,
340). But Pierre, having at the point of his conversion been at once moved by pity and prompted
by sexual passion, refuses to move beyond the irony this entails. In the novel's concluding
chapter, having been sentenced to death by hanging for the flagrant murder of Glen Glendinning,
Pierre stubbornly laments, "Had I been heartless now, disowned, and spurningly portioned off
the girl at Saddle Meadows, then had I been happy through a long life on earth, and perchance
through a long eternity in heaven!" (360). Instead, he determines to burn forever in the friction
produced by the sentimental paradox; in place of harmonized human and divine love, "Now, 'tis
merely hell in both worlds" (360). But even in his defiant engagement with the perverse terms of
existence—"Well, be it hell"— Pierre cannot escape the urge to self-purification from the
conflicting desires mediated by the sexual body. In the midst of his savage bravado, he throws
out a piteous demand for altered ontology, saying, "But give me first another body! [...] I long
and long to die, to be rid of this dishonored cheek" (360). When Isabel and Lucy, mirrored
couplings of his perversity, seek entrance to the prison cell, he cries out in desperation,
"Away!—Good Angel and Bad Angel both!—For Pierre is neuter now!" (360). By the
conclusion, as Stern as argued, Lucy and Isabel collectively represent "Good Angel and Bad
Angel both" (179), each an erotic agent who converts Pierre to a holy enterprise that, in turn,
awakens untapped reservoirs of self-interest.
Having played the role of organic angel, Isabel and Lucy encounter the horrific results of
their supernaturalized influence. Lucy, upon discovering Isabel's status as sister, not charity-wife,
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"shrunk up like a scroll, and noiselessly fell at the feet of Pierre" (360). With her body itself
wholly staked on the premise of her unchallenged proprietary power, Lucy withers at the word of
a rival celibate love-interest. Finding her dead, Pierre turns to Isabel as the first and final
embodiment of an irreducibly compromised ontology, crying, "Girl! wife or sister, saint or fiend!
[...] in thy breasts, life for infants lodgeth not, but death-milk for thee and me!" (360). Pierre
cannot isolate out the wife from the sister, nor the saint from the fiend; he can only by means of
violence force them together into eternal stasis. The most explicitly sexualized action of the
novel thus proves a gesture, not toward consummation and harmony, but rather towards a
permanent irresolvable antagonism: "seizing Isabel in his grasp" and "tearing her bosom loose,
he seized the secret vial nesting there" (360). As Isabel collapses from the effects of the poison,
"her whole form sloped sideways, and she fell upon Pierre's heart, and her long hair ran over
him, and arbored him in ebon vines" (362). Pierre's concluding tableau pictures a suffocating
superimposition of body upon body, rather than sexual release. Isabel falls upon Pierre's heart,
her hair runs over him, and arbors him, transfixing him in the deadlock of irreconcilable desires.
Pierre's dying look of "scornful innocence" (362) attests to his refusal to renegotiate the terms of
the sentimental contract, which assured that following the heart would lead to God.
With Pierre, Melville parodies the sentimental investment in the purifying force of
sacralized female beauty and with it, the construction of a benevolent nation through exploitation
and consumption. When Lucy's brother Fred encounters the horrific scene on the prison cell
floor—among the double-suicides the body of his beloved sister—he returns the novel to its
haunted colonial beginnings, crying "Oh, my God, my God! Thou scalpest me with this sight!"
(362). The violent aftermath of Pierre, Isabel, and Lucy's faith in the "redeeming influence of
affective feeling" (Barnes 80) marks them simultaneous victims and villains in the ongoing
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enterprise of American benevolence, and harks back to the at once seamless and contradictory
representation of the elder Pierre's Christianity. To an audience who relied on novels to reenact a
national narrative of millennial resolution through the harmonizing of interests, Melville offered
in Pierre only "an untimely, timely end;—Life's last chapter well stitched into the middle" (360).
Conclusion
From the martial Christianity of the Puritans to the sentimental humanism of the 19th
century evangelical, Melville retells the narrative of American expansion as an irreducibly
compromised experiment in staging heaven on earth. He furthermore dramatizes this problem in
the most intimate terms possible, in the sphere of private conversion and sentimental sympathy.
Melville rightly intuited the ramifications that spiritualized eroticism contained for the national
narrative; the contradictions of desire thus picture in Pierre a fundamental theological and
political paradox that Melville saw at the heart of the nation's millennial aspirations. Enmeshed
in the self-interested benevolence of its original mission as "a city upon a hill," the America of
Pierre endlessly recycles its rituals of self-purification through natural and supernatural
revelation, determined to reconcile private desire with divine mandate. By undercutting these
rituals at their most sacred juncture—the body of the organic angel—Melville produced a
comprehensively devastating exposé of American ideals.
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V. RACIAL AESTHETICS IN STOWE'S UNCLE TOM'S CABIN AND HARRIET WILSON'S
OUR NIG

Mid-19th century novelists experimented with the figure of the organically good woman
as the mediator between divine beauty and human desire, a "living icon" whose attractive
incarnation enabled a continuity between fleshly and spiritual devotion. In depicting the
conversion and spiritual maturation of these exceptional women, antebellum novelists devised,
with more or less success, a variety of strategies for intersecting erotic and spiritual appeal.
Chapters 3 and 4 of this project chronicled the deliberate breakdown of this crucial affect into
competing principles of lust and holy love, manifested by a splitting or twinning of the organic
angel trope. The last chapter in this study also features a pairing of spiritual icons in the
abolitionist novel Uncle Tom's Cabin—but one that reveals the racialized constraints implicit in
the peculiar embodiment of the organic angel. Finally, I conclude the study by exploring how
the failed development of a black heroine in a black-authored bildungsroman exposes the
cultural costs of essentializing racial and gender-specific bodies.
In her positive manifestations, the organic angel "catches men's eyes" even as she "directs
their thoughts to heaven" (Adams 97, 107) where embodiment will safely dissolve into spirit.
Harriet Beecher Stowe's 1859 novel The Minister's Wooing deploys such a living icon in the
character of Mary Scudder, whose romancing of her childhood sweetheart results in his last-hour
conversion. While The Minister's Wooing encapsulates Stowe's liberal aesthetic of Christian
conversion, its vision of eroticized spiritual efficacy founders at the borders of the black female
215

body. Candace, African American servant of Mary Scudder, also plays the role of evangelical
female witness, but Candace's appeal derives from oral testimony and maternal succor, over and
against her aesthetically abject body. Humbly self-proclaimed as "poor, ole, foolish, black, [and]
wicked" (349), Candace corrects and strengthens her white counterparts' faith, but through a
contrast rather than consonance of her moral and physical attributes. In a novel centered on the
complementarity of erotic and divine attractiveness, Stowe's restriction of Candace's spiritual
influence suggests the hidden racial configuration of the organic angel.
Composed seven years earlier, Stowe's wildly popular antislavery novel Uncle Tom's
Cabin (1852) outlines the contours of her normative racialized outlook on Christian conversion.
The racial topography of Uncle Tom's Cabin illustrates how the concept of "blackness"
pressurized the dominant culture's liberal aesthetic of divine womanhood and reveals the limits
of antebellum commitment to the paradigm of an eroticized evangelical feminine. Midcentury
racial ideologies of the body ensured that the black female would be the one figure Stowe and
her mainstream audience could not imagine as iconographic spiritual intermediary, and this
exclusion had far-reaching cultural ramifications. As Harriet Wilson would demonstrate in her
1859 novella Our Nig, racialized religious aesthetics left the black female conceptually trapped
within the boundaries of her body.
The trope of the organic angel depended on a purported convergence of moral and
physical attractiveness predicated on bodily transparency; blackness, however, tended to return
the white imagination to the surface of the body as opaque, rather than a tissual medium housing
the divine. While Stowe and her white contemporaries disagreed widely on the metaphysical
significance of blackness, their formulations of that significance all rested, implicitly or
explicitly, on the assumption that blackness was a stamp of physical degradation, and as such
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precluded an aesthetic correspondence between soul and body as both expressive of "God's
image." 78
In contrast with its body wedded to racial blackness, the African soul remained
susceptible to the same spiritual cleansing that could make all souls "blackened" by sin "white as
snow." This "soul-body dichotomy"79 undergirded the theology of racial paternalism, which held
that the subordination of physically and morally degenerate Africans paved the way for their
spiritual rescue under the enlightened influence of white Christians. Southern Christian
apologists for slavery thus justified slaveholding on the premise that "the severity of the African
servant's interior and exterior condition" (Earl 18) demanded the institution as a purifying
"school of chastisement" (qtd. in 20). In her Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin, Stowe would at once
attack slavery as a horrifying misdirection of white paternalism and canonize the view that the
"chastisement" of slavery comprised the black race's singular contribution to salvation history.
Rather than challenging the essential inferiority of physical blackness, Stowe would work
in Uncle Tom's Cabin within the framework of this argument for the noncoincidence between
black body and soul. Southern apologists' foregrounding of African slaves' suffering bodies as
instrumental in their salvation laid the groundwork for what Jean Fagan Yellin has described as
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Stowe's "transvaluation" of racial stereotypes (136), a valorization of lowliness drawn from New
Testament theology.80 Within Stowe's schema, black bodies call forth and disseminate a special
kind of grace, not through an attractive mediation of divine light and beauty (as does the "living
icon") but through the disfigurement and debasement of already-abject flesh.
Stowe's racialized vision of evangelical iconography, however, created a double-bind for
representations of divinized black womanhood. On the one hand, the black woman's exterior,
construed as both unattractive and opaque, barred her from occupying the role of an organic
angel whose attenuated body interfused erotic attractions with divine charisma. On the other
hand, for black females the brutalization of the flesh under slavery often went hand in hand with
sexual exploitation, a crime which, in the 19th century imagination, tended to collapse
distinctions between "polluted" body and "polluted" soul. Placing a black woman in the iconic
role of the crucified African thus risked a dissolution of the crucial boundary between black body
and whitened soul, a comprehensive blackening that would obliterate Stowe's racialized aesthetic
of redemption by contrast.
It is an Uncle Tom, then, rather than an Aunt Chloe, who figures as the representative
African saint, and an Eva, rather than a Topsy, who functions as the novel's Southern organic
angel. As scapegoats for the slaveholding South, both the organic angel and her black
counterpart undergo an expiatory martyrdom, but where the delicate white child Eva's converting
power derives from interior sufferings that decrease corporeality, Uncle Tom's derives from
exterior torture that relentlessly exposes and exploits his black embodiment.
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The necessity for these paired suffering icons implicitly underscores the failure of the
organic model of conversion—with its faith in human nature's irresistible attraction to a
picturesque Gospel—to address the kind of resistance to sentimental appeals that Stowe
encountered in subscribers to slaveholding ideology. The image of the gentle and forgiving
Uncle Tom's torments called forth an avenging deity outside the pale of a liberalized antebellum
Christianity and the moral universe of sentimental authors like Judd and Cummins. By suffering
the kind of bodily mortification that Christ suffered, Uncle Tom brought back the shock of evil
and the threat of hell to the genre of genteel popular fiction.
Perhaps no single work of the decade more sharply deflated Stowe's metaphysics of race
than Harriet Wilson's black-authored 1859 novella Our Nig. This thinly-sketched
autobiographical fiction takes as its point of departure the birth, maturation, and attempted
conversion of Frado or "Our Nig," indentured mulatta servant of an abusive white Northern
family. While Our Nig, like Uncle Tom’s Cabin, engages the genres of the female
bildungsroman and the conversion narrative, it frustrates the hope of dramatic movement
entailed by maturation and conversion. The sentimental aesthetic of conversion could only
countenance a black girl's development as the radical suppression of her body in the interest of
the soul, but because Frado's mistress works to actively "blacken" her by verbal, physical, and
sexual abuse, Frado lacks the means of escaping into a transcendent "white" interiority. Instead,
Frado’s attempts to anchor her identity in a prospective afterlife predicated on a white interior
force her ever deeper into the ramifications of her body as black and female.
Rather than experiencing racial blackness as a given metaphysical essence, Frado suffers it as a
socio-cultural imposition fueled by economic demands for her laboring body. In response, she
rejects the racialized Christian narrative that separates out souls and bodies and chooses to
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inhabit her body as the full extension of her existence. The apocalyptic horizons of Uncle Tom’s
Cabin thus contract in Our Nig into an experience of unrelieved temporal abjection, throwing
into relief the covert costs of hallowed white womanhood.
"Are there two Christs?" William Lloyd Garrison would query in his 1852 review of
Uncle Tom's Cabin (qtd. in Sundquist 15), the novel that would make its author "the single most
powerful voice on behalf of the slave" (Hedrick 234). While Garrison was reacting to Stowe's
apparent relegation of a sacrificial Gospel only to full-blooded black males, in contrast to whites
and mulattos, his comment accurately illuminates the novel's bipartite soteriological structure,
divided not only along racial but gender lines. Uncle Tom's Cabin does, in fact, explicitly
present "two Christs"—both passive sufferers and both representative figures of the power of
sentimental conversion. These figures, however—the white, frail girl-child Eva and the large,
powerful black man Uncle Tom—stand as aesthetic counterpoints in Stowe's self-conscious
revision of the Christian narrative.
In case any among her readership missed the cues in the novel proper, in her Key to
Uncle Tom's Cabin Stowe explained the character of "gentle Eva" as an "impersonation in
childish form of the love of Christ" (51). While other midcentury sentimental novelists like
Sylvester Judd and Maria Cummins would experiment more boldly with female Christ-figures
whose love combined the moral and sexual appeal of fully embodied womanhood, Eva subsides
to the absolute corporeal minimum in Protestant sentimental iconography; her progressively
disembodied femininity stages a seamless recession of sacral flesh into luminous spirit. A
foreshortened version of the organic angel, Eva undergoes no conversion process at all because
her physical maturation remains incomplete; instead, her immaculate body, including its
incipient sexual dimension, simply recedes until divinity and soul intersect at death.
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Stowe provides a brief glimpse of Eva's nascent womanly endowments that encapsulates
how the erotic typically plays out in the sentimental 'economy of grace,' which relies on the
intercessory power of the female body to secure and redirect erotic admiration toward spiritual
ends. In chapter XXIII, titled "Henrique," Stowe introduces the character of Eva's cousin, a boy
his father describes as "a devil of a fellow, when his blood's up" (390) and one who in Eva's
presence cruelly chastises his mulatto servant Dodo. Initially, Eva tries to reason with Henrique
but finds it "vain to try to make her handsome cousin understand her feelings" (389). Only after
modestly redirecting attention to herself as the desirable mediate object does Eva succeed in
initiating Henrique's change of heart, a change of heart Stowe clearly links with romantic
infatuation.
The tableau of the budding attachment takes shape through the eyes of Augustine and
Alfred, Eva and Henrique's respective fathers. As Eva and Henrique return from a horse ride,
Augustine exclaims, "Look here, Alf! Did you ever see anything so beautiful?" and Stowe
invites the reader to share the men's perception, saying, "in truth, it was a beautiful sight"
(original emphasis). The narrator's rendering of the scene accentuates the role of erotic
admiration in intensifying the sway of Eva's angelic beauty:
Henrique, with his bold brow, and dark, glossy curls, and glowing cheek, was
laughing gayly as he bent towards his fair cousin, as they came on. She was
dressed in a blue riding-dress, with a cap of the same color. Exercise had given a
brilliant hue to her cheeks, and heightened the effect of her singularly transparent
skin, and golden hair. (394-5)
Eva's beauty for an instant takes on the characteristics of a mesmerizing physical vitality: her
"transparent skin" mediates the "brilliant hue" of blood flowing from vigorous exercise, and the

221

perpetual whiteness of her garments gives way to richness of color. Alfred announces the erotic
implications of this representation by exclaiming, "Good heavens! what perfectly dazzling
beauty! [...] I tell you, Auguste, won't she make some hearts ache, one of these days?" (395).
Eva's "singularly transparent" skin here doubles as an erotic and spiritual tissue; she may
effectually win hearts by virtue of her emergent capacity to "break" them. By doubly embedding
Eva within the male gaze—object of Henrique's attention as perceived through paternal eyes—
Stowe "heighten[s] the effect" of Eva's spellbinding physiognomy, her transparent skin and
golden hair. And Stowe unveils the telos of this heightened effect in the subsequent paragraphs.
Henrique, obtuse to Eva's rational objections to his treatment of Dodo, yields instantly to
Eva's emotional request, mediated through eroticized beauty. When Eva concludes, "At any rate
[...] dear Cousin, do love poor Dodo, and be kind to him, for my sake!" the boy replies, "I could
love anything, for your sake, dear Cousin; for I really think you are the loveliest creature that I
ever saw!" (396). Henrique, the narrator reports, "spoke with an earnestness that flushed his
handsome face," and Eva received "it [the earnestness] without even a change of feature" (396).
Here the figure of the beautiful female functions to refract erotic excitement into agapic
generosity, natural desire into Christian service, as Henrique pledges to "love" Dodo because Eva
is the "loveliest creature." Eva's evident self-possession in a sensual moment signals her ability
to purify and redirect Henrique's infatuation toward conversion, to win hearts rather than
breaking them.
Unlike the conventional organic angel whose increasing spiritual influence corresponds
with the process of sexual maturation, Eva's eroticism intensifies by virtue of her body's
approaching absence, and Stowe reserves her ultimate spiritual efficaciousness for the realm of
memory. This implicit trajectory surfaces in Eva's reply to Henrique's pledge of devotion: "I'm

222

glad you feel so, dear Henrique! I hope you will remember" (396). Appealing to her own future
absence proves a marked refrain that corresponds with Eva's increasing spiritual prowess as
death approaches: "When I am dead, then you will think of me, and do it for my sake" (403), she
declares to St. Clare, and the imminence of her absent body initiates "a sort of judgment vision"
that presages his conversion (404). On her death bed, surrounded by plantation slaves, Eva will
inscribe the plan of salvation within the frame of her impending departure, saying, "I have
something to say to you, which I want you always to remember. . . . I am going to leave you. In
a few weeks you will see me no more—" (418).81 Eva's articulation of her future absence, like
Stowe's use of the dash, works to heighten her future presence-in-absence; by making herself
absent while present, Eva ensures she will be forever present when absent. The barrier between
body and spirit breaks down, so that just as the near-absent body mediates the spirit, the spirit
will mediate the effects of the once-present body. The narrator lays out the function of this
exchange, when she identifies the character of Eva with "the peculiar charms of the one who is
not" (original emphasis). "It is as if heaven," she expounds, "had an especial band of angels,
whose office it was to sojourn for a season here, and endear to them the wayward human heart,
that they might bear it upward with them in their homeward flight" (383). The "wayward" heart,
with its earth-bound inclinations, falls under the spell of the angelic body, which seals the heart's
natural endearment for supernatural ends.
The angelic body signifies the soul's most attenuated house; Eva's approaching death
therefore manifests through a triangulation of thinness, transparence, and light, as the body
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makes visible its own interior, the soul. And the more visible the sacral interior of the feminine
body, the greater its capacity to penetrate hearts. An intimate moment between Eva and Uncle
Tom illustrates this sublime convergence, as the feminine body gains access to the heart by
signaling its own evacuation. In one of the many instances where Eva pronounces her
forthcoming departure from the earth, "The child rose, and pointed her little hand to the sky; the
glow of evening lit her golden hair and flushed cheek with a kind of unearthly radiance, and her
eyes were bent earnestly on the skies. 'I'm going there,' she said, 'to the spirits bright, Tom; I'm
going, before long'" (382, original emphasis). Even as Eva emphatically directs her own gaze and
Tom's toward "the skies," she calls to his mind the thinning vestiges of her body, whose affect
pierces him: "The faithful old heart felt a sudden thrust; and Tom thought how often he had
noticed, within six months, that Eva's little hands had grown thinner, and her skin more
transparent [....] even now that fervent cheek and little hand were burning with hectic fever"
(382-3). As the "glow of evening" illuminates the "flushed cheek" which burns "with hectic
fever," the body's interior comes to light as divine radiance, an interior fully visible only through
the disintegration of that body.
The expiatory death of Eva accordingly involves no surface symptoms of decay; it
clarifies and reduces rather than foregrounds the body, rendering it luminous as the rapidly
dissolving container of spirit. The portrait of Eva in the chapter subsequent to "Henrique" thus
shifts the underlying formation of Eva's transparent beauty from that of lustrous vitality to
lustrous disease. She retains the "golden hair" and "glowing cheeks" reminiscent of her ride with
Henrique, but she now wears her signature "white dress," and her eyes gleam "unnaturally bright
with the slow fever that burned in her veins" (401). The glow kindled by fever serves to heighten
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Eva's beauty even as it dissolves that beauty's physical source—a kind of non-corporeal bloodletting that hallows the body it destroys.
Eva's aesthetic crucifixion derives its primary symbolic force through the contrast of
color, the flush of the body's internal physiology with the whiteness of pallid flesh, a whiteness
that coextends with and collapses into the white light of the soul's radiance. The narrator
describes Eva lying on her deathbed awaiting the arrival of the plantation slaves, "her crimson
cheeks contrasting painfully with the intense whiteness of her complexion, and the thin contour
of her limbs and features, and her large, soul-like eyes fixed earnestly on everyone" (417-8).
What chiefly remains of Eva, her metonymic eyes, and her augmenting redness and whiteness,
highlight the climax of the racially white body's disintegration into the spiritual whiteness of the
soul, the last vestige of physicality comprising the fever that only white skin can show. Eva's
practice of clothing herself in white moves here from figurative to literal, just as, in the hymn she
shares with Uncle Tom, the "bright spirits" are figuratively "robed in spotless white" but literally
pure spirit (382). Eva's white skin serves as the middle term in a volatile emblematic progression
from white clothing to white spirit, as, within Stowe's sentimental aesthetic, figurative and literal,
material and spiritual, cross-signify and interpenetrate. The "beautiful world" (418)
characterized by bright spirits robed in white filters seamlessly backward into the biological
processes of death, extending to the very garment worn by the angelic body. Thus beauty and
whiteness, clothing, the flesh, and the spirit, all mutually implicate and reinforce one another,
coalescing into a racially specific theological aesthetic contingent on the concept of a spiritual
body.
Even as she sacralized the white female body in particular, Stowe set out in Uncle Tom’s
Cabin to affirm an equality of souls across racial lines, the potential for every converted soul to
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"become an angel" in the afterlife (415). Only a minority of mid-century white Americans
actually argued against the existence of any soul inhabiting the black body82; this position, after
all, nullified the extensive foreign mission projects funded by churches across the nation and
undermined the pro-slavery contention of divinely-ordained white paternalism.83 Nevertheless,
the viability of the African's soul as competitive candidate for "the beautiful world" warranted
emphasis because, in the mind of midcentury white Americans, the black body worked as
counterevidence against its spiritual interior, obscuring rather than advertising the soul's
existence. A body conceived as opaque, unattractive, and blighted, obtruded upon the Protestant
sentimental aesthetic, with its investment in the natural revelation of divine beauty. As Stowe
and other well-intentioned whites defended the spiritual dignity of the black person, they
accordingly felt compelled to oppose it to a given physical degradation—the African conceived
as "God's Image, though cut in ebony" (qtd. in Figures 8-9).
By the time Stowe composed Uncle Tom's Cabin in 1852, a systematic body of discourse
had grown up around the concept of essential racial difference (Tawil 9) and taken hold at a
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popular level as common sense assumptions. In terms of racial aesthetics, pseudo-scientific
analysis combined with longstanding cultural associations of the color white with purity and
transcendence to enthrone the Euro-American profile as both prototypical and climactic in terms
of human evolution.
In Stowe's 1855 First Geography for Children, for instance, she lays out for the benefit of
the young a strictly aesthetic and purportedly objective assessment of racial phenotypes.
Coupled with an illustration depicting the busts of five racial types, Stowe's description aligns
the concept of racial others with bodies that interpose their differences between the (white)
viewer and the ideal attractiveness of the Anglo-Saxon.84 In a prefatory remark, Stowe states
that "The middle and best-looking is one of the European race," adding, "As we belong to that
race, I need not describe it" (174). All of the deviations from this model prove implicitly
unfortunate, as when Stowe appends that "there are some" of the Indian and African races that
"look as well as the European race excepting their dark skins" (175). Self-evidently the archetype
of human beauty, the Anglo-Saxon requires no physical description at all; only the "specimen"
(174) of the racial other necessitates a foregrounding of every bodily characteristic, each an
obstacle to the perception of a naturalized symmetry: if only the foreign races could shed their
deviant features, Stowe implies, they too could body forth the quintessential human phenotype.
While slaveholding in the 1850s was confined to the South, the racialized hierarchy
Stowe delineates in First Geography took hold of the whole nation, with ideology and aesthetics
fusing at a subconscious level. Because abolitionists and anti-abolitionists operated under a
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shared set of aesthetic and physiological assumptions about racial blackness, those like Stowe
"who attacked slavery in fiction portrayed the races in precisely the same terms as those who
defended it" (qtd. in Carby 33). Richard Yarborough speaks for many critics when he concludes
that Stowe's "commitment to challenging claims of black inferiority was frequently undermined
by her own endorsement of racial stereotypes" (25).85 I have suggested, however, that in
attacking slavery Stowe did not intend to challenge black inferiority per se; rather she undertook
to shock a mainstream audience into adopting a radical new ethics based on what they already
believed,86 that within a fundamentally inferior body resided an immortal soul—and further, that
this soul’s very impoverished embodiment facilitated its unique susceptibility to spiritual grace.
Stowe’s effort to transvalue racial blackness, however, stranded the black female body
between two versions of conversion aesthetics, as it could neither mediate divine light nor
undergo a sacralizing expiatory suffering. Within the world of Uncle Tom's Cabin, Stowe
disabuses the African girl Topsy of the notion that her blackness poses an obstacle to her own
conversion; the separability of black body and soul ensure Topsy’s viability as a candidate for
angelhood in the afterlife. This body-soul schism, intended as redemptive, nonetheless serves to
degrade the black female body and assert its incapacity to function as agent of sentimental
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conversion, foreclosing the possibility of a fictional representation of angelic womanhood in the
person of a girl of African descent.
Stowe introduces Topsy in blatantly grotesque terms in order to demonstrate the absolute
incommensurability between Topsy's aesthetic deficiencies and her potentially "angelic" soul:
(black) body and (white) soul do not match up. Paradoxically, then, Stowe amps up her racial
stereotypes in order to humanize Topsy—or better, immortalize her— by insisting on her
capacity for salvation, "goblin-like" (351) visage notwithstanding. Via Topsy, Stowe will
illustrate that, in the case of the black body, appearance does not serve as an indicator of
supernatural capacity.
In the chapter titled "Topsy," the titular heroine makes her appearance as "one of the
blackest of her race," not only in terms of her skin but her unreadable subjectivity. Her reflective
eyes, "glittering as glass beads" deflect access to the soul, and "an expression of the most doleful
gravity and solemnity" was "oddly drawn, like a kind of veil," over her face (351). In these
introductory passages, narrator and characters join forces to represent Topsy’s subjectivity as
latent but so incomprehensible and hidden—"'so heathenish'"— it devolves into objecthood
(352). Ophelia, astonished by the spectacle that is Topsy, exclaims, "Augustine, what in the
world have you brought that thing here for?" When St. Clare calls for a dance from Topsy with a
whistle as for "a dog," the narrator reports that "The black, glassy eyes glittered [...] and the thing
struck up [...] an odd negro melody" (352). Just as the narrator reiterates the deflective quality of
the glassy, glittering eyes, she reiterates the image of the veil as, when Topsy completes her
dance with an unearthly abruptness, "a most sanctimonious expression of meekness and
solemnity over her face, only broken by the cunning glances which she shot askance from the
corners of her eyes" (352). The face and eyes which ought to mediate the body's interior instead
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so effectively block it as to almost collapse the evidence of its existence. Expression conceals
rather than reveals, and the eyes prove cornered objects which the light of the interior must
escape around rather than through.
The "blackness" of Topsy's body and affect thus represent a positive obstacle to the
apprehension of a recognizably human subject within. Those glimpses of human subjectivity—
Topsy's "cunning" (351-2) and "drollery" (352)—serve to further materialize her, for, as it turns
out, her plans consist of an apparently purposeless pilfering of objects.87 In the first two pages of
her titular chapter, Stowe characterizes Topsy's appearance and activity as "odd" no fewer than
five times (351-2), for Topsy embodies deviation—or, to use a more resonant term, depravity.
Her blackness throws her off the interpretive grid of intersubjectivity, thus damning her to an
existence outside the sphere of human community, the transparent communion among saints as
delineated by sentimental authors like Judd and Cummins. But rather than disputing the black
body as thus stamped with abjection, Stowe suggests that its visible lowliness corresponds with a
salvific interior lowliness, a self-abasing receptivity to divine beauty as embodied by the organic
angel.
Ezra Tawil has observed that "the nineteenth-century discourse of race was never a
simple matter of the body's complexion or morphology"; rather, race denoted "a kind of
psychological and emotional interior" (11). This interior, Tawil amply demonstrates, revolves
around the concept of "impressibility" (167) to "superior" natures, the liability to be strongly and
spontaneously influenced by the white race. Stowe will deploy this purported innate racial trait
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to repeal the metaphysical implications of Topsy's body, with its stamp of depravity, as
impermeable to the divine touch. Topsy will, therefore, be saved, both in spite of her black body,
which visually typifies damnation, and because of her "blackness," which ensures her utter moral
abjection and attendant susceptibility to, in this case, Eva's mediation of spiritual grace.
Inasmuch as Eva stands as Stowe's conception of the ultimate racial product, "born of
ages of cultivation, command, education, physical and moral eminence" (361-2), she represents
the human person refined to the point of divinity, a racial essence so purified it approaches
autonomy from the body. Topsy stands as racial and spiritual counterpart: "born of ages of
oppression, submission, ignorance, toil, and vice" (362), she has accumulated the dregs of
mortality. But this very relation between "the representatives of the two extremes of society"
(361) Stowe intends to prove redemptive, as Topsy's very abjection creates her vulnerability to
spiritual impress.
The failure of a mass conversion on the part of African slaves, Stowe takes care to show
in the Key, lies with the failure of the white race to embody the Gospel. Should they do so, she
suggests, the conversion of the black race would unfold irresistibly, as a result of their
tremendous imitative capacity and instinctive response to the beautiful. The "white race," Stowe
insists, should "regard their superiority over the coloured one only as a talent intrusted for the
advantage of their weaker brother" (56). Instead, Christian society has produced Topsy, "the
representative of a large class of the children who are growing up under slavery [...] feeling the
black skin on them, like the mark of Cain, to be a sign of reprobation and infamy, and urged on
by a kind of secret desperation to make their 'calling and election' in sin 'sure'" (91). In this
remarkable passage, although she fails to conceive of an alternate fully-humanizing paradigm,
Stowe imagines what it would feel like for one's skin to be separable and entrapping, an external
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obstruction that blocks access to eternal life. Unable to escape the implications of the black body,
this "class of children" turns to the best alternative—reconciling body and soul by aggressively
"blackening" the soul—a familiar situation within Calvinism, when a potential convert might
despair of his or her "election" and so plunge whole-heartedly into "sin."
Topsy's misconception that her soul can never escape her skin, and, conversely, that the
light of whiteness can never penetrate her skin and reach her soul, comprises the only stumbling
block between her and conversion; once the sympathetic divinity of the organic angel penetrates
her with its illuminating touch, her resistance to conversion collapses instantly and utterly. To
Eva's initial appeals to Topsy to be good, the latter replies, "Couldn't never be nothin' but a
nigger, if I was ever so good [...] If I could be skinned, and come white, I'd try then" (409). When
Eva insists that "people can love you, if you are black Topsy [...] Miss Ophelia would love you,
if you were good" (409), Topsy responds with incredulity. In Topsy’s mind, as Stowe creates it,
blackness as the sign of a natural and permanent state of damnation can no more be thwarted
than Calvinism's congenital sinner predestined for hell can overthrow the dictates of God.
But Topsy has failed to grasp, according to Stowe, the coincidence of the abject body with an
abject soul whose very gift consists of its lowliness, its predisposition to receive grace. Only
when she has experienced her own susceptibility to this grace does Topsy begin to countenance
the notion that she "can go to Heaven at last, and be an angel forever, just as much as if [she]
were white" (410). When Eva extends her divine touch through "her little thin, white hand,"
Topsy's deflective glassy and glittering eyes dissolve with "large, bright drops," that signal a "ray
of real belief, a ray of heavenly love, had penetrated the darkness of her heathen soul" (410).
At this moment Stowe sets up a powerful visual tableau that would resonate across the
nation and participate in a proliferation of iconic mementos canonizing Uncle Tom’s Cabin’s
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racialized conversion aesthetics.88 As Topsy sobs, abased on the ground with her "head down
between her knees," Stowe frames above her Eva, "the beautiful child," who "bending over her,
looked like the picture of some bright angel stooping to reclaim a sinner" (410). In "Arguing
with Pictures," Ellen J. Goldner suggests that Stowe, who stated her intention "to paint pictures"
in Uncle Tom’s Cabin because "[t]here is no arguing with pictures," crafted this scene "to display
as a simple and immediately accessible truth the allegory of Christian redemption" (71).
For Goldner, the aesthetic force of the image, with its "stark contrast of black and white" (73)
counters Eva’s verbal message to Topsy that she "can go to Heaven at last and be an angel
forever, just as much as if [she] were white" (410). Goldner rightly points out that Stowe’s wordpicture "is infused with metaphors of darkness and light that call to mind a Calvinist narrative
redemption, based not in equality but in opposition and exclusion" (71). I would suggest,
however, that for Stowe this allegorical background and Eva’s assertion of an egalitarian afterlife
serve a complementary purpose in highlighting the organic angel’s role as a figure of irresistible
grace who rescues the immortal soul from its blackened "body of death."89 White middle-class

88

Goldner describes how the novel "stimulated a consumer fad that took up its characters in plays, popular songs,

lithographs, children’s books, and various sentimental items for the middle-class home," "Arguing with Pictures," p.
72. Goldner further notes that "the image of ‘the beautiful child’"—Eva—"was one of the most often reproduced
icons," p. 76. In her essay "Stowe and Religious Iconography," Carla Rineer includes a photograph of a painted
portrait of Eva and Topsy hung in one of Stowe’s guest rooms, which molds the angelic body and benignant face of
Eva in a condescending posture over the supplicating face and ebony-black body of Topsy. See p. 197.
89

Rom.7.24, King James Version.

233

consumption of this racialized iconography90 generated a sense of ownership over the conversion
process, a sense that black bodies could be managed by white angels.
The irresistible appeal of Eva as loving white female indeed precipitates Topsy's
conversion, and Ophelia notably undergoes her transformation for this role91 through the
transference of her attention from (black) body to (white) soul. Topsy's body on its own resisted
a recognition of immortality, but Ophelia "viewed her now through the softened medium that
Eva's hand had first held before her eyes, and saw in her only an immortal creature" (443).
Through faith, the "softened" or transparent medium, Ophelia achieves a kind of x-ray vision;
she sees "in" her only "an immortal creature," the receptive soul. And after Topsy receives the
first "ray of heavenly love," the narrator likewise desists from any further racially specific
characterization. In fact, aside from Marie St. Claire's boorish pronouncement that "she's just so
ugly, and always will be" no further physical description of Topsy takes place in the text, as
Stowe chooses to further characterize her only through "the softened medium," her journey from
faith into female sainthood.
Topsy, the narrator suggests, does become a saint, in time—or so she implies by
remarking that "Topsy did not become at once a saint" (443). We learn that Topsy "grew in grace
and favor"; that, "at the age of womanhood, she was, by her own request, baptized [...] and
showed so much intelligence, activity and zeal, and desire to do good in the world, that she was
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at last recommended, and approved as a missionary to one of the stations in Africa" (612).92 In
effect, Topsy would seem to have achieved the status of the organic angel, the end of a process
triggered precisely in the same way as, for instance, Cummins’ Gertrude, and through almost the
exact same conversation—that even "ugly" children can undergo conversion and become "good"
and, therefore, lovable. But where the bulk of Cummins' novel then preoccupies itself with the
physical manifestation of female sainthood, Topsy's physicality, so emphatically foregrounded in
the beginning, disappears completely from view. Even the news of her saintliness arrives
secondhand, when the narrator relays, "we have heard that the same activity and ingenuity
which, when a child, made her so multiform and restless in her developments, is now employed,
in a safer and more wholesome manner, in teaching the children of her own country" (612). We
learn what has become of Topsy's former "activity and ingenuity," but not, as in the case of
Gertrude, what has become of her body.
Molly Farrell writes that Stowe "cannot imagine [Topsy] as being anything other than a
subject trapped in the process of becoming" (265), and I would argue that this entrapment lies
with the non-convergence of the black body and the white soul. The process of convergence
between moral and physical attractiveness that completes the conversion journey of the organic
angel remains stymied in the case of Topsy. Stowe accordingly delimits her converting agency to
the instruction of children, of her own race, and in her "own country" (612). By assigning Topsy
a ministry to children and in Africa, Stowe forgoes any threatening association of the youthful
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black female body with illicit sexuality.93 Absent the organic angel’s capacity to yoke spiritual
charisma with physical charm, Topsy’s combined spiritual and sexual maturation proves
unrepresentable. 94
Topsy's racial abjection preconditions her to yield to the influence of the organic angel,
but her own body can provide no aesthetic aid to conversion. By contrast, in the figure of Uncle
Tom, Stowe advertises the black body itself as instrumental in initiating conversion. Stowe's
effort to rewrite the narrative of African enslavement as eschatologically triumphal prompted her
to create a redemptive role specific to the black male body as the ideal substrate for public
sacrificial punishment. The symbolic power of this role derived from its association with
orthodox representations of the crucifixion as a reconciling of human and divine natures through
gruesome bodily suffering, rather than attractive coalescence.
Because midcentury liberal Christians had reconceived conversion as a peaceful
integration of compatible natures, they tended to find graphic representations of Christ’s
crucifixion repugnant. Judd, for instance, would have his natural-born saint Margaret dream
explicitly of a Christ who "doesn't hang on the cross as he does in the Primer" (167). In his
efforts to assert the continuity between human and divine life, Judd would contrast the orthodox
notion of an "Atoning Sacrifice," marked by Christ's physical agonies at the crucifixion, with the
sentimental celebration of the "Atonement" as a benign "interdwelling" (171). Liberal
Christianity's emerging interest in the effeminate beauty and transparency of Christ as "the fairest
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among the sons of men" (169) thus both reflected and enabled the sacralization of the white
female body with its wholly interiorized sufferings.
In spite of Stowe's reverence for the organic angel, within Uncle Tom’s Cabin the iconic
savagery of the master and abjection of the slave threatens to overwhelm the kind of benign
conversion aesthetic dramatized through the life and death of Eva. In the 1850s, proliferating
images of the brutal, implacable slaveholder and his brutalized black slaves tested the conceptual
force of a bloodless atonement and the paradigm of conversion by sympathetic attraction. The
horrific conditions of slavery destabilized the liberal depreciation of human evil and readily
synced up with revivalist rhetoric warning of divine wrath and eternal punishment. The
American abolitionist movement indeed drew much of its momentum from the prodigious
revivals of the 1830s, which demanded instantaneous conversion from specific hell-binding
behaviors that, for many Americans, culminated in the problem of slavery as the national sin
(Davis 251-2).
Slavery had created the conditions for a highly visible body-on-body barbarism that
demanded an equally visible corporeal expiation of an appalling crime that tainted the whole
nation. Thirteen years after the publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, in his Second Inaugural
Address, Lincoln would make sense of the Civil War’s staggering white-on-white bloodshed as
the expatiation for "every drop of blood drawn with the lash" (qtd. in Arnold 46)—but in 1852
Stowe hoped that the "blood drawn with the lash" could itself provide the expiation. Within this
paradigm, in imitation of Christ, the black man’s crucifixion would secure forgiveness for the
white man’s sin of crucifying him.95 Even as she petitioned for the end of black slavery, Stowe
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thus hallowed the savage dynamics of the peculiar institution as the school of suffering by which
the black race uniquely contributed to a preordained salvation plan.
A body magnified first by its blackness and second by its physical chastisement under
slavery provided Stowe with an ideal aesthetic base for a conversion iconography rooted in the
legacy of the crucifixion. At the same time, however, this inversion of the organic angel trope
reintroduced the problem of sexuality as an impediment to the use of bodily aesthetics for
spiritual ends. The black female body proved the most resistant to a disarticulation of flesh from
lust, for exposure and punishment raised the specter of rape and thereby overtly sexualized the
body’s abjection.96 Rape’s penetration of the body’s interior furthermore fatally softened the
distinction between black body and "white" soul so crucial to racialized sentimental
iconography.97
Stowe’s anxieties about the sexualized slave body ramified differently onto black
females, whose eroticism she completely discounted, and mulattas, whose eroticism she
highlighted as deadly for slave and slaveholder alike. Stowe had a great horror of the propensity
of the attractive slave body to facilitate mutual damnation between rapist and victim; in the
context of slavery, erotic endowments could facilitate only an obsessive recurrence to the sexual
body, the violation of which, as Stowe depicts it, leads to atheism. In speaking of master-slave
relations in the Key, Stowe repines, "woman, with her tenderness, her gentleness, her beauty—
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woman, to whom mixed blood of the black and the white have given graces perilous to the
slave—what is her accursed lot in this dreadful commerce?" (280). Precisely the "graces"
attributable to the female saint, "her tenderness, her gentleness, and her beauty," produce the
kind of sexual exploitation and mutual spiritual hardening that Stowe pictures between Legree
and Cassy. Unable to transcend or redirect the white male gaze, the only redemptive move for
the mulatta, the novel suggests, lies with escape. Stowe could thus not risk foregrounding a
feminine black body because the combination of abjection and female sexuality could not
produce a triumphal icon of blackness. Whether construed as wholly black or as mulatta, the
black female could not redirect attention from body to soul; nor could her corporeality be
visually exploited without introducing sexual overtones.
Only a black man would be able to bear the full brunt of Stowe's transvaluation of
blackness, which rewrote bodily abjection as a figuration of Christological grace. Because the
black housing of the white soul could not make visible its interior physiology to create an
aesthetically pleasing, symbolic form of compensatory bloodshed, it needed humiliating
exposure and laceration to reveal its spiritually efficacious interior. For Stowe, laceration of the
black body signified the peculiar gift of blackness—salvation not in spite of but because of
relentless abject embodiment. She would accordingly apostrophize with the approach of Tom's
death, "this, oh Africa! latest called of nations,—called to the crown of thorns, the scourge, the
bloody sweat, the cross of agony,—this is to be thy victory; by this shalt thou reign with Christ
when his kingdom shall come on earth" (562, author's emphasis). Although throughout the novel
Stowe deplores the emotional tortures inflicted by slavery, with its destruction of affective and
familial ties, here she cites only mechanical devices of torture, those designed to rend the body
and accrue to the surface its interior substance.
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The sentimental aesthetic of suffering required that body approach spirit through the
dissolution of its corporeality; the black transvaluation of this aesthetic demanded the
magnification and rupture of the body. These apparently inverse aesthetics both depended on a
feminized subjectivity, suggesting how deeply entrenched the association between femininity
and divinity had become in antebellum Protestant culture. The ineffaceable sexual embodiment
of the violated black woman had doubly debarred her from epitomizing this association; she
could neither usher in the kingdom of heaven on earth through bodily evanescence nor through
bodily excrescence as "bleeding Africa" (qtd. in Hedrick 215). But if Stowe could not deploy the
icon of the tortured black woman in her transvaluation of blackness, she would nevertheless
invest her male icon with the feminized subjectivity that, by midcentury in America, had become
a stand-in for the truly Christian disposition. Indeed, Hazel Carby would label Uncle Tom as the
one instance of black "true womanhood" in the novel (34), an unsurprising paradox in light of
the era's insistence on a harmless, passive Christ as the centerpiece of a peaceful mediation
between nature and divinity.
Uncle Tom and Eva share the feminine subjectivity that, in liberal sentimentalism,
marked the Christian saint: deeply feeling, visionary, and self-abnegating. This subjectivity
stood, on the one hand, in opposition to the masculine, and on the other hand, in opposition to
whiteness98; the white masculine accordingly emerges in the novel as the indifferent, skeptical,
and self-aggrandizing opponent of the Christian ethic. Privileged in every way, the white male
could boast no form of abjection or vulnerability that would link him with the Christian reversal,
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"weakness" as "strength." Only vicariously could he achieve entrance into a faith naturally
accessible to those endowed with feminized subjectivities. Both racially and sexually dominant,
his very privileges rendered him the least liable to 'enter the kingdom of heaven.'99 The
intersection of whiteness and manhood yields an excess of preeminence that overcomes the
spiritual associations of whiteness with the skepticism, materialism, and hard-heartedness
connected with a mercantile masculinity.
Uncle Tom, by contrast, has a male body evacuated of masculine subjectivity, and this
gap between the powerful body and the vulnerable subject creates a heightened abjection whose
appeal complements the aesthetic appeal of Eva. Like Eva, Tom offers his body for
consumption on behalf of the guilty white male, but as chattel property rather than object of
aesthetic enjoyment. Even before his climactic hour of martyrdom, Uncle Tom can stir his
master St. Clare into spiritual reflection by virtue of the debasing contrast between his looming,
ineffaceable corporeality and simple, self-effacing selfhood.
Stowe introduces Uncle Tom as the quintessential African male in terms of his physique
in order to naturalize his meekness of character as the essential black masculine personality once
put in touch with the Gospel.100 Tom has an impressive male physique, but one which has no

99

St. Clare, for instance, converts to Christianity only after the combined intercession of three saints—his mother,

Eva, and Uncle Tom—and even then, only at the moment of his death; Simon Legree never converts at all. As Curtis
Evans points out, "there is no compelling answer to these accounts [of white male unbelief in the novel] unless one
takes race and gender into account," p. 506.
100

The aggression of characters like Sambo and Quimbo, Simon Legree’s cruel black overseers—and in Stowe’s

later novel, the titular rebel Dred—thus represent unnatural contortions of the black masculine created by white
failure to model the Gospel. Peter Stonely argues that Stowe pairs the "black as humble beast of burden (Tom)"
with "the black as ruthless predatory animal (Sambo/Quimbo)," adding that she thereby "submits to a Gothicized

241

impact on his sensibilities; he has 'a lot' of body, but, stamped by the abjection of blackness, his
body affords him no consciousness of male privilege. Rather, the sheer stature of his male body
intensifies the absence of its relation to Tom's feminine consciousness: "He was a large, broadchested, powerfully-made man, of a full glossy black, and a face whose truly African features
were characterized by an expression of grave and steady good sense, united with much
kindliness and benevolence" (68). Here Stowe carefully aligns what at first appears to be a
volatile description of black virility with a stabilizing set of benignant virtues, discretely
foreclosing intimations of a masculine subject within the male body. Tom’s "truly African
features" conceal no conflicted will; rather, they conform to a simple predisposition to serve. In
the instance where Tom rescues Eva from drowning, the narrator reiterates his physical prowess
as "broad-chested" and "strong-armed" (233), but Tom will never wield his body in any act of
resistance or aggression. Rather, he perpetually places it in postures of submission—lowering it
to demonstrate humility, shoulder burdens, or receive punishments.
Stowe invests this feminized deployment of the black male body with an erotic capacity
to initiate conversion complementary to Eva's, the latter through the coalescence of body and
spirit, and the former through their divergence. In a crucial scene following Eva's death, Stowe
illustrates how the meekness of the black male can inspire a salvific affection in the white male
breast, paving the way for his redemption from the crimes of slavery. In this instance, Tom,
anxious on behalf of St. Clare's well-being, approaches him with an "honest face, so full of grief,
and with such an imploring expression of affection and sympathy," it "struck his master" (435).
racism that equates blackness with male, appetitive sexuality and, more generally, with evil," p. 61. Notably,
however, both Sambo and Quimbo collapse into tearful penitents at Tom’s martyrdom; this suggests to me that their
prior stereotypical behavior signifies a malformation of their "true" personalities which surface instantaneously at
their conversion.
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Tom's "honest face" suggests an uncomplicated subjective transparency, revealing rather than
concealing his motives of "affection and sympathy." His expression confirms that he lacks a
masculine drive to rectify the power relations between St. Clare and himself. Instead, his whole
agency centers on a sacrificial enterprise, guided by a feminized benevolent passion that allows
for the propitiative substitution of his body for St. Clare’s sins. St. Clare accordingly responds to
Tom's affectionate solicitude by placing the weight of his own guilt on Tom's body: "He laid his
hand on Tom's, and bowed down his forehead on it" (435). Tom’s abased body provides the
corrective to St. Clare’s exalted intellect, which has blocked his path to sympathy and faith. 101
As a converse of the organic angel’s aesthetic eroticism, the gap between Tom's imposing
male body and his self-abasing sensibilities serves to redirect desire toward faith.102 In the death
of Eva, St. Clare fears he has lost the one mediator between his natural unbelief and the divine
gift of faith: "Was all that beautiful love and faith only one of the ever-shifting phases of human
feeling [...] And is there no more Eva,—no heaven,—no Christ,—nothing?" (436). Tom cannot,
like Eva, mediate Christ through beauty, so he evokes faith in St. Clare by further abjecting his
body as he attests to his own direct experience of the divine. Tom falls to his knees and speaks
"with fast-running tears and choking voice," and St. Clare "leaned his head on his shoulder, and
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wrung the hard, faithful, black hand" (436). The role of Tom's maleness here concerns its
evacuation of any masculine self-interest or dominance; literally on his knees and holding up St.
Clare's head, Tom makes the absolute offer of his body for St. Clare's salvation, saying, "I's
willin' to lay down my life, this blessed day, to see Mas'r a Christian" (436). St. Clare's
response—"Poor, foolish boy!"—underlines the source of Tom's affective power: the
incongruous abasement of his large male body evokes an eroticized pity and an
uncomprehending awe. But even in this climactic moment of his living witness, Tom only
succeeds in bringing St. Clare "nearer Eva" (438).
Tom does successfully initiate three conversions at his final destination, the hellish
plantation of Simon Legree—those of Legree's mulatto mistress Cassy and his two brutal black
overseers, Sambo and Quimbo. But these conversions, because triggered at the very heart of
slavery's barbarity, require more than mere self-abasement and emotional appeals: they demand
absolute physical prostration and a relentless shedding of blood on the part of the black saint.103
Tom's death, indeed, occurs as a protracted and bloody process, unfolding as gradually as Eva's
wasting disease. Beginning on page 507 with a "shower of blows" and the first of blood trickling
down his face, his martyrdom resists conclusion until page 591.
The figure of Simon Legree, the paradigmatic brutal overseer and Tom's murderer, stands
at the edge of liberal Protestant aesthetics of conversion. Neither the prayers of his angelic
mother nor his saintly slave's abjection create a resonance of desire in his heart. His natural
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inclinations pit him against the spiritualization of both beauty and pity, so that he typifies the
long-vilified figuration of human nature as instinctively hostile to the divine and deserving of
eternal punishment. The key to the sentimental aesthetic—the spiritualization of desire—
aggravates rather than alleviates Legree's fear and hatred.
"Cradled with prayers and pious hymns" (528) from birth, Legree, the narrative suggests,
merits his damnation because he rejects, once for all, the overtures of sentimental conversion in
the form of his saintly mother. Legree’s mother personifies the ideology of the 19th century cult
of motherhood, which, in its hallowing of the influential maternal body, participates in the
celebration of feminine affect central to the organic angel trope.104 A "fair-haired" and "gentle"
woman, who led Legree "to worship and to pray" and "trained her only son, with long,
unwearied love, and patient prayers," Legree's mother obtains to what should be the apex of
nurturing influence. Legree, however, upon reaching maturity spurns this maternal mediation,
and the narrator traces his successful resistance to the "hard-tempered sire" upon whom his
mother "had wasted a world of unvalued love" (528)—thereby linking the failures of erotic and
maternal affect. Although Legree’s mother kneels at her profligate son's feet105 "in the last
agony of her despair" and, on her death bed blesses and forgives him in his absence, her spiritual
influence proves insufficient. On the day marked as Legree's "day of grace," heaven presents its
most persuasive appeal to his sympathies: "good angels called him" and "mercy held him by the
104
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hand." Legree, the narrator reports, "was almost persuaded," but in the ensuing struggle towards
conversion "sin got the victory," hardening his heart to the point that he later throws his
supplicating mother "senseless to the floor" (528-9).
From the moment when Legree resists the divine at its most proximate and appealing
(good angels and angelic mother), the forces of liberal aesthetic conversion undergo a reversal of
effect: "That pale, loving mother,—her dying prayers, her forgiving love" now "wrought in that
demoniac heart of sin only as a damning sentence, bringing with it a fearful looking for of
judgment and fiery indignation" (529). Her influence safely eroticized following her death,
Legree’s mother reappears as the ghost of a vengeful lover, her love-token of "long, curling hair"
twining sensually in his fingers. The aesthetic object most calculated to seduce him back
towards the divine, this blond lock triggers not the salvific recollection of his mother’s
desirability but terror-stricken recoil. "Often," the narrator reports, "he had seen that pale mother
rising by his bedside, and felt the soft twining of that hair around his fingers, till the cold sweat
would roll down his face, and he would spring from his bed in horror" (529). By the time he
encounters a parallel sacral-sensual token in the "long, shining curl of fair hair" which Eva
bestowed on Tom, Legree can only scream "Damnation!" (527) in response.
Legree cannot be saved because, within the paradigm of antebellum liberal Christianity,
salvation occurs through the natural human craving after divine beauty. The terror of divine
wrath that within the model of orthodox Christianity characterized the natural human response to
holiness, in Legree signals an unforgivable capacity to resist the aesthetic and moral appeal of
feminine grace. Having followed in the steps of the "hard-tempered sire," Legree is left to the
judgment of a vengeful masculine divinity; the transparence of the fair, pale saintly woman now
mediates only foretastes of eternal fire (259).
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The resistibility of Legree's divine mother, with the combined aesthetic and moral appeal
of her sacrificial body, anticipates the resistibility of Uncle Tom's feminized self-abasement. Just
as Tom offers up his body to be consumed on behalf of St. Clare's salvation, so he proffers the
extraction of all his blood for Legree's, saying, "Mas'r, if you was sick, or in trouble, or dying,
and I could save ye, I'd give ye my heart's blood; and, if taking every drop of blood in this poor
old body would save your precious soul, I'd give 'em freely" (582-3). Legree indulges Tom's
offering, shouting, "I'll take every drop of blood he has!" (584), but the visible dispersion of
Tom's "heart's blood" can no more convert him than his mother's interiorized agony and
bloodless atoning death.
Stowe's dramatization in Legree of the theological tenet of unregeneracy, which had
provoked considerable anguish in her own life,106 signals the limit of her emotional identification
with slaveholders and, as a corollary, the limit of her belief in their susceptibility to conversion.
"There are those," she would remark in the Key, "who yet retain the delusion that, somehow or
other [...] by a soft, genteel, rather apologetic style of operation, Leviathan is to be converted,
baptised, and Christianised" (440). Her exasperation with the "paralysis of public sentiment"
(274) on the issue of slavery would prompt her to quote Othello, saying, "Never pray more.
Abandon all remorse [...] For nothing canst thou to damnation add / Greater than this" (qtd. in
248). The existence and perpetuation of slavery in the United States in the era of the cult of
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feeling compelled Stowe to create the character of Legree as an embodiment of the kind of
callousness in the face of the "magic of the real presence of distress" (UTC 156) that left her
incredulous. In the Key she would record the pathetic letter of a slave woman pleading to a
church elder that her daughter not be traded South; the woman implored that the owner imagine
his own daughter in the same position, ejaculating, "Oh, then you would FEEL!" (236). Stowe
followed the letter with the cryptic pronouncement, "The girl, however, was sent off to the
Southern market" (236).
The limits of sympathy in initiating either the conversion of the individual heart or social
change in the context of slavery prompted the kind of jeremiadical denouncements that punctuate
both the novel and its key, on the "heaping up of wrath against the day of wrath" (Key 495).
Although by isolating out the character of Legree as an object of damnation Stowe would to
some extent attempt to create a scapegoat for the worst crimes of slavery, her need to admit of
Legree as a product of both regional and national negligence left the borders of that damnation
unstable. In a chapter in the Key devoted to justifying her characterization of Legree, Stowe
would exclaim that "the men who make and uphold [those] laws" that protect the infinite power
of the master "think they are guiltless before God, because, individually, they do not perpetuate
the wrongs which they allow others to perpetrate!" (69). In this sense, Legree’s resilient hardheartedness served as a frightening metonymy for a "public sentiment […] utterly blasted and
paralyzed" (255). The emotional sensibility at the heart of the sentimental model of conversion
thus demanded the return of its own repressed, Calvinism's "theological terror" (Hedrick 215) as
the only remaining spiritual feeling that the damned could feel.
The unstable borders of national guilt brought on by a paralysis of sentiment called for an
immanent and decisive settling of accounts that would finally distinguish the feeling from the
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unfeeling, the elect from the damned. In Uncle Tom's Cabin, as Richard Yarborough has argued,
Stowe "tapped both a religious and a secular millennial ideology that would view the Civil War
as divine retribution" (57). Although in 1852 Stowe still aspired to help stave off the doomsday
ramifications of national indifference, the failure of the sentimental aesthetic to convert the
slaveholder forecasted the need for a violent disruption of America’s narrative of progressive
salvation. Decisive resolution of evil by divine judgment, as the dark subtext of Uncle Tom’s
Cabin, nevertheless depended on a fundamentally hopeful premise—that such a deus ex machina
could cleanse the nation of the repercussions of centuries of racial oppression. Seven years after
the publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, the freeborn black woman Harriet Wilson would produce
an obscure text that dismantled the millennial narrative and its radical confidence in the
possibility of systemic change—whether in this life or the life to come.
In the white-authored 1856 fictitious slave narrative, Autobiography of a Female Slave by
Mattie Griffith, Christian mulatta heroine Ann attempts to persuade her fully-black counterpart
Amy to "Trust in God" (208). Amy, however, obdurately resists Ann's claim that black and
white people are equal before God and anticipates the implications of her own soullessness,
saying, "when I dies, I'll jist lay down and rot like de worms, and dere wont be no white folks to
'buse me" (508). Ann protests that no abuse will transpire in heaven; rather, "God and His angels
will love you, if you will do well and try to get there" (209). But Ann's reasoning proves
unavailing; in the end she informs the reader that Amy's "ignorance could not see the difference
between the body and the soul" (210).
The writing of anti-slavery activists, including Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin, predicated the
inherent value of the black person on "the difference between the body and the soul."
Predestined to temporal abjection on earth, black persons could nevertheless transcend the
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damning corporeality of their bodies by obtaining to the angelic status of white souls in heaven.
As Anne would remark on a full-blooded black woman of "tawny complexion": "Her soul was as
precious to [God], as though her complexion had been of the most spotless snow" (307). Authors
like Griffith and Stowe sought to rewrite racial essentialism in terms of equal spiritual
opportunity; both races could achieve the same spiritual eminence but by racially specific means.
Either by demonstrating a recognizably white interiority that promises spiritual whitening in the
afterlife, or by a mortification of the body so absolute that it is "put to death" literally and
metaphorically, the soul within the black body could attain to white angelhood. In either case,
the negative essentialist associations of the black body remained intact, including its
metaphysical resonance with paganism and implicit damnation. Far from diminishing the
symbolic import of blackness, Stowe would in fact increase it by heralding the revelation of its
full significance at the Day of the Judgment when the curse of blackness would manifest as the
peculiar means to salvation by way of the cross.
In consequence of Stowe's efforts to rewrite racial essences within a hopeful teleology,
whiteness and blackness loom large in her novel, expanding beyond temporal boundaries into
millennial resolution. But because the vision of redemptive blackness depends on either looking
past the black body into white interiority or foregrounding the exploitation of the black male
body, it pushed the doubly-cursed black female body107 to the very margins of significance. For
this reason, as Cassandra Jackson contends, "to represent black women's physicality at all [...]
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was to risk supporting ideological projections of black women as 'only physical'" (157).108
Harriet Wilson, the first African American female author of a published novel in English (Gates,
Bondwoman xiii), would dramatize this symbolic entrapment in her 1859 autobiographical novel
Our Nig; or, Sketches from the Life of a Free Black, In a Two-Story White House, North.
Showing that Slavery's Shadows Fall Even There. by "Our Nig." The very circularity of the
novel's complete title, bookended by "Our Nig," suggests the suffocating contraction of narrative
boundaries, as Wilson presents black female experience policed by the interlocking oppression
of race and gender.
Our Nig creates a false hope of dramatic movement, the transcendence of spiritual,
physical, and psychological bondage. Critics have wrestled over the proper generic classification
of Our Nig (Piep 178), to the point that Debra Walker King concludes simply that "the finished
product defies categorization" (31). Among diverse genres, Our Nig at some level comprises a
"young black woman's bildungsroman" (Gardner 242), a fugitive slave narrative spinoff (Carby
43), and a fictionalized conversion narrative.109 But at the root of each generic borrowing lies its
failure of development and resolution in the context of Wilson's adaptation.110 The literary
tropes of maturation, conversion, and escape from slavery, naturally often paralleled in early
African American writing, in Our Nig instead stagnate the protagonist Frado at the center of an
"ever-diminishing world" (Lang 64). The forward and upward movement of traditional
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antebellum genres—spiritual enslavement to spiritual freedom, physical enslavement to physical
freedom, childhood weakness and vulnerability to influential womanhood—all collapse around
Frado. She retains her self-interested anger at injustice, circles continually back to her
oppressive host family, and grows progressively weaker and more dependent as she matures.
A key source of Uncle Tom's Cabin's power lay with its reinstatement of an apocalyptic
horizon that helped usher in the Civil War as a drastic purgation of the national sin of slavery.
But for the contracted horizons of Frado as a "free black," a civil war over slavery would alter
nothing. Frado, already free, has nothing and nowhere to escape to. Rather, her strength
decreases in proportion to her ostensible progress towards maturation and conversion, both of
which necessarily imply a possible alterity of condition.
The origin of Our Nig's failure to complete any generic evolution concerns Wilson's
startling refusal to countenance racial essentialism in any form: not a single racial generalization
occurs in the entire book. By rejecting racial essentialism, Wilson deflates any metaphysical
significance of the racial body. Blackness, in terms of both nature and the supernatural, "means"
nothing in Our Nig. By contrast, in terms of socially constructed conditions, it means
everything. This transplantation of significance from the metaphysical to the purely social and
material realm accounts for Our Nig as a profound literary anomaly for its time.
The movement of the midcentury sentimental conversion narrative or female
bildungsroman depended on a soteriological framework which involved essentialist racial
assumptions. As a result, in Our Nig, by rejecting racial essentialism Wilson unmoors her
narrative altogether from a linear trajectory. As Karsten Piep explains, "In opting for a simple,
episodic storyline that ends where it begins, Wilson deliberately breaks with the linear 'overplot'
of the typical 'women's novel' to foreground the 'horrors of [Frado's] condition'" (180). Wilson
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chooses to foreground the black female body, the very body subject to erasure in conventional
antebellum religious iconography by virtue of its hopeless ties to both blackness and sexuality.
Estranged from its own potentially whitened soul as well as from the saving heroics of
Christological sacrifice, the black female body within the dominant cultural ideology exists as
pure self-contained physicality, discontinuous with a transcendent spiritual realm. In Uncle
Tom’s Cabin Topsy’s redemption accordingly depends on her capacity to escape that body
through its textual erasure, but in Our Nig, Wilson refuses to essentialize Frado’s body and
therefore softens the distinction between (black) body and (white) soul that makes conversion
meaningful. The margins of the soul collapse into the limitations of the body, and Frado lives
out her experience as a temporal damnation of abuse and neglect, bound to the downward spiral
of her bodily fortunes.
Because Wilson refuses to outline a racialized path to transcendence, blackness and
whiteness in the novel break down from metaphysical categories into ideological and
socioeconomic creations. A number of critics have commented on Wilson’s use of ironic
inversions to combat racist stereotypes, and these inversions ultimately participate in a larger
project of dismantling racial essentialism altogether. Carol E. Henderson, for instance, contends
that "Wilson complicates the national identic paradigm associated with the privilege of whiteness
through an inversion of the theological and sociological constructs which name 'whiteness' and
'blackness'" (33). Gates similarly speaks to Our Nig’s "inversion of blackness and evil and good
and whiteness" (l), illustrated for example in the contrast between the cruel Bellmont daughter
Mary and good-hearted Frado. Taken in isolation, inversions of racial stereotypes suggest an
effort to work within the framework of racial essentialism—but moral attributes in the novel do
not distribute evenly along racial lines, making it impossible to trace a racial genealogy of
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character. Frado’s black father, for instance, cares devotedly for her mother, while Frado’s black
husband will abandon her and their child. As Barbara Krah argues, Wilson, "like the trickster,"
does not "merely substitute one hierarchy for another"; rather, she "deconstructs clear-cut
hierarchies altogether" (476).
This distinction is crucial to understanding Wilson's remarkable departure from racial
representations in her day. Even African American antebellum writers would frequently draw on
the moral and theological binarism between black and white, body and soul (Ernest 221), in
racially coded formations such as Frederick Douglass' complaint about "impunity" given "to any
one, (no matter how black his heart,) so he has a white skin" (374; qtd. in Ernest 221). Wilson
has Jim, Frado's black father, represent himself to her white mother within this logic, saying, "I's
black outside, I know, but I's got a white heart inside. Which you rather have, a black heart in a
white skin, or a white heart in a black one?" (12). Wilson rejects, however, these kinds of
transpositions, which smack of a racialist religious construction of discontinuity between the
(black) skin and the (white) heart. Instead, Wilson at the outset of her novel establishes
"blackness" purely as a function of societal structures, when she depicts Frado’s mother Mag as
falling under the curse of blackness by virtue of her sexual and social trespasses. In effectually
tracing the social blackening of a white woman so comprehensive her abjection proves
indistinguishable from racial abjection, Wilson sets the stage for the mulatta Frado’s parallel
blackening at the hands of her white tormenters.
The first two chapters of Our Nig trace the descent of Mag Smith, white mother of Frado,
from a "loving, trusting" young woman "early deprived of parental guardianship," to an angry,
hostile societal outcast. Triggered by a conventional scenario of seduction and abandonment,
Mag's slow descent "down the ladder of infamy" begins irrespective of racial considerations. In
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fact, the reader does not even learn Mag's racial identity until four pages into her abbreviated
story, at which point she describes to the "kind-hearted African" Jim her state of abjection in
terms of bodily contamination: "Folks seem as afraid to come here as if they expected to get
some awful disease. I do n't believe there is a person in the world but would be glad to have me
dead and out of the way" (9). Wholly prior to her entertaining the "evils of amalgamation" (13)
by marrying Jim, Mag has thus already obtained to a racialized status of degradation: she lives in
a "hut" by herself, is "above no drudgery" (8), and poses a social threat construed as biological
contamination. It only remains for Mag, through "her union with a black," to initiate "the climax
of repulsion" which "expelled" her forever "from companionship with white people" (15).
"'Blackened' by her 'fallenness' and contaminated by her intercourse with black men" ("Beyond"
197), Mag's character highlights the phenomenal quality of racial categories and anticipates
Frado’s education into a socially-constructed racial status.
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese notes that "[n]ormally the critics who write about mulatto
heroines do not include Frado" (42), and I would argue this neglect stems from Frado's own
process of progressive racial abjection, which moves her forward on a continuum of "blackness"
that corresponds with her perceived economic potential and sexual threat. When Frado,
abandoned at age six by her impoverished parents to the tyranny of the white Bellmont
household, first encounters the amiable Bellmont son Jack, he remarks, "She's real handsome and
bright, and not very black, either" (25). In response to Frado’s disruptive evidence of racial
whiteness, the despotic Mrs. Bellmont works to activate her latent melanin and thereby confirm
her status as black and economically available (and sexually unavailable): Frado thus "was never
permitted to shield her skin from the sun [....] Mrs. Bellmont was determined the sun should have
full power to darken the shade which nature had first bestowed upon her as best fitting" (39).
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Just as the townspeople determine to punish Mag for her transgression of the moral order,
so Mrs. Bellmont seeks to punish Frado for her racial transgression—the scandal of her having
skin "not many shades darker" than Mrs. Bellmont's daughter Mary (39). Frado's resilient traces
of racial whiteness, then, invoke the more emphatic blackening, a move which underscores the
social construction of her racial status. In this sense, as Fox-Genovese points out, Frado's
abjection fits within the normative miscegenationist structure for, her "enslavement did follow
the condition of the mother" (42). Frado, though of biracial origins, and Mag, though of white
origins, "are" black because, for Wilson, blackness results from the cultural superimposition of
abjection on any given body.
Mrs. Bellmont's escalating insistence on registering Frado's 'essential' blackness
neutralizes Frado's ostensible movement towards the physical and spiritual maturation which
characterize the domestic bildungsroman. Cummins' Gertrude and Stowe's Topsy both
purportedly originate as physically and morally distasteful figures whose transformation stems
from an awakened impulse to pursue goodness. Although Gertrude's declared unattractiveness
proves something of a sleight of hand and Topsy's domesticated body lies beyond the pale of
Stowe's imaginative representation, in both cases spiritual development connotes a material
transfiguration, and the two work together to generate the narrative movement. Frado, by
contrast, enters the narrative as "a beautiful mulatto, with long, curly black hair, and handsome,
roguish eyes" (17), and the more "handsome" (70) she becomes as she matures, the more
viciously Mrs. Bellmont ravages her body, once vowing, "I'll not leave much of her beauty to be
seen, if she comes in my sight" (47). She likewise threatens to "take the skin from her body"
(46), as if, in Frado's case, the removal of the compromised mulatto skin would disclose an
unequivocally black interior. In keeping with the racial prejudice that construed the black body
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as an extension of an essential "black" interior, Mrs. Bellmont attempts to force evidence of
Frado's inherent abjection from the inside out. With the blossoming of Frado's sensual appeal
and, in turn, religious sensibilities, Mrs. Bellmont forces her back down the steps of growth that
mark maturation and conversion narratives.
In Mrs. Bellmont’s eyes, mulatto beauty thus proves threatening because it threatens to
disguise Frado's interior "blackness" and obliterate the mistress’s claims to control of the body.
Eroticism and spirituality111 for Mrs. Bellmont have no place in the black body, and their
appearance in Frado necessitates radical suppression, constant reminders that Frado's
"whiteness," whether in terms of phenotype or Christian behavior, has no bearing on her latent
abject "nature." Hence, when Frado begins to give evidence at church meetings that "a heavenly
Messenger was striving with her" (86) and commences examinations of conscience and a
devoted reading of Scripture, Mrs. Bellmont forbids her reading the Bible or further attending
church. Mrs. Bellmont, the narrative reports, "did not feel responsible for her spiritual culture,
and hardly believed she had a soul" (86). She instructs Frado that "it would do no good for her to
attempt prayer; prayer was for whites, not for blacks'" (94).
Because Mrs. Bellmont works to force from Frado's body the expression of a racial
interior, Frado, like Griffith's Amy and Stowe's Topsy before her, has difficulty believing in the
separability of soul from body and therefore receiving the Christian message predicated on that
solution to the problem of black bodies. Guided by the tutelage of the good-hearted Aunt Abby,
Mr. Bellmont's sister, and the local pastor, Frado "became a believer in a future existence" (84).
But her faith concerns the destiny of "all good white people," while she continues to doubt, "is
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there a heaven for the black?" (84). When the kindly minister invites, "all, young or old, white or
black, bond or free" to come "to Christ for pardon," this proclamation of spiritual equality "was
the message she longed to hear" (85). In this recognition of spiritual equality, of the potential
"whiteness" of all souls, lay white antislavery writers' remedy to Mrs. Bellmont's brand of
racism.
For someone like Stowe, and for the kindly Bellmont characters in the novel, the solution
to Frado's black body lies with being good, the potential whitening of her soul. As the devout
Christian James Bellmont gently charges Frado on his death bed, "if you will be a good girl, and
love and serve God, it will be but a short time before we are in a heavenly home together" (95,
author's emphasis). While, I would argue, Our Nig does not come out strongly either in favor of
or against Christianity, a point critics have argued extensively,112 Wilson does out of hand reject
the racialized Christian narrative of transcendence of the black body through interior whitening
or exterior suffering. Frado experiences both, but, as she sobs to James after he tells her to "try
to be a good girl" (50), "If I do, I get whipped" (51). This disturbing contradiction captures
Wilson’s challenge to the notion that moral strivings can tap into a metaphysical alterity (the
white soul) and trump social conditions. Instead, Frado's abjection increases in proportion to her

112

In Resistance and Reformation, John Ernest suggests that Our Nig represents the fruits of Wilson’s "fully realized

and hard-earned Christian perspective," p. 77. Few critics, however, read the novel’s treatment of Christianity this
positively. Cynthia Davis argues that "Harriet Wilson and her Frado are ‘saved’ not through religion but through
speech itself," adding that they "speak of themselves and their own agony—not of God and His glory," p. 396. In
this vein, Barbara Krah notes that "an apologetic tone is entirely missing" from Wilson’s "account of Frado’s ‘unChristian feelings toward her oppressors," which leads her to conclude that "Wilson rejects the conventional image
of the pious Christian for herself and her protagonist," p. 473.

258

whiteness, both racial and "moral," and the antislavery message, while it seeks to undermine the
basis for slavery, retains the premise of essential created difference that Wilson rejects.
Wilson's most cogent challenge to the narrative of racial essentialism occurs in a catechetical
exchange between Frado and James, in which, after lamenting her condition of perpetual
chastisement, Frado inquires, "Who made me so?" James answers, "God," and Frado proceeds
to ask after the creator of various individuals, ending with "your mother" (51). James affirms
that God made his mother as well, to which Frado concludes, "Well, then, I don't like him [....]
Because he made her white, and me black. Why didn't he make us both white?" (51, author's
emphasis). James can only respond, "I don't know," and remains troubled for several days
afterward (51). James' inability to explain why God would create a fundamentally disadvantaged
human body whose inherent abjection invited the exploitation of the advantaged race exists as
Wilson's implicit critique of a racialized Christianity, of any extra-cultural significance of
blackness.
The gospel of the separability of body and soul, for Frado, provides no avenue for a
movement towards sainthood; though mulatta, she serves like her mother as a stand-in for the
doubly-corporealized black woman cut off in both directions from the sacralization of the body.
And unlike Topsy, who can transcend her corporealization at least through the representative
disappearance of her body from the text, Frado's body, increasingly brutalized and damaged,
becomes heavier and heavier in narrative import. And its foregrounded suffering dramatizes the
reason behind the problematic exclusion of the black female body from the racialized Christian
heroics of a figure like Uncle Tom.
Uncle Tom's transcendence of his black body depends on the rending of that body so that
his blood speaks his saintly interior. The more spectacular his bodily mortification, the more
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emphatic his millennial role in illustrating the peculiar spiritual gift of "bleeding Africa."
Authors like Stowe refrained from placing the female body at the center of this scenario for fear
of a scandalous interfusion of the exposed body's spiritual power with an invitation towards
sexual degradation, a violation of the body that could mutually penetrate the souls of victim and
viewer/aggressor. Frado stands at this fatal intersection of gender and race, but not in the terms
that Stowe imagined. Frado's exploitation denies altogether the aesthetics of spectacle, with its
risk of sensual pollution; her tortures do not expand her body, either efficaciously or
perniciously. Instead, they compress and contract her, rendering her at once unreadable and
inassimilable through non-spectacular sexualized violence.
Phyllis Cole remarks on the "flatly told episodes" in which Mrs. Bellmont wedges open
Frado's mouth with a piece of wood as "more disturbing than the grotesque bloodiness of
Abolitionist whipping scenes" (38). The sense of horror generated by these scenes exceeds those
of spectacle because representations of the flaying of a body purport to exhaust the
representation of the torture. In this sense "Abolitionist whipping scenes," though gruesome,
suggest a full exposure and therefore containment of pain. Furthermore, the exteriorized torture
of the lash invites a contrasting representation of interior immunity, a limit to the victimizer's
jurisdiction over the victim: as Uncle Tom declares to Legree, "No! no! no! my soul an't yours,
Mas'r! [...] no matter, no matter, you can't harm me!" (508). By contrast, Mrs. Bellmont
penetrates the body's interior and cuts off any expression of pain, leaving the violation
unbounded: on one occasion, "Mrs. B. and Mary commenced beating [Frado] inhumanly, then
propping her mouth open with a piece of wood, shut her up in a dark room, without any supper"
(35). In another instance, Mrs. Bellmont forced "the wedge of wood between her teeth" and "beat
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her cruelly with the raw-hide," insisting to Aunt Abby that the wood remain in place until she
permit otherwise (93).
Propping a mouth open with wood denotes sadistic intent, and Cassandra Jackson
effectively argues for same-sex rape as a strong explanation for "the novel's omissions" (156),
including Wilson's prefacing statement, "I have purposely omitted things that would most
provoke shame in our good anti-slavery friends at home" (qtd. in 156).113 If gender and race
doubly corporealize the black female body in antebellum representations, rendering it invisible
on a spiritual plane, how much more so same-sex rape, an act which Jackson points out was
"culturally and legally invisible in the period" (159). Furthermore, by forcing the wood to remain
wedged inside Frado's mouth, Mrs. Bellmont creates a visible continuity between her indentured
chattel and a material object, implying her limitless jurisdiction over Frado's body.
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The gaze of Mrs. Bellmont's "fiery eyes" has penetrated too deeply for Frado to stake her
hopes on a future extraction of her soul from the abjection of her body. As a consequence, in a
truly astonishing passage, Frado chooses to reject and actively resist the trajectory and teleology
of the domestic bildungsroman:
Frado pondered; her mistress was a professor of religion; was she going to
heaven? then she did not wish to go. If she should be near James, even, she could
not be happy with those fiery eyes watching her ascending path. She resolved to
give over all thought of future world, and strove daily to put her [spiritual] anxiety
far from her. (104, author's emphasis)
To "give over all thought of the future world" constitutes an absolute reversal of the thrust of
both black and white-authored anti-slavery literature of the period. And Wilson provides no
narrative commentary on Frado's decision; rather, she shortly follows this decision with Frado's
first gesture of defiance toward Mrs. Bellmont's control of her body: "'Stop!' shouted Frado,
'strike me, and I'll never work a mite more for you'" (105).
Frado's thorough corporealization, her necessity of inhabiting a body whose abjection
extends to that body's interior, precludes her successful development along the lines of
maturation and conversion. In response, she defies the narrative that separates out the corporeal
from the incorporeal, body from soul. As a result, the apocalyptic margins of final judgment
collapse into the space of her own private vengeance. When Mary Bellmont dies from a
sustained illness, Frado can hardly contain her ecstasy: "S'posen she goes to hell," she tells the
horrified Aunt Abby, "she'll be as black as I am. Would n't mistress be mad to see her a nigger!"
(107). Rather than using Mary's death to dilate upon the metaphysical significance of Mary's
cruelty and the infinite horror of a lost soul, Frado contracts Mary's soul into the boundaries of
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her own experience of a damned body. Rather than picturing Mary in the tortures of eternal fire,
Frado only imagines Mary being "as black as" she is—as meriting the torturous experience of the
body which Frado has unjustly born. As Frado imagines it, Mary’s experience of the afterlife is
not that of the soul’s release from the body into its spiritual fate (however painful), but,
horrifically, the soul’s entrapment in a humiliating physical badge of depravity. Hell for Mary is
simply Frado’s life on earth. Mrs. Bellmont, likewise, receives a temporal redaction of divine
judgment when she dies, as Frado has lived, "after an agony [...] unspeakable" (130). Wilson
leaves Frado's impious comments and the Bellmont women's temporal punishments to speak for
themselves, and together they force an encounter with the costs of denigrating the black female
body, even and especially in the interests of the soul. For Frado, as Wilson depicts it, this cost
consists in the loss of a spiritual horizon—a loss that Frado embraces because it frees her to
concentrate on the increasingly debilitating needs of her ineffaceable body.
Our Nig by no means constitutes a triumphal counter-narrative to sentimental antislavery
writing; rather it simply and tenaciously clings in the cracks between the stories of conversions,
transformations, and escapes. Frado does not achieve a counter-transcendence through rejecting
a metaphysical significance to her black body; her first gesture of defiance toward Mrs. Bellmont
proves her last. Body broken by years of chattel laboring, even after her indenture she remains
sporadically and increasingly dependent on local charity, including the Bellmonts'. Towards the
conclusion of the novel, as fiction dissolves into autobiography (Gates and Ellis xxxv), Wilson
reveals the ongoing toll of inhabiting a body marked by abjection, as one effort after another
towards independence leaves her deteriorating in health and hope. Unable to transcend or barter
her exhausted body, Wilson offers her text for consumption in its place (Henderson 40).
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Ultimately, for Wilson blackness and damnation are synonymous, and both are what people do to
you and take from you.
Harriet Beecher Stowe believed in the power of pictures to indisputably mediate truth,
and in Uncle Tom’s Cabin she composed verbal tableaus that reinforced entrenched cultural
assumptions about the degraded attributes of racial blackness. Stowe did not attempt to
undermine the notion of black physical inferiority because, like most white Americans of her
day, she took black bodies’ surface opacity and distinguishing features as evidence of
degeneration from the superior Caucasian phenotype. At the same time, however, Stowe
believed ardently in the equality of souls across racial lines, and was mortified by what she saw
as white exploitation of the vulnerability endemic to racial blackness. She accordingly
determined to rewrite the narrative of the abject African race in terms that would herald that
people’s role in saving not only their own souls from the clutch of depraved bodies but the souls
of whites depraved by spiritual blackness. The result of her efforts—Uncle Tom’s Cabin—
celebrates racial abjection as the lowly path to crucifixion and redemption—a path that only one
race could take.
This path proved, however, not only racially specific but gender specific. Stowe could
not visualize a black female version of redemptive suffering that did not also conjure longstanding associations of the black woman’s body with overt sexuality, whether as subject or
object of lust. The conditions of Stowe’s innovative aesthetic thus barred the black woman from
figuring as an agent of sentimental conversion. She could not—like Eva, Judd’s Margaret, or
Cummins’ Gertrude— play the organic angel and mediate the Gospel through the aesthetic and
erotic appeal of the flesh. She could, like Topsy, be converted, but this process necessitated a
visual banishment of the body, an impossibility in the context of iconic bodily suffering. In this
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sense, Stowe’s novel created the aesthetic conditions that lead logically to Harriet Wilson’s Our
Nig, which follows the fortunes of a young black woman who not only cannot convert others but
also cannot herself be converted. What Stowe would perhaps not have anticipated is the way
that Wilson would allow her heroine’s entrapment to contract the boundaries of the narrative
itself, ultimately entrapping the reader in a world whose horizons fail to extend beyond a
relentless and mundane struggle for survival.
The sentimental aesthetic of conversion, centered on the naturalized spirituality of the
organic angel, itself represented a contraction of narrative possibility, as it confined divine action
to beneficent human influence. As Stowe reflected on the tenacious expansion of slavery in a
country dedicated, as she understood it, to Christian principles, the hope that liberal Christian
aesthetics could effect spiritual transformation across the nation—that a gentle Gospel would
irresistibly turn the tide of hearts—grew dim. The all-sufficient influence of the organic angel
seemed inadequate in the face of such widespread concessions to the ugly realities of slavery.
Because slavery had forced into the foreground the exploitation of black bodies, Stowe
developed a racially-specific conversion iconography informed by the power of this disturbing
image. Ultimately the dual aesthetics of Uncle Tom’s Cabin would help usher in the kind of
savage "divine" reprisal Stowe at once invoked and hoped the novel could forestall, pointing to
both the power and the limits of sentimental conversion aesthetics.
But Stowe’s crafting of a racialized icon in the figure of Uncle Tom disclosed a
preexisting racially-specific construction to the organic angel herself, and therefore to an
American Christianity whose race-based theological aesthetic would wreak havoc long after the
Civil War. Blackness complicated representations of divinized feminine influence because in the
white imagination it typified sexuality absent the sacralizing presence of transparent beauty.
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Antebellum novelists experimenting with the power of feminine beauty to effect spiritual
transformation had a delicate task in evoking the eroticism of the maturing female body without
representing that energy as directed towards sexual ends. For authors like Stowe, the developing
black female stood in direct opposition to this projection, in that her body could not be
reconfigured as suffused with divine light or stamped with divine beauty—it could only call
attention to itself as object. And not as aesthetic object inviting veneration, but as chattel object,
inviting sexual and economic exploitation.
This confusion of aesthetics, ideology, and theology dictates the material circumstances
and moral possibilities for Wilson’s Frado and, by extension, the peculiar narrative shape of the
novel. The dramatic movement of the 19th century sentimental novel depended on the
maturation and conversion of the heroine, whose role as an organic angel illustrated the
consonance of natural and spiritual processes. What Our Nig ultimately suggests is that, for the
black woman, racialized Christianity can destroy both.
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